Since 1945, the authorities of Russia and Japan have not been able to sign a peace treaty because of a dispute over the ownership of the southern part of the Kuril Islands.

The Northern Territories Issue (北方領土問題 Hoppo: ryō:do mondai) is a territorial dispute between Japan and Russia that Japan considers unresolved since the end of World War II. After the war, all the Kuril Islands came under the administrative control of the USSR, but a number of the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir and the Lesser Kuril Ridge - are disputed by Japan.

In Russia, the disputed territories are part of the Kuril and Yuzhno-Kuril urban districts of the Sakhalin region. Japan lays claim to four islands in the southern part of the Kuril chain - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai, referring to the bilateral Treatise on Trade and Borders of 1855. Moscow's position is that the southern Kuriles became part of the USSR (of which Russia became the successor) according to the results of the Second World War, and Russian sovereignty over them, which has the appropriate international legal design, is beyond doubt.

The problem of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands is the main obstacle to the complete settlement of Russian-Japanese relations.

Iturup(Jap. 択捉島 Etorofu) is an island of the southern group of the Great Ridge of the Kuril Islands, the largest island of the archipelago.

Kunashir(Ainu Black Island, Japanese 国後島 Kunashiri-to:) is the southernmost island of the Great Kuril Islands.

Shikotan(Jap. 色丹島 Sikotan-to: ?, in early sources Sikotan; name from the Ainu language: "shi" - large, significant; "kotan" - village, city) - the largest island of the Lesser Ridge of the Kuril Islands.

Habomai(Jap. 歯舞群島 Habomai-gunto ?, Suisho, “Flat Islands”) is the Japanese name for a group of islands in the northwest Pacific Ocean, together with Shikotan Island in Soviet and Russian cartography, considered as the Lesser Kuril Ridge. The Habomai group includes the islands of Polonsky, Oskolki, Zeleny, Tanfiliev, Yuri, Demin, Anuchin and a number of small ones. Separated by the Soviet Strait from the island of Hokkaido.

History of the Kuril Islands

17th century
Before the arrival of the Russians and the Japanese, the islands were inhabited by the Ainu. In their language, “kuru” meant “a person who came from nowhere,” from which their second name “smokers” came from, and then the name of the archipelago.

In Russia, the first mention of the Kuril Islands dates back to 1646, when N. I. Kolobov spoke about the bearded people inhabiting the islands Ainakh.

The Japanese first received information about the islands during an expedition [source not specified 238 days] to Hokkaido in 1635. It is not known whether she actually got to the Kuriles or learned about them indirectly, but in 1644 a map was drawn up on which they were designated under the collective name "thousand islands". Candidate of Geographical Sciences T. Adashova notes that the map of 1635 "is considered by many scientists to be very approximate and even incorrect." Then, in 1643, the islands were surveyed by the Dutch, led by Martin Fries. This expedition made more detailed maps and described the lands.

18th century
In 1711, Ivan Kozyrevsky went to the Kuriles. He visited only 2 northern islands: Shumshu and Paramushir, but he asked in detail the Ainu and Japanese who inhabited them and the Japanese brought there by a storm. In 1719, Peter I sent an expedition to Kamchatka led by Ivan Evreinov and Fyodor Luzhin, which reached Simushir Island in the south.

In 1738-1739, Martyn Spanberg walked along the entire ridge, putting the islands he met on the map. In the future, the Russians, avoiding dangerous voyages to the southern islands, mastered the northern ones, taxed the local population with yasak. From those who did not want to pay it and went to distant islands, they took amanats - hostages from among close relatives. But soon, in 1766, the centurion Ivan Cherny from Kamchatka was sent to the southern islands. He was ordered to attract the Ainu into citizenship without the use of violence and threats. However, he did not follow this decree, mocked them, poached. All this led to a rebellion of the indigenous population in 1771, during which many Russians were killed.

Great success was achieved by the Siberian nobleman Antipov with the Irkutsk translator Shabalin. They managed to win the favor of the Kuril people, and in 1778-1779 they managed to bring into citizenship more than 1500 people from Iturup, Kunashir and even Matsumaya (now Japanese Hokkaido). In the same 1779, Catherine II by decree freed those who accepted Russian citizenship from all taxes. But relations were not built with the Japanese: they forbade the Russians to go to these three islands.

In the "Extensive land description of the Russian state ..." of 1787, a list was given from the 21st island belonging to Russia. It included islands up to Matsumaya (Hokkaido), whose status was not clearly defined, since Japan had a city in its southern part. At the same time, the Russians had no real control even over the islands south of Urup. There, the Japanese considered the Kurilians their subjects, actively used violence against them, which caused discontent. In May 1788, a Japanese merchant ship that had come to Matsumai was attacked. In 1799, by order of the central government of Japan, two outposts were founded on Kunashir and Iturup, and guards began to be constantly guarded.

19th century
In 1805, a representative of the Russian-American Company, Nikolai Rezanov, who arrived in Nagasaki as the first Russian envoy, tried to resume negotiations on trade with Japan. But he also failed. However, the Japanese officials, who were not satisfied with the despotic policy of the supreme power, hinted to him that it would be nice to carry out a forceful action in these lands, which could push the situation off the ground. This was carried out on behalf of Rezanov in 1806-1807 by an expedition of two ships led by Lieutenant Khvostov and midshipman Davydov. Ships were plundered, a number of trading posts were destroyed, and a Japanese village was burned on Iturup. Later they were tried, but the attack for some time led to a serious deterioration in Russian-Japanese relations. In particular, this was the reason for the arrest of Vasily Golovnin's expedition.

In exchange for the right to own southern Sakhalin, Russia transferred to Japan in 1875 all the Kuril Islands.

20th century
After the defeat in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia transferred the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan.
In February 1945, the Soviet Union promised the United States and Great Britain to start a war with Japan on the condition that Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands be returned to it.
February 2, 1946. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the inclusion of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in the RSFSR.
1947. Deportation of Japanese and Ainu from the islands to Japan. Displaced 17,000 Japanese and an unknown number of Ainu.
November 5, 1952. A powerful tsunami hit the entire coast of the Kuriles, Paramushir suffered the most. A giant wave washed away the city of Severo-Kurilsk (formerly Kasivabara). The press was forbidden to mention this catastrophe.
In 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan agreed to a Joint Treaty formally ending the war between the two states and ceding Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. Signing the treaty, however, failed: the United States threatened not to give Japan the island of Okinawa if Tokyo renounces its claims to Iturup and Kunashir.

Maps of the Kuril Islands

The Kuril Islands on an English map of 1893. Plans of the Kuril Islands, from sketches chiefly mand by Mr. H. J. Snow, 1893. (London, Royal Geographical Society, 1897, 54×74 cm)

Map fragment Japan and Korea - Location of Japan in the Western Pacific (1:30,000,000), 1945

Photomap of the Kuril Islands based on a NASA space image, April 2010.

List of all islands

View of Habomai from Hokkaido
Green Island (志発島 Shibotsu-to)
Polonsky Island (Jap. 多楽島 Taraku-to)
Tanfiliev Island (Jap. 水晶島 Suisho-jima)
Yuri Island (勇留島 Yuri-to)
Anuchina Island
Demina Islands (Japanese: 春苅島 Harukari-to)
Shard Islands
Kira Rock
Rock Cave (Kanakuso) - a rookery of sea lions on a rock.
Sail Rock (Hokoki)
Candle Rock (Rosoku)
Fox Islands (Todo)
Bump Islands (Kabuto)
Can Dangerous
Watchtower Island (Homosiri or Muika)

Drying Rock (Odoke)
Reef Island (Amagi-sho)
Signal Island (Jap. 貝殻島 Kaigara-jima)
Amazing Rock (Hanare)
Seagull Rock

From the editors of "Russia Forever":At the end of 2016, the Kuril problem in relations between the Russian Federation and Japan became extremely urgent again. It is not even the long-term systemic and strategic persistence of Japanese diplomacy that is striking, but the acceptability of the logic of certain compromises on our part in the issue of the South Kuriles.

If at the beginning of 2016 the Kremlin declared that the issue of the islands of the South Kuril ridge was closed, and Russian sovereignty over them was not in doubt, then in September a new formula appeared:Kuriles in exchange for close cooperationas it was done with China. The Russian leader openly stressed that in exchange for economic cooperation, we gave up the territory that had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR since 1929. And if Japan is ready to cooperate, then it can get the lands that belonged to it until 1945 - a deal with China became possible "against the very high level of trust that had developed between Russia and China by that time. And if we achieve the same high level confidence with Japan, then here we can findsomecompromises."

But it was the territorial deal with China in 2004 that immediately launched a new round of Japanese demands on Russia as a potentially successful event with due diplomatic perseverance in bargaining and consistent media aggression on the issue of territorial claims.

Here is a detailed analysis of the history of the Kuril issue and the problem of bilateral relations caused by the territorial claims of Japan, considered from the point of view of Russia's national interests, published in 2005, but extremely revealing from today.

Then, in 2004-2005, there was a landmark stage of the aforementioned aggravation of Japanese claims to the Kuriles, but a decade has passed, and things are still there? Or already... - the reader can judge for himself whether the Russian position in defense of its territorial sovereignty has now strengthened?

Article "The 'Kuril Problem' and Russia's National Interests"published in: Bulletin of the Pacific State Economic University. 2005. No. 4. S. 106-124.

In Russian-Japanese relations, the year 2005 was marked by a number of memorable dates. This is the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the 100th anniversary of the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the 60th anniversary of the victory over Japan in World War II. All these dates are connected with the most acute problem of bilateral relations caused by Japan's territorial claims.

The unexpected transfer of 2.5 Russian islands to China (1), the statements of V. Putin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov about the possibility of transferring Shikotan and the Habomai ridge to Japan, the visit of the President of the Russian Federation to Japan in 2005 again exacerbated the issue of the so-called "northern territories". As the well-known researcher B.I. Tkachenko notes, “the basis for the correct solution of the“ Kuril problem ”and other problems in the field of international relations should be the national interests of Russia, the Russian people - the current and future generations of Russian citizens, of course, in dialectical harmony with the norms international law and on the basis of assessments of the effectiveness of foreign policy and specific foreign policy measures, directions and doctrines of foreign policy ...

The duty of historians, together with international lawyers, is to comprehensively and reasonably show the Russian and international public the illegality of Japanese claims to the Russian Far Eastern territories - the Kuriles and South Sakhalin.

What are these islands, how legitimate are Japan's claims, and what is Russia's national interest?

Usually they talk about Japan's claims to four islands: Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai. However, this is not entirely true. The Kuril Islands consist of two parallel ridges of islands - the Greater Kuril (divided into 3 groups: southern, middle and northern) and the Lesser Kuril. The large islands of Iturup (length about 200 km, area - 6725 km²) and Kunashir (length - 123 km, area - 1550 km²) belong to the southern group of the Great Kuril ridge. The Lesser Kuril Ridge consists of 6 small islands: Shikotan, Zeleny, Anuchin, Polonsky, Yuri, Tanfilyev, as well as small reef groups of islands included in this ridge: Demina, Lisya, Shishki; islands Signalny, Storozhevoy and surface rocks Cave and Surprising.

The islands of the Lesser Kuril Range, with the exception of the largest Shikotan (average size - 28 × 10 km, area - 182 km²), the Japanese call Habomai, after the name of the village in the eastern part of the island. Hokkaido. Their total area is about 200 km². The Lesser Kuril Ridge is extended 105.5 km to the northeast, counting from the extreme eastern cape of Hokkaido, in a line parallel to the Greater Kuril Ridge 48 km south of the latter. Thus, even without counting the small islands, Japan disputes not 4, but 8 islands, which even psychologically significantly changes the situation.

The Kuril Islands are of strategic importance for maintaining the defense capability, preserving the guarantees of sovereignty and independence, and the national security of Russia. All the straits leading from the Sea of ​​Okhotsk to the Pacific Ocean pass through the Kuril Islands. In the event of the transfer of Iturup and Kunashir to Japan, it will fully control the Catherine Strait. Through it, free, unhindered and uncontrolled passage of submarines of the US and Japanese navies will be fully realized. This, in turn, will reduce the combat stability of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and, above all, nuclear submarines. According to military experts, the loss of at least part of the Kuriles will lead to violations of the military infrastructure and the integrity of the unified strategic defense in the Russian Far East.

Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan have naturally prepared areas for the deployment of armed forces, especially missile defense systems. The deep-water Kasatka Bay on Iturup is a unique place in military-strategic terms: here in 1941 the Japanese Navy was able to covertly place itself before a surprise attack on the US fleet in Hawaii (Pearl Harbor). The same territories can be used militarily against the Russian Pacific Fleet with equal success.

From the point of view of geopolitics, the main wealth of any country is land, since the population of the planet is constantly growing, and resources are limited. The area of ​​the South Kuril Islands is more than 8600 km², which is several times larger than Luxembourg and roughly corresponds to the area of ​​Cyprus, Lebanon, Jamaica. Therefore, the importance of this subregion will only increase. And if we take into account the continental shelf and sea areas, then the area of ​​the South Kuriles subregion significantly exceeds the territories of many European states (2). In addition, the South Kuril Islands are a completely unique combination of natural, recreational and territorial resources.

Speaking about the important economic significance of these islands, it should be noted that 65 thousand hectares are reserved lands. Wild, almost untouched nature, hot mineral springs and balneological mud make it possible to use these territories as a recreation and tourism zone, as well as medical and recreational activities. The southern islands of the Kuril archipelago are covered with forests (spruce, fir, velvet, etc.), suitable, especially in Kunashir, for use as timber. Fur-bearing animals (mink, fox, beaver, etc.), rookeries of sea animals (fur seals, seals, sea lions, etc.), bird nests are of high economic value. The water area adjacent to the islands is rich in various hydrobionts, the area is promising for mariculture and the production of seaweed. It has the richest concentrations of red algae in the world, accounting for 89% of the reserves of the entire Far East region used for biotechnology.

The nature of the Southern Kuriles is unique. In a relatively small area, the reserves of marine bioresources reach 5 million tons, which makes it possible to annually catch up to 1.5 million tons of fish, including valuable species, and, according to some estimates, can bring Russia up to 4 billion US dollars a year .

Fish processing plays a major role in the economy of the islands. The leading and largest enterprise in this industry in the Far East, ZAO Ostrovnoy Fish Processing Plant, is located on Shikotan. CJSC Krabozavodsky is also located here. Yuzhno-Kurilsky Kombinat LLC operates in Kunashir, and the Kuril Fish Factory works in Iturup.

In addition, the Japanese have long appreciated the colossal importance of other economic resources. The islands disputed by them are the richest sources of minerals. The valuation of only explored reserves and probable resources of gold is approximately 1.2 billion US dollars, silver - 3.4 billion (at world market prices at the beginning of 1988). The total cost estimate of the predicted resources of copper, zinc and lead is $9.7 billion, sulfur is $5.6 billion. The total explored mineral reserves in the South Kuriles, without reserves of titanomagnetites, are estimated at world prices at least at $45.8 billion USD .

The main mineral resource of the South Kuril shelf is titanomagnetite ores in the form of placers with an admixture of rare earth elements. According to the Institute of Mining of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, from titanium-magnetite raw materials only in the hall. Prostor at Iturup can produce final products in the form of metallic titanium, iron powder and vanadium (excluding rare earths) with a total value of 2252.277 billion US dollars. at world market prices in 1992. In addition, Iturup has the only deposit of rhenium - a rare "space" metal, 1 kg of which costs 3600 US dollars.

Among other things, according to the weekly "Arguments and Facts", the richest oil deposits worth tens of billions of dollars are hidden in the shelf of the South Kuriles, there are gas reserves. Hydrocarbon reserves on the continental shelf are estimated at 1.6 billion tons of standard fuel. According to preliminary estimates, the entire complex of natural resources of the South Kuril subregion is at least 2.5 trillion. USD .

Thus, the economic and military-strategic value of these territories, which some forces are trying to present as bare rocks, cannot be overestimated.

Disputes about the "originality" of these territories are pointless and counterproductive. The indigenous population of the Kuriles, like Hokkaido, were the Ainu (Kuril race), who did not have their own statehood. Japan and Russia began the development of these territories at about the same time. Until 1855, there was no officially established border between the two powers, and each of them considered the Kuriles to be its territory.

This state of affairs led to various conflicts. Thus, the famous Russian navigator Vice-Admiral V. M. Golovnin, who made two round-the-world voyages (in 1807-1809 on the Diana and in 1817-1819 on the Kamchatka), was captured during the exploration of the Kuriles on Kunashir the Japanese. Together with him, 8 crew members were captured. The future corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1818) spent 26 months in Japanese captivity (1811-1813) and was released only after news of Russia's victory over Napoleon reached Japan.

The Russian government has repeatedly offered Japan to sign a border treaty, but Japan has consistently refused. Only during the hardest Crimean War for Russia (1853-1856), when Russia waged an unequal struggle against England, France, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia, Japan considered that the time had come for territorial demarcation. It should be noted that during this war Japan provided its bases to the Anglo-French squadron for attacks on Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and actually threatened Russia with joining the enemy coalition. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Russian mission (headed by Vice Admiral E.V. Putyatin), having lost the Diana frigate in a shipwreck, found itself in a difficult situation, because it was in danger of colliding with British and French warships, constantly cruising along the Far East coast of Russia.

Under these conditions, on February 7 (today this date in Japan is celebrated as the "Northern Territories Day"), 1855, the Russian-Japanese Treaty "On Trade and Borders" was signed in the Japanese city of Shimoda. It should be noted that, despite the difficult circumstances of the signing of the treaty, it marked the beginning of the establishment of Russian-Japanese diplomatic and trade relations, opened the ports of Shimoda, Hakodate and Nagasaki for Russian ships. It is important to emphasize that the first article of this document proclaimed "eternal peace" between our countries. The agreement established the border between the islands of Urup and Iturup, Sakhalin was declared "undivided". Thus, the South Kuriles, which she now claims, went to Japan, and the rest of the Kuril Islands became the territory of Russia.

The next bilateral treaty on territorial delimitation was concluded only 20 years later. During this time, the situation has changed significantly. In 1867, accelerated modernization began in Japan, known as the "Meiji revolution", there was a transition from isolationism to a policy of active expansion. However, an attempt that same year to send 300 Japanese colonists to Sakhalin ended in failure. At the same time, Russia was successfully developing Sakhalin, gaining a foothold in Primorye and the Amur region, but the European (Balkan) direction remained the main one for it. Russia was preparing for a war with the Ottoman Empire in order to take revenge for the heavy defeat in the Crimean War, restore its authority, liberate the fraternal Slavic and Orthodox peoples from Turkish oppression and strengthen its influence in this region. For the sake of solving this main task, Russia was ready to make significant sacrifices, especially since there were clearly not enough resources for all areas. So, in 1867, Russia sold Alaska to the United States for a symbolic price with the right to buy it after 100 years.

Against this background, on April 25 (May 7), 1875, a new Russian-Japanese treaty was concluded in St. Petersburg. According to the Petersburg Treatise, Russia exchanged 18 central and northern Kuril Islands for Japan's rights to Sakhalin. The Petersburg Treaty, as noted by Yu. Georgievsky, Candidate of Historical Sciences, author of the book "The Kuriles - Islands in the Ocean of Problems", is the only historical example in Russian-Japanese relations of a cardinal solution of the territorial problem by peaceful means on the basis of mutual concessions and with maximum consideration of the strategic interests of the parties on that moment .

However, in the future, the geopolitical interests of the two powers increasingly contradicted each other. The onset of the imperialist era of the military redistribution of the world was marked in relations between the two countries by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. It should be emphasized that the aggressor was Japan, which attacked Russia without declaring war. Despite the fact that the Japanese did not manage to win a complete victory, this war was unsuccessful for our country. A series of serious defeats "from a backward Asian country" and dissatisfaction in society with the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty led to the revolution of 1905-1907. According to Article 9 of the Peace Treaty, Russia ceded to Japan in perpetual and complete possession of the southern part of Sakhalin Island up to the 50th parallel.

Japan, seeking to justify the demand for the cession of South Sakhalin to it, which clearly contradicted the provisions of the Petersburg Treaty, put forward the thesis that the war crosses out previous international legal agreements, and achieved recognition of this thesis by the Russian delegation. Thus, Annex No. 10 to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty states that as a result of the war, "all trade agreements between Japan and Russia were canceled." Thus, Japan deprived itself of the opportunity to appeal to all treaties concluded before the Second World War. Moreover, by attacking Russia in 1904, Japan grossly violated the "eternal peace" proclaimed in the first article of the Shimoda Treaty, thereby losing the opportunity to refer to this document.

Japan grossly violated the Portsmouth Peace Treaty itself. For example, in April 1918 the Japanese imperialists invaded Vladivostok. In 1918-1925. they occupied and tried to seize Primorye, the Amur Region, Transbaikalia and Northern Sakhalin. Even against the background of other interventionists, the Japanese were distinguished by aggressiveness and cruelty (3).

As the candidates of historical sciences A.M. Ivkova and E.V. Cheberyak rightly note, "Japanese militarism is a monster comparable to Nazism." Back in 1931, the Japanese invaders occupied Manchuria, creating a springboard for further aggression. Thus, two years before A. Hitler came to power, the first hotbed of the Second World War appeared. On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops continued their aggression against China. Already on July 28, 1937, Beijing fell. The invaders behaved extremely cruelly towards the civilian population. So, on December 13, 1937, the Japanese fascists captured Nanking, where they exterminated about 300 thousand people. It should be especially noted that in modern Japan they are trying to hush up these crimes, which can be qualified as genocide against the Chinese people. According to the Kommersant-Vlast magazine, about 10 million civilians were killed in China during the years of Japanese occupation.

It is not surprising that Japan's attempts to rewrite school textbooks, removing these hard facts from them, caused a storm of indignation in the PRC, the Republic of Korea and the DPRK. At the same time, the silence of Russia is surprising. This is all the more strange, since Japanese propaganda, hushing up its crimes and inflating "human rights violations" in relation to the Japanese population of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles and Japanese prisoners of war, seeks to turn the main ally of Nazi Germany into an innocent victim, and the Soviet Union into an aggressor and occupier , who illegally seized "originally Japanese territories." Characteristically, Japanese propaganda, inflating revanchist sentiments towards Russia, simultaneously teaches its citizens to forgive the Americans. But it was the United States that not only bombed and occupied the Japanese islands, but also dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In Hiroshima alone, according to 2004 data, 237,062 inhabitants died (most from radiation sickness). In fact, these were acts of genocide for which the Americans are not going to apologize. Even one of the fathers of the atomic bomb, the Hungarian immigrant physicist Leo Szilard, admitted: “This is a disgusting war crime, an inhuman massacre. If the Germans had done this, we would have tried them in Nuremberg and hanged them. But we got away with everything.”

Now the United States is Japan's main ally, so they are forgiven everything, even hundreds of thousands of mercilessly killed civilians. But Russia is a completely different matter, it does not know how to strictly and consistently protect its national interests, and Japan is not going to forgive anything for it. Therefore, from the entire history of the Second World War, Japanese propaganda seeks out only those facts that suit it and fit into the version of the "illegal seizure of the northern territories." Even the Hiroshima museum gives information that "after the atomic bombing, Stalin treacherously attacked Japan, as a result of which the legitimate Japanese territories were torn away."

As a result of this "study of history", according to the press service of the Hiroshima Prefecture, 25% of Japanese schoolchildren believe that the Soviet Union dropped an atomic bomb on them. If our country continues to take a passive position and do nothing, then soon we will have to justify ourselves for the crimes of others.

Russia and other countries of the anti-fascist coalition should remind the presumptuous falsifiers of history about the real role of Japan in World War II, including the inhuman treatment of prisoners of war, who were cut with samurai swords and who were tested with chemical and biological weapons.

They should also be reminded of the aggression against the USSR in the region of Lake Khasan in July-August 1938, which ended in the defeat of the 19th Japanese division. In May 1939, the Japanese invaders attacked the closest ally of the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic. Under the Mutual Assistance Treaty, the USSR provided military support to the MPR. During the fighting in May-September 1939, the Soviet-Mongolian troops under the leadership of commander G.K. Zhukov completely defeated the invading aggressors. These serious defeats were one of the main reasons why Japan did not dare to attack the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.

During almost the entire Second World War (September 1939 - September 1945) Japan and the Soviet Union were not at war, because. in April 1941, a Neutrality Pact was concluded between them for a period of 5 years. However, both sides viewed this Pact as more of a tactical gain in time. The USSR needed it to concentrate all its forces against Germany, and Japan needed it to continue aggression in the Pacific.

It should be noted that during the Second World War, the Japanese militarists did not stop military provocations. In 1944 alone, about 200 such violations were recorded, including many cases of shelling of Soviet territory. At sea, the aggressor's warships detained and sank Soviet merchant ships. In addition, the Japanese supplied the Nazis with intelligence information. To repel a possible Japanese attack, the USSR was forced to keep up to 47 divisions and 50 brigades in the Far East, as well as the Pacific Fleet. Thus, Japan actually grossly violated the neutrality treaty.

You can often hear that it would be very difficult for the USSR to wage a war on two fronts (against Germany and Japan). However, Japan did not have the resources for a war on two fronts (against the USSR in the West and the USA, Great Britain and their allies in the Pacific theater of operations). Therefore, Japan's non-participation in the war against the USSR was caused not by the good will of the Japanese government, but by pragmatic considerations. The Japanese concentrated the millionth Kwantung Army on the border of our country and waited for Germany to inflict a decisive defeat on the USSR. In this case (for example, after the fall of Moscow or Stalingrad), they were ready to enter the war and, with minimal losses, capture the resource-rich territories of Siberia and the Far East (the Japanese General Staff developed specific plans for a war against the USSR with exact dates for the start and end of hostilities). However, these plans were not destined to come true, since the Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany and its allies in Europe.

At the same time, the war in the Pacific theater of operations continued. The governments of Britain and the USA recognized in 1945 that if the USSR did not enter the war with Japan, then they would need a 7 million army to invade the Japanese islands, while at the beginning of 1945 the American-British ground forces in the Pacific Ocean and in Southeast Asian countries numbered about 2 million people. In this case, according to the forecasts of the allies, the war would have dragged on for 18 months after the defeat of Germany. It should be noted that protracting the war and attempting to land on the Japanese islands would have led to huge casualties, and the governments of the Western powers, unlike the Stalinist leadership of the USSR, sought to minimize their losses as much as possible.

At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain agreed on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan 2-3 months after the end of the war in Europe, provided that South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were returned to it after the end of the war. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government announced that the neutrality treaty had become null and void through the fault of the Japanese side. However, this warning did not bring Japan to its senses, and it rejected the US, British and Chinese demand of 26 July for unconditional surrender. The USSR began hostilities against Japan on August 9, 1945, and in August-September liberated Northeast China, North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles from the Japanese invaders. On September 2, 1945, Japan signed an act of unconditional surrender, thereby agreeing to any peace conditions proposed by the allies. In 1946, in accordance with this act and the decisions of the allied powers, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles were included in the USSR.

In 1951, a peace treaty was signed in San Francisco between Japan and the Allies, according to which Tokyo renounced all rights, titles and claims to South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. It was during that period that a third, the United States, seriously interfered in relations between the two countries.

It would seem that the Americans should have been grateful to the USSR. The Soviet Union was their ally in World War II and, having suffered huge losses in it, nevertheless, faithful to its allied duty, entered the war with Japan, thereby saving many lives of American soldiers. However, the US ruling circles have always acted according to the well-known principle of all imperialists since the time of ancient Rome - "divide and rule." In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Britain and the United States supported Japan, hoping to subsequently weaken both her and Russia in the first place. As a result, they received a new powerful enemy in the face of Japan.

Their alliance with the USSR was forced and tactical. The monstrous in its cynicism phrase of Harry Truman, said at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, is well known: "If the Russians win, we should help Germany, and if the Germans win, we should help Russia, and let them kill as many as possible." The situation changed after Pearl Harbor, when the US became involved in a war against the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. In this situation, the USSR turned out to be a natural ally for them. The Western powers granted the Soviet people the right to bear the brunt of the war against fascism, but at the same time prepared for the struggle for the post-war redivision of the world. They used the power of the Soviet army to defeat Japan, but as early as April 1945, the newly elected President of the United States, Truman, said that if the atomic bomb exploded, "I will have a club against these Russian guys." Subsequently, he ordered the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, seeking to scare not so much Japan as the USSR.

It should be noted that the USSR, which inflicted the largest defeat on the Japanese troops, did not receive its occupation zone on the Japanese islands. By the way, if Stalin managed to insist on his own and achieve the inclusion of Hokkaido in the occupation zone of the USSR, Japan could have expected the fate of Germany or Korea, which became divided countries, and against this background, the Kuriles would seem like an insignificant loss.

With the end of World War II, the USSR turned for the United States from an ally into an adversary in the Cold War. At the same time, the "spirit of the Elbe" was still strong in Western public opinion, so the United States had to disguise its true intentions. The United States used the "Kuril issue" to drive a wedge between the USSR and Japan, to prevent their possible rapprochement and to keep Japan forever in the orbit of its influence. Subsequently, one more goal was added to these goals: with a successful combination of circumstances, to establish military control over the South Kuriles and the strategically important Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bOkhotsk through the allied Japan.

It should be noted that the San Francisco conference took place at the height of the Cold War. Moreover, the context of the Korean War (June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953), which was the bloodiest in the second half of the 20th century, left its mark on it. It must be recalled that American troops fought on the side of South Korea, while the PRC and the USSR were secretly helping the DPRK. Mao Zedong sent about a million "volunteers" to the war, and Stalin sent the 64th air corps: 3 air divisions, 3 anti-aircraft gunnery divisions and a separate regiment of night fighters. There was a real threat of a new world war. Since January 1950, the USSR did not participate in the work of the UN Security Council in protest against the UN policy towards communist China, whose place in this organization was occupied by representatives of the Kuomintang government, which lost the war and was based in Taiwan.

In this situation, the United States did not allow the delegation of the PRC, the main ally of the USSR, to participate in the conference, which predetermined the position of the Soviet leadership, which refused to sign the treaty. A similar position was taken by other countries of the socialist camp: Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In the San Francisco peace treaty developed by the United States and England, signed on September 8, 1951, Japan's refusal from the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, agreed with the USSR in Yalta, was recorded. But this treaty was drawn up very ambiguously, and it did not indicate to whom exactly the Kuriles should go, the islands were also not named, which was one of the reasons why the USSR did not sign the San Francisco Treaty.

Prominent Russian statesman Yu.M. Luzhkov (4) considers Stalin's refusal to sign the San Francisco Treaty a gross mistake. In his opinion, the territorial issue fell victim to the globalist passions of the then party leadership, which considered it small compared to the strategic alliance with communist China. As Luzhkov rightly believes, with the signing of the treaty, even in its degraded final version, the USSR did not lose anything; on the contrary, all contradictions in relations with Japan would be removed. At the same time, according to Luzhkov, the fact of not signing the treaty in no way cancels the fullness of Russia's rights to the Kuril Islands.

Thus, Japan renounced all rights and titles to all the Kuril Islands. Consequently, she did not even have the right to raise the issue of the return of some territories. Moreover, the country that signed the unconditional surrender could not put any conditions on the winners.

However, there was no peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. According to international law, a peace treaty must include 4 mandatory clauses:

1. Termination of the state of war.

2. Restoration of diplomatic relations.

3. Solving the issue of reparations.

4. Fixing new state borders.

All these issues were not resolved due to the non-signing of the San Francisco Treaty by the Soviet Union, and they had to be settled on a bilateral basis. In the meantime, the Japanese economy was developing rapidly, and the United States skillfully directed the revanchist aspirations of the country they occupied into an anti-Soviet channel. The issue of the "northern territories" became a kind of outlet for the infringed Japanese self-consciousness.

Under such conditions, from June 1955 to October 1956, negotiations were held between Japan and the Soviet Union with the aim of concluding a peace treaty, which did not lead to an agreement: the Japanese side stated that Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai ridge were the territory of Japan and demanded their return, and the Soviet side was ready to compromise: transfer the relatively small Shikotan and Habomai to Japan, but retain the larger Iturup and Kunashir.

As a result, instead of a peace treaty, Japan and the USSR signed a Joint Declaration on October 19, 1956, which provided for the termination of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations. In addition, the USSR renounced all reparations and claims against Japan, undertook to release and repatriate to Japan all its citizens convicted in our country. The signing of the declaration opened the way for Japan to the UN, since the USSR undertook to support its request to join this organization. Article 9 of this document states that after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the parties will continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty; and the USSR, as a gesture of goodwill, agrees to the transfer after the conclusion of a peace treaty of the Habomai ridge and Fr. Shikotan. Thus, the declaration gave Japan much more than the USSR. But in 1960, Japan signed a military treaty with the United States, which secured the presence of American bases on its territory. In the USSR, this pact was rightly regarded as aggressive.

A "memorandum" was sent to Tokyo stating that a new situation was emerging in which it was impossible to fulfill the promise to transfer Habomai and Shikotan.

As it became known after the declassification of the archives, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, known as the inspirer and promoter of the policy "from a position of strength" and "balancing on the brink of war," exerted brutal pressure on Japan. In particular, he sent a message to the Japanese government, in which he stated that if Japan agreed to sign an agreement with the transfer of only two islands, then the United States would take Okinawa from her. After that, Japan abruptly changed its position, demanding all four islands at once (5). Following this, the USSR declared that while foreign troops were on the territory of Japan, the implementation of the declaration was impossible.

Early 60s - mid 80s. The Japanese government actively supports and stimulates the "Public Movement for the Return of the Islands", but does not officially raise these demands to the principle of state policy, without linking it with the development of economic and cultural ties with the USSR. This indirectly indicates that Japan understands the weakness of its argumentation. This is also evidenced by attempts to "scientifically substantiate" the belonging of the islands of Shikotan and Habomai to about. Hokkaido: not being able to deny their rejection of all the Kuriles, the Japanese are undertaking a "detour", trying to prove that the islands they dispute "do not belong to the Kurils." Naturally, these "evidence" does not stand up to scrutiny.

The situation has been changing since the mid-1980s, when a thaw in Soviet-Japanese relations is planned. This is happening against the background of the growth of the political, economic and military power of Japan and the beginning of the collapse of the USSR. In this situation, Tokyo hoped for territorial concessions from the USSR in exchange for economic assistance. On April 18, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev signed the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration", paragraph 4 of which provided for the development and conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the USSR, "including the problem of territorial delimitation, taking into account the positions of the parties on the ownership of the Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashir Island and the islands Iturup".

Thus, for the first time in an official document, the USSR acknowledged the existence of a "territorial problem", which, of course, is a strategic mistake. However, this statement does not mention the transfer of any territories to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty. Moreover, in his speech at a joint meeting of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev commented on the official position of our country regarding the Tokyo Declaration of 1956: “It speaks not only of the end of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations, but also of the transfer Japan of the two islands after the conclusion of a peace treaty. We believe that one should rely only on that part of the document that became a historical reality, had international legal and physical consequences. after 30 years to reanimate. The chance was then missed. Since then, new realities have arisen. From them we must proceed ".

Thus, despite all subsequent accusations, Gorbachev was not going to make any territorial concessions, but in the conditions of the political tug-of-war between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Japanese diplomacy made a bet on the leadership of the RSFSR, which sought to seize the initiative in international affairs from the "center". In fact, B.N. Yeltsin crossed out the entire policy of the USSR in 1960-1991, declaring the unconditional recognition of the 1956 Declaration. Moreover, in the "Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations", signed on October 13, 1993 by the Russian President and Prime Minister Japan, it is planned to create a joint Russian-Japanese commission to develop the text of a peace treaty by resolving the issue of belonging to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai.

It is significant that the transfer of Iturup and Kunashir was not even envisaged by the Declaration of 1956. But the parties did not move further than this, since the issue acquired a wide public response and the injustice of Japanese claims was so obvious that their satisfaction would have been political death for Yeltsin.

President Vladimir Putin feels much more confident inside the country, which gives him reason to try to solve the territorial problems he inherited. He intends to solve them through compromise, but according to the sad tradition that has developed recently, compromise at the expense of Russia. On this basis, the border issue with China was finally resolved.

Russia, as already noted, has lost 2.5 islands, but, as Foreign Minister S. Lavrov explained, this is not a loss of territory, but "a clarification of borders." According to the same scheme, the Russian leadership intends to "clarify" the borders with Japan. Its official representatives declared that they recognized the 1956 declaration and were ready to transfer Habomai and Shikotan to Japan after the signing of the peace treaty. However, even these obvious concessions are not enough for Japan. She perceives them only as a signal to increase pressure on Russia, believing that by agreeing to give up two islands, Russia will give up all four. Thus, Japan deprives the Russian leadership of the opportunity to create at least the appearance of a compromise and "save face." Thus, during his pre-New Year's press conference in 2004, the Russian president found himself in an extremely uncomfortable position when a Japanese journalist said: "Two islands are not enough for us, we want four."

In response, Vladimir Putin ruled out the possibility of transferring the four southern islands of the Kuril chain to Japan and recalled that only two islands were mentioned in the Soviet-Japanese declaration of 1956, which was ratified by both Japan and the Soviet Union. "If Japan ratified the declaration, why does Japan raise the issue of four islands?" the president said. "Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, and we will try to fulfill all the legal obligations that the USSR assumed, no matter how difficult it may be." According to Putin, Article 9 of the 1956 declaration states that "a mandatory precondition for the possible transfer of the two islands is the signing of a peace treaty, which unequivocally reads as the settlement of all further territorial disputes." In addition, Putin drew attention to the wording contained in the declaration: "The Soviet Union is ready to transfer two islands, but it is not said under what conditions to transfer, when to transfer and whose sovereignty will extend to these territories."

One of Putin's closest associates, B.V. Gryzlov (6), stated that "by and large, there are no problems," since Japan was deprived of the Kuriles "as punishment for more than 50 years of aggression against near and far neighbors in the Pacific basin." It should be noted here that Articles 77, 80, 107 of the UN Charter, as a punishment for unleashing the Second World War, provide for the withdrawal of territories that served as the base of aggression. The Kuril Islands were such a base of aggression not only against the United States, but also against the USSR, creating a threat to security in the Far East. “The claims to the South Kuriles,” Gryzlov noted, “is, in fact, an attempt to revise the results of the Second World War, question many more borders drawn by the victorious countries in the Second World War, and politically return the world 60 years ago.” According to Gryzlov, the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was a gesture of goodwill and "was stipulated by conditions that were not met by the Japanese side, so it did not take place" .

Here the following should be noted.

Firstly, the declaration differs from the treaty in that it is rather a protocol of intent, is adopted on the basis of the clause "while the previous conditions remain" and does not oblige the parties to strictly follow the declared, especially after half a century. N.S. Khrushchev believed that such a prospect would keep Japan from military-political cooperation with the United States. But a few years later, Japan and the United States completely changed the conditions - the 1960 treaty created a real threat that, in response to a gesture of goodwill, military bases directed against the USSR (Russia) would be created on the transferred islands. NATO's advance towards our western borders, contrary to verbal promises and assurances of friendship, once again confirms the reality of this threat.

Secondly, the declaration cannot be taken out of the general context. It in no way cancels either the results of World War II, or the San Francisco Peace Treaty, or Japan's renunciation of any rights, titles and claims to all the Kuriles, and, consequently, Russia's full sovereignty over these territories.

Thirdly, a peace treaty should not be an end in itself, and if it is impossible to sign it without losing part of its territory, then there is no point in signing it at all.

In his September 2005 televised interview with Russian citizens, Putin also confirmed that all four islands "are under the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, this is enshrined in international law, these are the results of the Second World War." In practice, the "Kuril problem" could have been closed on this, but Putin declared his readiness to continue negotiations, giving Japan hope to achieve its goal. The United States is also joining the pressure on Russia as an "ally in the anti-terrorist coalition". On February 19, 2005, the Foreign Ministers of the United States and Japan held consultations in Washington, as a result of which they adopted a joint statement. In the "Joint Strategic Goals" section, Washington and Tokyo called on Moscow to "completely normalize Russian-Japanese relations by solving the problem of the northern territories." That is, for a membership card of the Japanese-American club, which guarantees security in Asia, Russia is offered to pay with the South Kuriles. Characteristically, this is happening exactly 60 years after the Yalta Conference, where the US asked the USSR to enter the war with Japan in exchange for the Kuriles and South Sakhalin.

The Russian Foreign Ministry immediately expressed bewilderment in connection with an attempt to "internationalize the problem of a peace treaty with Japan", pointing out that "this kind of" hints "with the involvement of a third party are unlikely to have a beneficial effect on the dialogue on such a difficult and delicate issue" .

On the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Japan's unconditional surrender, the head of the Japanese government, D. Kaizumi, issued a statement in which he apologized for his country's crimes in World War II and its aggressive policy in the first half of the 20th century. However, territorial claims against Russia, which are nothing more than an attempt to revise the results of the Second World War, and other steps taken by Japan do not give grounds to believe in the sincerity of such statements. In particular, Japan has immortalized the memory of Emperor Hirohito, who led the country during World War II and, along with Hitler and Mussolini, bears full responsibility for its unleashing. In May 2005, the Japanese parliament passed a law renaming Greenery Day (April 29, Hirohito's birthday) as Siowa Era Day (Siowa is the name chosen by the late emperor for his reign).

Summing up, we can state that the transfer of the South Kuriles to Japan (in whole or in part) will lead to a number of negative consequences:

1 . Lowering the prestige of the Russian Federation in the international arena, as territorial concessions to a foreign power do not add respect to the state and raise doubts about the independence of its foreign policy.

2 . Russia will be neutralized geopolitically as a "center of power" in the Far East, while the geostrategic positions of the United States and Japan in the immediate vicinity of our country's borders will be strengthened.

3 . The solution of the issue of transferring the Kuril Islands to Japan in essence will be the first step in revising the results of the Second World War, which may be followed by German territorial claims against Russia (Kaliningrad region), Poland (Silesia), the Czech Republic (Sudet), Finland against Russia (Karelia), Japan to the USA (islands and archipelagos in the Pacific Ocean), etc.

4. The territorial cession to Japan will create a dangerous precedent and against the background of the redistribution of the post-Soviet space will become a signal for the redistribution of Russia itself. (Secret talks between the US and China have already taken place on this issue.)

5 . The transfer of the islands will not solve the Kuril problem. Firstly, it can be assumed that Japan's appetites will not be limited to only two or four islands, it can raise the question of the entire Kuril chain, and then, possibly, of Sakhalin (in Japan there are forces and even parliamentary political parties that advocate specifically for such a broad interpretation of the "territorial question"). Secondly, there may well be forces in Russia that will consider this decision unfair and will fight for the revision of the treaty, using all possible means, including violent ones.

6 . The authority of the leadership inside the country will inevitably fall, which can lead to mass protests with unpredictable consequences (suffice it to recall that even the defeat of Russia in a football match with Japan at the 2002 World Cup led to mass pogroms in the center of Moscow).

7 . Perhaps the emergence of "Transnistrian syndrome". Disagreement with the decision of the "center" may stimulate the growth of separatist tendencies in the Far East region, which will aggravate the political situation in the country as a whole. We must not forget the statements of the Sakhalin Cossacks about their readiness to defend the Kuriles with weapons in their hands in the event of their transfer to Japan, their calls to create secret weapons stores in the taiga, to prepare for a guerrilla war.

8. There will be problems of immigrants from the Kuril Islands and related issues of employment, housing, schools, kindergartens, material assistance, etc.

9 . Russia will suffer huge economic damage. It is quite possible that the standard of living of the population of the Russian Federation will decrease due to additional expenses for the resettlement and improvement of the inhabitants of the islands. The problem of the country's food supply will become aggravated due to the loss of the main region for providing the country with seafood.

10. Significant damage will be done to the country's defense capability.

11 . New interethnic problems may arise (between those Russians who will remain to live on the islands and the Japanese). Inevitably, there will be problems of pairing two ways of life (two mentalities) based on different socio-political, economic, spiritual and cultural values. We have no experience in solving such problems.

12. By partially returning the territories over which we entered the war, Russia indirectly recognizes the injustice of the war with Japan, which will give a powerful impetus to Japanese revanchism.

13 . Veterans and national self-consciousness will be insulted, which can lead to a "brown revolution" or a complete loss of national self-respect, national identity and, as a result, the collapse of the country.

Thus, the "clarification" of the borders with Japan can lead to a national catastrophe. It should be emphasized that the consequences would be catastrophic even if "only" the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge were transferred. Of course, in this case, the economic damage will be significantly lower, and the damage to the military infrastructure will be less, but the political and moral consequences will not decrease. As B.I. Tkachenko rightly notes, "The very fact of conducting interstate negotiations on the Russian-Japanese "territorial problem" is already Japan's connivance in not recognizing the results of World War II and their conceptual revision" .

At the same time, Tkachenko theoretically admits the possibility of transferring two islands: "the transfer of the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge to Japan in accordance with the Declaration of 1956 is possible in principle, but subject to an indispensable condition, namely: the elimination of foreign military bases and foreign military presence on Japanese territory in any form, the transformation of Japan into a neutral country, friendly to Russia. In this case, the requirements of domestic law regarding the change of the territory of Russia must be observed. "

It should be noted that, firstly, the probability that Japan and the United States will agree to this reasonable condition is zero. And secondly, according to paragraph 8 of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR of June 12, 1990, "the territory of the RSFSR cannot be changed without the will of the people, expressed through a referendum." A referendum is necessary even when internal borders are changed, so the opinion of the people is indispensable. However, such a referendum is not beneficial to the current government, since holding it will turn it into a convenient target for the opposition. Therefore, the option outlined by Tkachenko is unrealizable in practice.

In this situation, when all Japan's claims are legally invalid and we have every reason to defend our positions, the inability to protect vital national interests can only be explained by political lack of will. Russia lacks a foreign policy strategy, as even retired diplomats admit. Thus, according to the former ambassador to Turkey (1998-2003), Alexander Lebedev, who worked in the Foreign Ministry for a decade and a half, "Russia has no coherent and intelligible foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR" . Different government institutions, organizations, not to mention companies, have their own interests and approaches, but there is no unified national policy that provides for a long-term strategy of action, a clear hierarchy of goals (what is the main priority and what is a field for compromise), etc. . Therefore, "protection of national interests" remains only a declaration, not filled with concrete content.

Russia's lack of a clear strategy (this applies not only to foreign policy) is due to two main reasons: a sharp change in the geopolitical (due to the collapse of the USSR) and socio-economic (due to the ongoing global transformation of Russian society) situation and the inadequacy of the domestic, primarily political, elite modern challenges.

In characterizing the contemporary Russian political elite, two main points should be noted. First, after the surge of upward mobility in 1991-1993. the upper strata of society began to close more and more to replenish with fresh forces "from below". The change of elites due to the peculiarities of the Russian political system and the lack of real competition between various political forces is practically excluded. The circulation of elites is also extremely difficult. The main criterion for moving up the social ladder is not professionalism, but personal devotion to superiors, thanks to which obedient performers who are not able to think independently and take initiative make a career. As a result of this negative selection, both the lack of bright political leaders and the obvious lack of fresh ideas have become more and more acute in recent years.

Secondly, there was a delegitimization of the selection process for the political class, as a result of which the ruling elite was replenished with a mass of random people, including people from a criminal environment. Hence its low quality as a subject of strategic management of society, group selfishness and the highest level of corruption.

Moreover, the term "comprador" is applicable to a significant part of the Russian elite, since it mediates between foreign (primarily American and Western) capital, ideas, values, and Russia. This elite is supranational and cosmopolitan; for them, Russia is not their homeland, but a place of enrichment, "this country." The comprador elite is closely connected with the interests of the "civilized countries" and supports them to the detriment of national interests.

At a press conference in Moscow following the Russia-EU summit on May 10, 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the territorial claims of the Baltic neighbors: "We are ready to sign a border agreement with Estonia and Latvia, but we hope that they will not will be accompanied by claims of a territorial nature that are stupid in their content ... Today in Europe, in the 21st century, when one side makes territorial claims to the other and at the same time wants to sign a border treaty, this is complete nonsense, soft-boiled boots. Japan's claims are no less "stupid";

D.Yu.Alekseev

NOTES

(1) During the visit of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to China on October 14, 2004, an agreement was signed on the transfer of the Big Islands on the Argun River, Tarabarov and part of the Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island at the confluence of the Ussuri into the Amur (the last two islands were part of the composition of Khabarovsk). The total area of ​​these islands is 337 km². This is more than the area of ​​Malta or the areas of Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, Gibraltar and the Vatican combined. The new border should pass through the summer cottages of Khabarovsk residents, in addition to economic damage, Russia will lose two frontier posts and the fortified area created to defend the city will lose its significance. It is also possible that the runway of the Khabarovsk airport will have to be moved, because. take-off and landing approach glide path is located over the islands of Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriysky.

(2) The area of ​​the 200-mile economic zone is 296,000 km²; for comparison, the area of ​​Italy is 301,200 km².

(3) The scope of this article does not allow dwelling in detail on the crimes of the Japanese interventionists, so I will give only one example: p. Ivanovka (a regional center in the Amur Region) was completely burned by the Japanese invaders, along with the inhabitants driven into a barn.

(4) Mayor of Moscow, co-chairman of the "Council of Wise Men" of Russia and Japan.

(5) The broadcast of the program "Mainland. The Kuril Islands: will we raise or lose?", Which was released on the channel "Litsa-TVC" on July 1, 2005.

(6) Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, leader of United Russia.

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The dispute over the southernmost Kuril Islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai - has been a point of tension between Japan and Russia since they were taken over by the Soviet Union in 1945. More than 70 years later, Russian-Japanese relations are still not normal due to the ongoing territorial dispute. To a large extent, it was historical factors that prevented the solution of this issue. These include demographics, mentality, institutions, geography, and economics, all of which encourage tough policies rather than willingness to compromise. The first four factors contribute to the persistence of the stalemate, while the economy in the form of oil policy is associated with some hope of a resolution.

Russia's claims to the Kuriles date back to the 17th century, which occurred as a result of periodic contacts with Japan through Hokkaido. In 1821, the border was de facto established, according to which Iturup became Japanese territory, and Russian land began from Urup Island. Subsequently, according to the Shimodsky Treaty (1855) and the St. Petersburg Treaty (1875), all four islands were recognized as the territory of Japan. The last time the Kuriles changed their owner as a result of the Second World War - in 1945 in Yalta, the allies, in fact, agreed to transfer these islands to Russia.

The dispute over the islands became part of Cold War politics during the negotiations for the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Article 2c of which forced Japan to renounce all of its claims to the Kuril Islands. However, the refusal of the Soviet Union to sign this agreement left these islands in a state of limbo. In 1956, a joint Soviet-Japanese declaration was signed, which de facto meant the end of the state of war, but failed to resolve the territorial conflict. After the ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, further negotiations were stopped, and this continued until the 1990s.

However, after the end of the Cold War in 1991, there seemed to be a new opportunity to resolve this issue. Despite the tumultuous events in world affairs, the positions of Japan and Russia on the Kuriles have not changed much since 1956, and the reason for this situation was five historical factors that were outside the Cold War.

The first factor is demographic. Japan's population is already declining due to low birth rates and aging, while Russia's population has been declining since 1992 due to excessive drinking and other social ills. This shift, together with the weakening of international influence, has led to the emergence of retrospective tendencies, and both nations are now basically trying to resolve this issue by looking backwards rather than forwards. Given such attitudes, one can conclude that the aging populations of Japan and Russia are depriving Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Vladimir Putin of the opportunity to negotiate because of firmly entrenched views on the issue of the Kuriles.

Context

Is Russia ready to return two islands?

Military construction in the Kuriles

Is it possible to agree on the Kuril Islands?

The perception of Japan in Russia was largely shaped by the issue of the Kuril Islands, and this continued until the end of the Cold War. Anti-Japanese propaganda became common after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and it was reinforced by Japanese intervention during the Russian Civil War (1918-1922). This led many Russians to believe that as a result, all previously concluded treaties were annulled. However, Russia's victory over Japan in World War II ended the previous humiliation and reinforced the symbolic meaning of the Kuril Islands, which came to represent (1) the irreversibility of the results of World War II and (2) Russia's status as a great power. From this point of view, the transfer of territory is seen as a revision of the outcome of the war. Therefore, control over the Kuriles retains an important psychological significance for the Russians.

Japan is trying to define its place in the world as a "normal" state, located next to an increasingly powerful China. The question of the return of the Kuril Islands is directly linked to the national identity of Japan, and these territories themselves are perceived as the last symbol of defeat in World War II. The Russian offensive and the capture of Japan's "inalienable territory" helped reinforce the victim mentality that became the prevailing narrative after the end of the war.

This attitude is reinforced by the Japanese conservative media, which often supports the government's foreign policy. In addition, nationalists often use the media to viciously attack academics and politicians who hint at a compromise on the issue, leaving little room for manoeuvre.

This, in turn, has an impact on the political institutions of both Japan and Russia. In the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin's position was so weak that he feared possible impeachment if the Kuril Islands were handed over to Japan. At the same time, the central Russian government was weakened as a result of the growing influence of regional politicians, including the two governors of the Sakhalin region - Valentin Fedorov (1990 - 1993) and Igor Fakhrutdinov (1995 - 2003), who actively opposed the possible sale of the Kuriles to Japan. They relied on nationalist sentiments, and this was enough to prevent the completion of the treaty and its implementation in the 1990s.

Since President Putin came to power, Moscow has brought regional governments under its influence, but other institutional factors have also contributed to the stalemate. One example is the idea that the situation should mature, and then some issue or problem can be solved. During the initial period of his rule, President Putin was able, but not willing, to negotiate with Japan over the Kuriles. Instead, he decided to devote his time and energy to resolving the Sino-Russian border conflict through the issue of the Kuril Islands.

Since returning to the presidency in 2013, Putin has become increasingly dependent on the support of nationalist forces, and it is unlikely that he will be ready to cede the Kuriles in any meaningful way. Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine clearly demonstrate how far Putin is willing to go to defend Russia's national status.

Japanese political institutions, while different from Russia's, also support a hard line of negotiation over the Kuriles. As a result of the reforms carried out after the end of World War II, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominates Japan. With the exception of the period from 1993 to 1995 and from 2009 to 2012, the LDP had and continues to have a majority in the national legislative assembly, and in fact its party platform for the return of the four southern islands of the Kuril chain since 1956 has been an integral part of national politics.

In addition, as a result of the real estate crash of 1990-1991, the Liberal Democratic Party nominated only two effective prime ministers, Koizumi Junichiro and Shinzo Abe, both of whom rely on the support of nationalists to maintain their positions. Finally, regional politics in Japan plays an important role, and elected politicians in Hokkaido are pushing the central government to take a assertive stance in this dispute. Taken together, all these factors do not contribute to a compromise that would include the return of all four islands.

Sakhalin and Hokkaido emphasize the importance of geography and regional interests in this dispute. Geography influences how people see the world and how they observe policy making and implementation. The most important Russian interests are in Europe, followed by the Middle East and Central Asia, and only after that Japan. To give one example, Russia devotes much of its time and effort to the issue of NATO expansion to the east, to the eastern part of Europe, as well as to the negative consequences associated with the events in Crimea and Ukraine. As far as Japan is concerned, the alliance with the United States, China, and the Korean Peninsula take precedence over relations with Moscow. The Japanese government must also consider public pressure to resolve issues with North Korea over kidnapping and nuclear weapons, which Abe has promised to do on several occasions. As a result, the issue of the Kuriles is often relegated to the background.

Probably the only factor contributing to a possible resolution of the Kuril issue is economic interests. After 1991, both Japan and Russia entered a period of prolonged economic crisis. The Russian economy reached its lowest point during the crisis of its national currency in 1997, and is currently facing serious difficulties due to the collapse in oil prices and economic sanctions. However, the development of oil and gas fields in Siberia, in the process of which Japanese capital and Russian natural resources are combined, contributes to cooperation and a possible resolution of the issue of the Kuriles. Despite the sanctions imposed, 8% of Japan's oil consumption in 2014 was imported from Russia, and the increase in oil and natural gas consumption is largely due to the consequences of the disaster at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima.

In their totality, historical factors largely determine the continued stagnation in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands. The demographics, geography, political institutions, and attitudes of the citizens of Japan and Russia all contribute to a tough negotiating position. Oil policy provides some incentive for both nations to resolve disputes and normalize relations. However, so far this has not been enough to break the impasse. Despite the possible change of leaders around the world, the main factors that have driven this dispute to a standstill are likely to remain unchanged.

Michael Bacalu is a member of the Council on Asian Affairs. He received a master's degree in international relations from Seoul University, South Korea, and a bachelor's degree in history and political science from Arcadia University. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author as an individual and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which he has ties.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

The Southern Kuril Islands are a stumbling block in relations between Russia and Japan. The dispute over the ownership of the islands prevents our neighboring countries from concluding a peace treaty, which was violated during the Second World War, negatively affects the economic ties between Russia and Japan, contributes to an ever-preserving state of distrust, even hostility, of the Russian and Japanese peoples

Kurile Islands

Disputed islands - Kunashir, Shikotan, Iturup, Khabomai

Kunashir Island

Habomai

The history of the discovery of the Kuril Islands

- In October-November 1648, he was the first of the Russians to pass the First Kuril Strait, that is, the strait separating the northernmost island of the Kuril ridge Shumshu from the southern tip of Kamchatka, under the command of the clerk of the Moscow merchant Usov Fedot Alekseevich Popov. It is possible that Popov's people even landed on Shumshu.
- The first Europeans to visit the Kuril Islands were the Dutch. On February 3, 1643, the two ships Castricum and Breskens, which left Batavia in the direction of Japan, under the general command of Martin de Vries, approached the Lesser Kuril Ridge on June 13. The Dutch saw the shores of Iturup, Shikotan, discovered the strait between the islands of Iturup and Kunashir.
- In 1711, the Cossacks Antsiferov and Kozyrevsky visited the Northern Kuril Islands Shumsha and Paramushir and even unsuccessfully tried to extort tribute from the local population - the Ainu.
- In 1721, by decree of Peter the Great, an expedition of Evreeinov and Luzhin was sent to the Kuriles, who explored and mapped 14 islands in the central part of the Kuril ridge.
- In the summer of 1739, a Russian ship under the command of M. Spanberg rounded the islands of the South Kuril ridge. Spanberg mapped, although inaccurately, the entire ridge of the Kuril Islands from the Kamchatka nose to Hokkaido.

Ainu lived on the Kuril Islands. The Ainu, the first population of the Japanese islands, were gradually forced out by newcomers from Central Asia to the north to the island of Hokkaido and further to the Kuriles. From October 1946 to May 1948, tens of thousands of Ainu and Japanese were taken from the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin to the island of Hokkaido

The problem of the Kuril Islands. Briefly

- 1855, February 7 (new style) - the first diplomatic document in relations between Russia and Japan, the so-called Treaty of Simond, was signed in the Japanese port of Shimoda. On behalf of Russia, it was endorsed by Vice-Admiral E. V. Putyatin, on behalf of Japan - authorized Toshiakira Kawaji.

Article 2: “From now on, the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup. The whole island of Iturup belongs to Japan, and the whole island of Urup and the other Kuril Islands to the north are the possession of Russia. As for the island of Crafto (Sakhalin), it remains undivided between Russia and Japan, as it has been until now.

- 1875, May 7 - a new Russian-Japanese treaty "On the exchange of territories" was concluded in St. Petersburg. On behalf of Russia, it was signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gorchakov, and on behalf of Japan, by Admiral Enomoto Takeaki.

Article 1. “His Majesty the Emperor of Japan ... cedes to His Majesty the All-Russian Emperor part of the territory of the island of Sakhalin (Krafto), which he now owns .. so that from now on the aforementioned Sakhalin Island (Krafto) will completely belong to the Russian Empire and the border line between the Empires of Russia and The Japanese will pass in these waters through the La Perouse Strait "

Article 2. “In return for the cession of rights to Sakhalin Island to Russia, His Majesty the All-Russian Emperor cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan a group of islands called the Kuril Islands. ... This group includes ... eighteen islands 1) Shumshu 2) Alaid 3) Paramushir 4) Makanrushi 5) Onekotan, 6) Harimkotan, 7) Ekarma, 8) Shiashkotan, 9) Mus-sir, 10) Raikoke, 11) Matua , 12) Rastua, 13) the islets of Sredneva and Ushisir, 14) Ketoi, 15) Simusir, 16) Broughton, 17) the islets of Cherpoy and Brother Cherpoev, and 18) Urup, so that the border line between the Russian and Japanese Empires in these waters will pass through the strait located between Cape Lopatkoy of the Kamchatka Peninsula and Shumshu Island"

- May 28, 1895 - An agreement between Russia and Japan on trade and navigation was signed in St. Petersburg. On behalf of Russia, it was signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Lobanov-Rostovsky and Minister of Finance S. Witte; on behalf of Japan, it was signed by Nishi Tokujiro, Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Russian Court. The treaty consisted of 20 articles.

Article 18 stated that the treaty supersedes all previous Russo-Japanese treaties, agreements and conventions

- 1905, September 5 - Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in Portsmouth (USA), which completed. On behalf of Russia, it was signed by Chairman of the Committee of Ministers S. Witte and Ambassador to the United States R. Rosen, on behalf of Japan by Foreign Minister D. Komura and envoy to the United States K. Takahira.

Article IX: “The Russian Imperial Government cedes to the Imperial Japanese Government in perpetual and complete possession the southern part of the island of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent to the latter .... The fiftieth parallel of northern latitude is taken as the limit of the ceded territory.

- 1907, July 30 - An agreement between Japan and Russia was signed in St. Petersburg, consisting of a public convention and a secret treaty. The convention stated that the parties were obliged to respect the territorial integrity of both countries and all the rights arising from the agreements existing between them. The agreement was signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Izvolsky and Ambassador of Japan to Russia I. Motono
- 1916, July 3 - in Petrograd Petrograd established the Russo-Japanese alliance. It consisted of a vowel and a secret part. In the secret one, the previous Russian-Japanese agreements were also confirmed. The documents were signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Sazonov and I. Motono
- 1925, January 20 - the Soviet-Japanese Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations, ... the declaration of the Soviet government ... was signed in Beijing. The documents were endorsed by L. Karahan from the USSR and K. Yoshizawa from Japan

convention.
Article II: “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the treaty concluded at Portsmouth on 5 September 1905 shall remain in full force and effect. It is agreed that the treaties, conventions and agreements, other than the said Treaty of Portsmouth, concluded between Japan and Russia before November 7, 1917, will be revised at a conference to be held subsequently between the Governments of the Contracting Parties, and that they may be amended or canceled as necessary. changing circumstances require."
The declaration emphasized that the government of the USSR does not share political responsibility with the former tsarist government for the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty: “The Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to declare that the recognition by his Government of the validity of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905 in no way means that The government of the Union shares with the former tsarist government the political responsibility for the conclusion of the said treaty.

- 1941, April 13 - Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR. The pact was signed by Foreign Ministers Molotov and Yosuke Matsuoka
Article 2 "In the event that one of the contracting parties becomes the object of hostilities by one or more third powers, the other contracting party shall remain neutral throughout the entire conflict."
- 1945, February 11 - at the Yalta Conference of Stalin Roosevelt and Churchill, an agreement was signed on the Far East.

"2. The return of the rights that belonged to Russia, violated by the perfidious attack of Japan in 1904, namely:
a) the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of about. Sakhalin and all adjacent islands, ...
3. Transfers of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union"

- 1945, April 5 - Molotov received the Japanese ambassador to the USSR, Naotake Sato, and made a statement to him that in the conditions when Japan was at war with England and the USA, the allies of the USSR, the pact loses its meaning and its extension becomes impossible
- August 9, 1945 - The USSR declared war on Japan.
- 1946, January 29 - Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in the Far East, American General D. MacArthur, to the Government of Japan determined that the southern part of Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands, including the Lesser Kuril Ridge (the Habomai group of islands and Shikotan Island), are withdrawn from the sovereignty of the Japanese state
- 1946, February 2 - By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in accordance with the provisions of the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration, the South Sakhalin (now Sakhalin) Region of the RSFSR was created in the returned Russian territories

The return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Russian territory made it possible to ensure access to the Pacific Ocean of the ships of the Navy of the USSR, to find a new frontier for the forward deployment of the Far Eastern group of ground forces and military aviation of the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, which was carried far beyond the continent

- 1951, September 8 - Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, according to which it renounced "all rights ... to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin ..., sovereignty over which it acquired under the Portsmouth Treaty of September 5, 1905." The USSR refused to sign this treaty, because, according to Minister Gromyko, the text of the treaty did not enshrine the sovereignty of the USSR over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan officially ended World War II, fixed the procedure for paying reparations to allies and compensation to countries affected by Japanese aggression

- 1956, August 19 - in Moscow, the USSR and Japan signed a declaration ending the state of war between them. According to it (including) the island of Shikotan and the Habomai ridge were to be transferred to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. However, soon Japan, under pressure from the United States, refused to sign a peace treaty, since the United States threatened that if Japan withdraws its claims to the Kunashir and Iturup islands, the Ryukyu archipelago with the island of Okinawa would not be returned to Japan, which, on the basis of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace the treaty was then administered by the United States

“President of Russia V.V. Putin has repeatedly confirmed that Russia, as a successor state of the USSR, is committed to this document…. It is clear that if it comes to the implementation of the 1956 Declaration, a lot of details will have to be agreed upon ... However, the sequence set out in this Declaration remains unchanged ... the first step before everything else is the signing and entry into force of a peace treaty "(Russian Foreign Minister S . Lavrov)

- 1960, January 19 - Japan and the United States signed the "Treaty of Interaction and Security"
- January 27, 1960 - The government of the USSR stated that since this agreement was directed against the USSR, it refuses to consider the transfer of the islands to Japan, since this will lead to the expansion of the territory used by American troops
- 2011, November - Lavrov: "The Kuriles were, are and will be our territory in accordance with the decisions that were made following the results of the Second World War"

Iturup, the largest of the South Kuril Islands, became ours 70 years ago. Under the Japanese, tens of thousands of people lived here, life was in full swing in the villages and markets, there was a large military base from where the Japanese squadron left to smash Pearl Harbor. What have we built here over the past years? Recently, here is the airport. A couple of shops and hotels also appeared. And in the main settlement - the city of Kurilsk with a population of just over one and a half thousand people - they laid an outlandish attraction: a couple of hundred meters (!) Of asphalt. But in the store, the seller warns the buyer: “The product is almost expired. Do you take it? And he hears in response: “Yes, I know. Of course I will." And how not to take it if there is not enough food (with the exception of fish and what the garden gives), and there will be no delivery in the coming days, more precisely, it is not known when it will be. Local people like to repeat: we have 3,000 people and 8,000 bears here. There are more people, of course, if you count the military and border guards, but no one counted the bears - maybe there are more of them. From the south to the north of the island, one has to get along a harsh dirt road through the pass, where hungry foxes guard each car, and roadside burdocks are the size of a person, you can hide with them. Beauty, of course: volcanoes, hollows, springs. But it is safe to ride on the local dirt trails only during the day and when
there is no fog. And in rare settlements, the streets are empty after nine in the evening - a curfew in fact. A simple question - why did the Japanese live well here, while we only get settlements? - most of the inhabitants simply do not occur. We live - we guard the earth.(“Rotational sovereignty”. “Spark” No. 25 (5423), June 27, 2016)

Once a prominent Soviet figure was asked: “Why don't you give Japan these islands. She has such a small territory, and you have such a large one? “That’s why it’s big because we don’t give it back,” the activist answered.

Table of contents

There is also a diametrically opposite point of view regarding the US role in the foreign policy of Russia and Japan. The famous American scientist Raymond L. Garthoff argued that the American leadership was not sufficiently informed about the intricacies of the geographical borders of the South Kuriles, so the borders of the Soviet occupation were drawn so that the islands of Shikotan and Habomai were attached to the South Kuriles, and not to Hokkaido, as it should The author believes that the United States has never taken any definite position in relations between Russia and Japan. For her, only a complete settlement of relations between them is important.

The first work in Soviet historical science that covers all aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations since 1917. to the present day, this is a collective monograph edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences I.A. Latysheva.

A notable milestone in the historiography of the problem was the work of Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor A.A. Koshkin. He pays much attention to the analysis of the agreements signed by the allied powers in 1943-1945, showing that Japan's current policy towards Russia is a policy based on the militaristic past of our Far Eastern neighbor.

Today, there are a number of rather complex problems in relations between Russia and Japan.

Firstly, this is the absence of a peace treaty, due to the unresolved territorial issue.

However, on the pages of the press one can come across an opinion that Russia does not need such an agreement. Doctor of Law A.N. Nikolaev in his article notes that “It is quite possible to do without a peace treaty with Japan, because we did without a similar treaty with Germany. The main thing has already been done: back in 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan made a joint statement on ending the state of war and restoring diplomatic relations.

Most researchers believe that the problem exists and needs to be addressed. In essence, all recipes for resolving the issue boil down to either Russia's renunciation of the Kuril ridge, or the preservation of rights to them. The arguments of supporters of the return of the islands to Japan can be summarized as follows:

The norms of international law and the image of Russia as a civilized state dictate the need to return the islands as a correction of a historical mistake made, and free of charge, because bidding on this issue would humiliate two great peoples. The logic of history requires the completion of the dismantling begun in Europe. The Yalta system, besides, Russia announced at the official level that it no longer considers its relations with Japan as the relationship of the winner and the vanquished.

The return of the islands will make it possible to radically improve trade and economic relations with Japan. This will contribute to the success of the reforms and open up new opportunities for Russia to integrate into the economic structures of the Asia-Pacific region and thereby improve the living standards of the population, which is the main and long-term goal of any country.

Opponents of resolving the territorial issue in favor of Japan believe that:

The return of the islands sets a precedent for many other territorial claims, which will significantly complicate its geopolitical position.

The economic damage from the return of the islands will exceed the possible benefits from cooperation with Japan, which is no longer interested in Russia as a source of raw materials and energy carriers or a potential market for its high-tech goods.

Researchers find very weighty arguments in defense of their interests.

Highlighting the main points related to the fate of these islands, which have a certain impact on the national security of Russia and its defensive potential, Makeev notes that the loss of these islands forms a serious gap in the unified defense system of the Russian Primorye, reduces the security of the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the possibility of their deployment in the Pacific Ocean.

Japan's demands to give her the Kuril Islands, according to Gamazkov, are dictated by economic interests. He notes that a strong magnetic anomaly is observed in the Kuril Strait, suggesting that iron ore deposits are located here at a shallow depth.

Japan seeks to expand its territory, Medvedev believes, hence the territorial demands.

The foundations of the source study foundation of the study were: Joint agreements, periodicals, texts of the Yalta agreement of the USA, USSR and Great Britain on the Far East.

An integrated approach to the study of sources, their critical analysis, comparisons and generalizations of the results obtained made it possible to study the nature of relations between Russia and Japan.

The methodological basis of the work is determined by the principles of historicism and scientific objectivity. The methods of analysis, synthesis, and generalization serve as practical means of research.

aim Our research is to study the origins and causes of the territorial problem in the relationship between Russia and Japan.

Based on this, the following tasks:

Find out when and by whom the Kuril Islands were discovered and developed;

Determine the significance of the Kuril Islands in relation to Russia and Japan in the 19th century;

To identify the belonging of the territories we are considering as a result of the Russian-Japanese war (1904-1905);

Analyze the transfer of the Kuril ridge to Russia as a result of the Second World War (1939-1945)4

To highlight the Kuril problem in the 50s of the XX century.

Consider how relations between Russia and Japan are developing today;

Consider existing positions on the territorial issue.

The first European expedition that found itself near the Kuril and Sakhalin coasts was the expedition of the Dutch navigator M.G. Friz in 1643. He not only explored and mapped the southeast of Sakhalin and the South Kuriles, but also proclaimed Urup a possession of Holland, which, however, remained without any consequences. Russian explorers also played a huge role in the study of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

First, in 1646, the expedition of V.D. Poyarkov discovered the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, and in 1697, V.V. Atlasov learned about the existence of the Kuril Islands. Already in the 10s. 18th century the process of studying and gradually joining the Kuril Islands to the Russian state begins. The success of Russia in the development of the Kuriles became possible thanks to the enterprise, courage and patience of D.Ya. Antsiferov, I.P. Kozyrevsky, I.M. Evreinov, F.F. Luzhin, M.P. .Shabalin, G.I. Shelikhov and many other Russian explorers - explorers. Simultaneously with the Russians, who were moving along the Kuriles from the north, the Japanese began to penetrate into the South Kuriles and the extreme south of Sakhalin. Already in the second half of the XVIII century. here appear Japanese trading posts and fishing, and since the 80s. 18th century - scientific expeditions begin to work. Mogami Tokunai and Mamiya Rinzo played a special role in Japanese research. At the end of the XVIII century. research off the coast of Sakhalin was carried out by a French expedition under the command of J.-F. Laperouse and an English expedition under the command of V.R. Broughton.

The first Russian settlements in the Kuriles of that time are reported by Dutch, Scandinavian and German medieval chronicles and maps. The first reports about the Kuril lands and their inhabitants reached the Russians in the middle of the 17th century.

In 1697, during the expedition of Vladimir Atlasov to Kamchatka, new information about the islands appeared, the Russians explored the islands up to Simushir (an island of the middle group of the Great Kuril Islands).

Decrees of 1779, 1786 and 1799 - confirmed the entry of the Kuril Islands, including the southern ones into the Russian Empire.

The Decree of 1786 is of the greatest importance. It was published on the basis of a memorandum prepared by the President of the College of Commerce A. Vorontsov and a member of the College of Foreign Affairs A. Bezborodko, and secured Russia's vast possessions in Asia, including the Kuril Islands.

The decree, in particular, said: "As a generally accepted rule, those peoples who made the first discovery of these have the right to unknown lands, as in the old days ....... it was usually done that any European people who found unknown land, they put their own sign on it ...., in which all the proof of the right to take possession consisted, then as a result of this they must undeniably belong to Russia: ... The ridge of the Kuril Islands ". The provisions of the Decree of 1786 were confirmed in 1799.

Thus, in accordance with official Russian documents at the end of the 18th century, the entire Kuril Ridge was considered as part of the territory of Russia.

Of the 3 main conditions developed by G. Viton, the presence of which gave the state a "legal title", Russia at the end of the 18th century had almost all of their elements in its assets. This is the observance of the provision on the "First Discovery", repeated description and mapping, including official editions of maps, installation of cross signs with inscriptions, notification of other states (Decree of 1786). Conducting research, including geological exploration and economic development of the Kuriles through the introduction of fish and animal fishing there, experiments with agriculture, the foundation of settlements and winter quarters, fully meets the provision on "first development - first occupation."

Administrative management of the islands from Kamchatka, systematic collection of daniyasak from local residents.

By the end of the 18th century, Russia, in accordance with the then existing norms of international law, had sufficient grounds to consider the entire Kuril Range as its own territory. At the same time, not a single Japanese legislative act of the 18th and early 19th centuries is known that would speak of the inclusion of the southern Kuriles in Japan.

Based on the above, the following conclusions can be drawn. The Kuril Islands were discovered in 1643 by a European expedition led by Martin Guerriteson de Vries. But there were no such consequences. Russian travelers and navigators played a huge role in studying them.

In 1874, with the arrival in St. Petersburg of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Russia, Enomoto Takeaki, negotiations began again. He brought two projects to resolve the main problem of the negotiations - the possession of the island of Sakhalin. According to the first, in exchange for South Sakhalin, Russia had to cede Urup Island with the adjacent islands to Japan and compensate for Japanese real estate on Sakhalin. According to the second, Japan was to receive all the Kuril Islands. On May 7, 1875, the Russian Chancellor A. M. Gorchakov and the Japanese envoy Enomoto Takeaki signed the Treaty between Russia and Japan, called the Treaty of St. Petersburg. In his Art. 1 said: “His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, for himself and his heirs, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia part of the territory of Sakhalin Island, which he now owns ... From now on, the aforementioned Sakhalin Island will completely belong to the Russian Empire, and the border line between the empires of Russia and Japan will be pass in these waters through the Strait of La Perouse. Article 2 stated: “In return for the cession of Russia’s rights to Sakhalin Island ... His Majesty the All-Russian Emperor for himself and his heirs cedes to His Majesty the Emperor the Japanese group of islands called the Kurils ... This group includes the 18 islands indicated below, namely 1. Shumshu, 2. Alaid, 3. Paramushir, 4. Makanrushi, 5. Onekotan, 6. Harimkotan, 7. Ekarma, 8. Shiashkotan, 9. Mussir, 10. Raikoke, 11. Matua, 12. Rastua, 13 The islets of Sredneva and Ushisir, 14. Ketoi, 15. Simusir, 16. Broughton, 17. The islets of Cherpoy and Brother Cherpoev, 18. Urup, so that the border line between the Russian and Japanese empires in these waters will pass through the strait located between the cape Shovel of the Kamchatka Peninsula and Shumshu Island. According to other articles of the St. Petersburg Treaty, all residents of the ceded territories were given the right to retain their former citizenship or return to their homeland, but at the same time they fell under the jurisdiction of the country to which the corresponding territory passed. In the ports of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and Kamchatka, Japan received the same rights for navigation, trade and fishing as countries that had the status of the most favored nation. In addition, Japanese ships calling at the port of Korsakov were exempted from port dues and customs duties for a period of 10 years. The Japanese consulate was also opened there. The Russian side paid over 112,000 rubles to Japan for real estate in South Sakhalin.

The Russo-Japanese treaty of 1875 caused mixed responses in both countries. Many in Japan condemned him, believing that the Japanese government had exchanged Sakhalin, which was of great political and economic importance, for the "small ridge of pebbles" that they imagined the Kuriles to be. Others simply stated that Japan had exchanged "one part of its territory for another." The famous Japanese writer and publicist Shimei Futabatei (1864-1909) wrote: “Public opinion was seething. Feelings that had lurked in me since early childhood, the feelings of a man of the Restoration, boiled up in me. Public indignation at the treaty and my feelings merged into one. In the end, I decided that the greatest danger to Japan's future is Russia." S. Futabatei believed that the day would come when Japan would fight Russia.

Similar assessments were heard from the Russian side: many believed that both territories belonged to Russia by the right of the discoverer. The Treaty of 1875 did not become an irrevocable act of territorial delimitation between Russia and Japan and could not prevent further conflicts between the two sides.

As for the Russian Foreign Ministry of the Russian-Japanese treaty of 1875, it was quite high, since the Russian government counted on improving foreign trade relations with Japan after the solution of the Sakhalin problem. The cession of the Kuril Islands was not seen as serious, as the government of the Russian Empire underestimated their strategic importance.

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the situation with the Kuriles, which had existed for many years, became official with the adoption of the Shimodsky Treaty of 1855. Its result was that Sakhalin was not divided, and Japan, in turn, received the rights to Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup.

As for the St. Petersburg tract, here it was about the exchange of the Kuril Islands for Sakhalin, i.e. practical surrender of the Kuriles without any compensation. The next point in Russo-Japanese relations was the Russo-Japanese War.

By imposing on Russia the unfair, predatory Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan thus crossed out the previous treaties concluded with Russia and completely lost any right to refer to them. Completely untenable, therefore, the attempts of the ruling circles of Japan to use the Shimoda treaty, trampled by the Japanese military, to justify their territorial claims to the Soviet Union.

While recalling the first Russo-Japanese treaties, Japan at the same time prefers to "forget" the barbaric aggression committed by Japanese imperialism against our country - the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East in 1918-1922. The Japanese invaders first occupied Vladivostok, and then occupied Primorye and the Amur region, Transbaikalia and Northern Sakhalin (which remained under Japanese occupation until 1925). Japan concentrated in the Soviet Far East 11 infantry divisions (out of 21 it had at that time) numbering about 175 thousand people, as well as large warships and marines.

The Japanese intervention inflicted deep wounds on the Soviet people and enormous destruction on the Soviet country. According to the calculations of a special commission, the damage from the management of the Japanese interventionists in the Soviet Far East amounted to a colossal amount of several tens of billions of rubles. This shameful action is now actually hushed up in Japan, the younger generation of Japanese, who continue to be frightened by the "Soviet threat", knows almost nothing about the Japanese intervention against Soviet Russia. References to it in Japanese textbooks are kept to a minimum.

Having intervened in Soviet Russia, Japan finally deprived itself of any moral right to refer to the treaties of 1855 and 1873, which it itself annulled.

Thus, we can conclude that Japan, as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, received the desired territories in the Far East. Japan achieved the predatory exclusion of a number of the Kuril Islands from Russia, despite previous peace treaties. But one can also say that the Treaty of Portsmouth was not entirely competent, because by attacking Russia, Japan violated the first paragraph of the Shimodsky Treaty of 1855 - "From now on, let there be permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan." Also, the treaty of 1905 practically terminated the treaty of 1875, to which the Japanese are trying to refer. Because its meaning was that Japan was giving up Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuriles. The route of 1875 between Japan and Russia becomes, most likely, a historical monument, and not a document on which to rely. The next stage in Russo-Japanese relations will be World War II.

On February 11, 1945, the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed an agreement in Crimea that 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, the USSR would enter the war against Japan on the side of the allies on the condition: “Restoration of the rights belonging to Russia, violated by the perfidious attack of Japan in 1904, namely the return of the southern part of Sakhalin Island and all the islands adjacent to it; transfer of the Kuril Islands” The heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain put their signatures under this agreement, in which they stated that the claims of the USSR should be satisfied.

At the time of taking office, Truman was informed about the secret work on the creation of the atomic bomb. Truman had no doubt that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince Japan of the inevitability of its complete defeat, and then atomic weapons would not be needed. However, the idea of ​​removing the USSR from the post-war settlement in East Asia did not give him rest. Truman's well-known statement on this subject: "If the bomb goes off, which I think it will, I will certainly have a club for these guys."

On August 6 and 8, 1945, without any military necessity, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on the peaceful, densely populated Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. However, this did not force Japan to capitulate. The Japanese government hid from the people the message about the use of the atomic bomb by the Americans and continued to prepare for a decisive battle on its territory. In strict accordance with the promises made in the Crimea, exactly three months after the surrender of Germany, the government of the USSR on August 8 declared war on Japan. On August 9, at an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki declared: the entry of the Soviet Union into the war this morning puts us completely in a hopeless situation and makes it impossible to continue the war.

On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, on board the American battleship Missouri, representatives of the allied nations, including Soviet Lieutenant General K.N. Derevyanko and representatives of Japan signed a historic pact on the unconditional surrender of Japan.

The US issues two official statements in August 1945: General Order No. 1 and US Initial Policy in Japan after Surrender. Japan was defined as consisting of the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku, and those smaller individual islands as defined by the Cairo Declaration. With its declaration of intent, Washington openly introduced an ideological element into the US-Soviet struggle for influence in the postwar world.

The package of the peace treaty with Japan developed by the United States included a provision stating that Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth. But this provision puts the question of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, as it were, in limbo, since, according to this treaty, Japan renounces South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but at the same time does not recognize the sovereignty of the USSR over these territories. And this happened when South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands, in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, had already been officially included in the USSR.

Thus, the United States foresaw in the San Francisco Treaty the absence of a genuine peace settlement between Japan and the USSR, because such a settlement was supposed to include the final resolution of all problems, including territorial ones. On July 12, 1951, a joint American-British draft of a peace treaty with Japan was published.

The head of the Soviet delegation A.A. Gromyko, speaking on September 5, stressed that the American-British draft treaty is not satisfied by any state that, not in words but in deeds, stands for the establishment of a lasting peace. So Moscow refused to join the signing of the peace treaty.

Thus, agreements were worked out at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, according to which the USSR pledged to go to war with Japan, subject to the return of its rights to the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Fulfilling its allied duty, the USSR declares war on Japan. After the capitulation of Japan, the United States embarks on a path of fierce opposition to Soviet influence. Only in 1956, thanks to the political and social forces of Japan, diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were restored.

As historians note, the “Kuril issue” was closed for the Soviet Union once and for all, as repeatedly stated by the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry A.A. Gromyko. And only short-sightedness and lack of competence, and perhaps the desire to outplay diplomatically the Japanese of the last Soviet - Gorbachev - Shevardnadze and, especially, the first leaders of the Russian Federation - Yeltsin - Kozyrev, led to the fact that they again began to discuss it at the official level to the indescribable joy of the Japanese, Americans and all the open and hidden ill-wishers of our country inside and outside of it.

Thus, we can conclude that in the 50s of the XX century another stage in the history of the Kuril Islands passed. In 1956, N.S. Khrushchev signed the Moscow Declaration. Her attitude is ambivalent. On the one hand, the state of war was ended and an attempt was made to establish diplomatic and consular relations with Japan. On the other hand, the USSR announced its agreement to transfer the islands of Hamboy and Sikotan to Japan, but after the conclusion of a peace treaty. But the Japanese violated the terms of the declaration and entered into an agreement on military cooperation with the United States, which secured the presence of American armed forces in Japan. For all the short-sightedness of Khrushchev's statements, it was about "transfer" and not "return", that is, readiness to dispose of his territory as an act of goodwill, which does not create a precedent for revising the results of the war. This declaration has become a "stumbling block" in our relations with the Japanese today.

In Japan, these territories are simply called "Northern Territories", making it clear that they belong to Japan and there is nothing to argue about.

What arguments does Japan put forward? The position of Japan is based, first of all, on the assertion that historically the four islands of Urup, Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan are primordially Japanese land and remain so, despite their occupation by the USSR in 1945. At the same time, they refer to the Synod Treaty of 1855, according to which the Russian-Japanese border in the area of ​​the Kuril Islands was established between the island of Urup and Iturup, and Iturup and the islands to the south of it were recognized as the possessions of Japan, and Urup and the islands to the north - Russia.

In international legal terms, the position of Japan is based on a legalistic argument, namely, these 4 islands are not part of the Kuril Islands, but a continuation of Hokkaido. Consequently, says Japan, signing the peace treaty, she did not give up these islands. Thus, Japan bases its claims on the assertion that the islands are not part of the Kuriles. If we turn to the history of the signing of the San Francisco Treaty between Japan and the United States, we will see that the American draft peace treaty left the territorial issue open, because there was no precise definition of the boundaries of the Kuril Islands.

The territorial issue was officially announced on October 19, 1951. Kumao Nishimura, Head of the Treaty Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, at a meeting of the special committee on a peace treaty of the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Japan, clarified the concept of "Kuril Islands", stating: "I believe that the territorial limits of the Kuril Islands, which are referred to in the agreement, include both the Northern Kuriles and southern Kuril Islands

But even in Japan there are scientists who have an opinion that differs from the official point of view, for example, the Hokkaido Shimbun newspaper published the opinion of professors S. Muroyama and H. Wada, who express doubts about the validity of the statement of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the concept The "Kuril Islands", which Japan renounced under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, do not include the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, that the Japanese Foreign Ministry's reference to the Synod Treaty of 1885 in order to confirm the official position is untenable, because, as they believe, at that time during In all diplomatic documents, Kunashir and Iturup are included in the concepts of the Kuril Islands, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry referred to the Japanese text of the treatise, which is a translator's mistake.

Today, the media often hear allegations that the USSR allowed the forcible seizure of the islands belonging to Japan, and the question of their return is raised, and all kinds of historical evidence and sociological surveys are conducted in favor of this.

N.S. Khrushchev was one of the first to make such an assessment in his memoirs: “If we had previously given a correct assessment of the conditions that had developed after the defeat of Japanese militarism and would have signed a peace treaty developed by the American side without our participation, but taking into account our interests, we would immediately open an embassy. We were invited to sign a peace treaty with Japan, but we refused. An ambiguous situation has developed that continues to this day.

Thus, the position of our state, like that of Japan, is quite justified, but it must be remembered that the disputed territories belong to us. And the fate of these territories depends on the policy of our state.

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