The largest military-political event of the Second World War

February 2, 2018 will mark the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, which has become a symbol of courage and resilience of our people unprecedented in world history. B Itva, which unfolded on the banks of the Volga from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943, marked the beginning of a radical change not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Second World War as a whole.

The victory near Moscow was of great international importance. Japan and Turkey refrained from entering the war against the Soviet Union. The increased prestige of the USSR on the world stage contributed to the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition. However, in the summer of 1942, due to the mistakes of the Soviet leadership, the Red Army suffered a number of major defeats in the North-West, near Kharkov and in the Crimea. German troops reached the Volga - Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The Germans again seized the strategic initiative, and went on the offensive. General G. Blumentritt, Deputy Chief of Staff of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, recalled: “Industrial and economic circles in Germany exerted strong pressure on the military, proving the importance of continuing offensive operations. They told Hitler that they could not continue the war without Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat.” Hitler fully shared the point of view of his economists, and in the spring of 1942, the General Staff developed a plan for a summer offensive (all the largest operations of the Wehrmacht were called options. The German summer offensive in the USSR was given the code name "Fall Blau" ("Fall Blau") - a blue option.) the main purpose of which was to seize the North Caucasian oil fields of Maykop and Grozny and capture Baku. It was also supposed to capture the entire Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and force Turkey to enter the war on the side of Germany. However, unexpectedly, in early July, Hitler, without waiting for the capture of Stalingrad and the turn to the Caucasus, ordered the removal of 11 divisions from the advancing troops, and some parts of the reserve, which were sent to Army Group North with the order to take Leningrad. The 11th German army was also transported there from the Crimea. Hitler's next step was the signing of Directive No. 45 on July 23, 1942. It ordered Army Groups "A" and "B" to split up - the first was to advance through the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and through the Caucasus to Grozny and Baku, and the second - to capture Stalingrad, and then Astrakhan. Almost all tank and motorized units were attached to Army Group A. Stalingrad was supposed to take the 6th field army of General Paulus.

The Soviet command, attaching paramount importance to the Stalingrad direction, believed that only a stubborn defense of this area could frustrate enemy plans, ensure the integrity of the entire front, and keep Stalingrad in their hands. It was also taken into account that in the current situation, the Stalingrad direction became extremely advantageous in operational terms, since from there it was possible to deliver a very dangerous blow to the flank and rear of the enemy grouping advancing through the Don to the Caucasus. Thus, the idea of ​​the Headquarters to organize a strategic defense was to bleed and stop the enemy in stubborn defensive battles, preventing him from reaching the Volga, to win the time necessary to prepare strategic reserves and move them to the Stalingrad region, so that in the future go on a decisive offensive.

On July 17, 1942, the vanguards of the divisions of the 6th German Army met at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers with the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front. The battles of the detachments marked the beginning of the great Battle of Stalingrad.

Failures in the summer battles had a negative impact on the combat capability of the Soviet troops. On July 28, 1942, the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 was issued, later known as the order "Not a step back!" For the first time in the war, Soviet soldiers, officers and generals, who were in a difficult state of mind under the influence of the successes of the Wehrmacht, heard the truth about the current state of affairs. Stalin was able to find simple, precise words that really reached the consciousness and heart of everyone.

“... Some stupid people at the front console themselves with talk that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have an abundance of bread ... Every commander, Red Army soldier and The political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children ... After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, much less people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in manpower reserves or in grain reserves. Retreating further means ruining yourself and at the same time ruining our Motherland. Each new piece of territory left by us will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense in every possible way ...

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat. Not one step back! This should be our main call now.”

These words, according to the recollections of many veterans, worked as a release from uncertainty, strengthened the morale of the entire army.

In August, fierce battles of the Soviet troops unfolded on the near approaches to Stalingrad. And in September, German troops began to storm the city. After two weeks of exhausting battles, they captured the center of the city, but they could not complete the main task - capturing the entire bank of the Volga in the region of Stalingrad. Fierce fighting in the city itself lasted more than two months. In military history before Stalingrad, such stubborn urban battles were not known. For every home. For each floor or basement. For every wall. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General Alexander Rodimtsev described those August days as follows: « The city looked like hell. The flames of the fires rose several hundred meters. Clouds of smoke and dust hurt my eyes. Buildings collapsed, walls fell, iron warped". A very characteristic statement appeared in a London radio message on October 11, 1942: “Poland was conquered in 28 days, and in Stalingrad, in 28 days, the Germans took several houses. In 38 days, France was conquered, and in Stalingrad, in 38 days, the Germans advanced from one side of the street to the other. Forever entered the history of the Battle of Stalingrad "Lyudnikov Island" - a small piece of land 700 meters along the front and 400 meters deep in the Lower village of the "Barricades" plant. Here the 138th Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Colonel I.I. Lyudnikov stood to death. On three sides, the division was surrounded by the Nazis, the fourth side was the Volga. Regardless of the huge losses, the Nazis from November 11 continuously attacked parts of the division. On that day alone, six enemy attacks were repulsed, up to a thousand Nazis were destroyed. The defense of the city lasted more than two months and ended in the collapse of enemy plans. Hitler did not achieve his goal. The city was held. Thus ended the first half of the heroic Battle of Stalingrad, unparalleled in history.

For Nazi Germany, the end of 1942, despite the seizure of large territories, was characterized by a deterioration in the economic, political and military situation. During defensive operations, all enemy plans to defeat the Red Army and seize the Caucasus with its oil sources were thwarted. The offensive capabilities of the German armed forces on the Soviet-German front were exhausted. The strike forces were weakened. The front of the advancing armies turned out to be stretched out, there were no large operational reserves. In such a situation, on October 14, 1942, the Hitlerite high command issued Order No. 1, according to which the Nazi army was to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front in order to hold the occupied territory, wear down the Soviet troops, make up for losses and create the prerequisites for the resumption offensive in the spring of 1943.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet troops decided to defeat in the winter of 1942-1943. the southern wing of the fascist German front from Voronezh to the Black Sea and simultaneously carry out a number of operations to improve the strategic position of Moscow and Leningrad. The ultimate goal of these operations was to achieve favorable conditions for the deployment of new major offensive operations. The Soviet command decided to initially go on a counteroffensive near Stalingrad with the aim of defeating the main enemy grouping in the south, and further develop the offensive in the Kharkov, Donbass and North Caucasian directions. By the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, our troops were opposed by a grouping that included: the 6th field and 4th tank German fascist armies, the 8th army of fascist Italy, the 3rd and 4th armies, the 6th army and 4 th Cavalry Corps of Royal Romania. The enemy troops included more than a million people (660 thousand of them in combat units), about 700 tanks, 10,300 guns and mortars of all calibers (including field guns - up to 5 thousand, anti-tank guns - 2.5 thousand, mortars of caliber from 81 mm and above - 2.7 thousand) and more than 1,200 aircraft. Although the German troops suffered heavy losses in previous battles, they still retained the ability to stubborn resistance.

The main forces of the Germans occupied tactical defense. There were only 6 divisions in the operational reserve. The absolute majority of the Nazi divisions were drawn into the struggle for Stalingrad. The weakest areas of defense were on the flanks of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping. Here the Romanian troops defended themselves, which were less armed and trained, and most of their personnel did not share the aggressive aspirations of both the German fascist ruling clique and their sold-out fascist and pro-fascist rulers.

By the second half of November 1942, the Soviet troops near Stalingrad were united into three fronts: Southwestern, Donskoy, Stalingrad. In total, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, there were ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies in the fronts. The Soviet troops had to solve a difficult task. Its difficulty was explained, first of all, by the relatively unfavorable balance of forces. Therefore, the fronts and armies experienced great difficulty in creating shock groupings, the fronts did not have the opportunity to allocate a sufficient number of forces to their reserves, and the creation of second echelons in them turned out to be generally impossible. In this regard, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and under his personal control, during September and October 1942, in an atmosphere of the deepest secrecy, a huge number of Soviet troops and military equipment from Siberia was transferred to the Stalingrad Front. Of course, all measures of secrecy and secrecy were observed, even mail messages were banned. Our foreign intelligence did a good job. As the head of the NKVD department, Sudoplatov, said in his book, through the double agent Max (who worked for both the NKVD and the Abwehr) and served in the communications department at Rokossovsky's headquarters, the Germans were "leaked" information that a major operation was being prepared in the Rzhev direction. Moreover, shortly before the start of the counteroffensive, Stalin removed Zhukov from Stalingrad and instructed him to start preparing the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation. The Germans were informed of this appointment in a timely manner. And they hastily transferred four tank divisions here, believing that where Zhukov was, Stalin would strike the main blow.

Indeed, the Germans did not know anything about the upcoming counter-offensive of the Soviet troops. Subsequently, the chief of the general staff of the German 6th Field Army Arthur Schmidt admits: "We all did not realize the scale of the threat and again underestimated the Russians." The mistake of the intelligence department of foreign Eastern armies, which was then headed by the future chief of West German intelligence, Reinhard Gehlen, also attracts attention. On October 31, he reported that there were no signs of an impending major Russian offensive anywhere. .

It should be noted that the situation at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was incomparably more favorable than at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow. As part of the fronts, a powerful means of developing operational success appeared in the form of tank and mechanized corps. In his order on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, I. V. Stalin promised: “There will be a holiday on our street!”. And these were not empty words, since the date of the counter-offensive of the Red Army on the Stalingrad front - November 19 - had already been precisely determined.

The purpose of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad was to defeat the main strategic grouping of the enemy, wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy and initiate a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War in favor of the Soviet Union and all the progressive forces of the world. In accordance with this goal, according to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts were to break through the enemy’s defenses in a number of sectors and, developing a strike in converging directions on Kalach-Soviet, surround and destroy the main enemy grouping near Stalingrad.

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with strikes from the Southwestern and Don fronts. The next day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front began hostilities. The Southwestern Front, with the forces of the 5th Panzer and 21st Armies, went on the offensive at 0850 hours after an 80-minute artillery preparation. In three hours of battle, rifle divisions captured the first position of the main line of defense. After that, tank corps were brought into battle, which quickly completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense and rushed into the operational depth. Following the tank corps, cavalry corps entered the gap. By the end of the day, the troops of the shock group of the Southwestern Front had advanced as rifle divisions up to 10-19 km, and tank corps - up to 18-35 km. Having completed the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the troops of all three fronts continued to develop the offensive in the operational depth. Tank and mechanized corps advanced with great success, sometimes in a day, advancing up to 60-70 km. Thus, the encirclement of the enemy was achieved. Subsequently, a fierce struggle of our troops unfolded for the liquidation of the encircled enemy and the consolidation of the situation on the external front.

Thus, as a result of the combat operations of our troops at the first stage of the operation, the enemy's defenses were broken through, the encirclement of his main forces was completed, and favorable conditions were created for their subsequent destruction. The 273,000-strong group of Nazi troops was surrounded. In addition, during the hostilities, the 3rd Army of Royal Romania was defeated, consisting of fifteen divisions, of which four divisions were captured in the Raspopinskaya area. Major defeats south of Stalingrad were also suffered by the formations of the 6th Army and 4th Cavalry Corps of the 4th Romanian Army.

Meanwhile, the fascist German command decided to rescue its encircled troops at all costs. To carry out this operation, a new army group "Don" was created under the command of Field Marshal Manstein, which included up to 30 divisions. Part of the forces of this group was to operate against the Southwestern Front and concentrated in the Tormosin area. The other part of its troops was concentrated in the Kotelnikovo area and was intended for operations against the Stalingrad Front. The greatest danger was represented by the Kotelnikovskaya group, in which there were up to 350 tanks. From the areas of Tormosin and Kotelnikovo, the Don group was supposed to strike in the general direction on Sovetsky, Marinovka and connect with the encircled troops. The encircled troops were also preparing a strike towards the Don group.

Preparing an offensive against the encircled enemy grouping, since the end of November 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command launched preparations for a further offensive by our troops on the external front, with its general development towards Rostov. It was decided to start the defeat of the enemy in the Rostov direction with a powerful blow from the troops of the South-Western and part of the forces of the Voronezh fronts. In November, five rifle divisions, four tank divisions, and two mechanized corps were sent to reinforce the Southwestern Front. The success of our troops in this operation greatly facilitated the struggle of the Stalingrad Front against the enemy's Kotelnikov grouping. However, despite the success achieved by the Soviet troops, the fascist German command managed to launch its counterattack in this direction, and the troops of the Stalingrad Front had to fight heavy defensive battles in the period from December 12 to 14, 1942. During this time, the Kotelnikovskaya group of German troops managed to advance up to 40 km and reach the line of the Myshkov River; no more than 40 km remained to the encircled group. According to Manstein, it was during these days that Paulus had the last opportunity to break out of the clutches with his army. To do this, it was necessary to strike with all available means towards Gotha's tanks. But Paulus did not try to do this, although Manstein, according to him, took full responsibility. After the war, Paulus angrily denied this, but this did not change the essence of the matter - he, together with the Fuhrer, took full responsibility for the death of his soldiers. Goth could not wait for Paulus for a long time at Myshkovo, and already on December 22, under the powerful blows of the Soviet troops, he began to quickly retreat and, as a result, was able to gain a foothold only 100 km from the “boiler”. The death warrant of the 6th Army was signed. In the early 1950s, Erich von Manstein, captured by the British, revealed the harsh logic of war. Despite the fact that I myself, he writes, urged the Fuhrer to decide on a breakthrough, I was firmly convinced that the 6th Army "was obliged to tie down the enemy forces opposing it for as long as possible," even at the cost of self-sacrifice.

On January 30, Paulus sent Hitler a warm congratulations on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of his coming to power. In a response radiogram, the Fuhrer awarded Paulus the rank of Field Marshal and said that not a single German field marshal had been captured yet. Paulus understood everything perfectly, but did not want to shoot. With the advent of the new year, 1943, a severe famine came to the 6th Army, especially unbearable against the backdrop of a 20-degree frost. The Soviet command knew about the position of the German troops, and was in no hurry to attack - hunger, cold and typhus were doing well anyway. An eyewitness to these events, the commander of the 767th Grenadier Regiment, Colonel Steidle, wrote about the situation in which Paulus's subordinates were then: “The field, littered with dead bodies, is indescribably scary. We looked with horror at the corpses with naked limbs, torn chests and cramped hands, with faces frozen in mournful grimaces, and pewter eyes bulging from fear from fear. And the living encroached on the dead, taking off their boots and uniforms, using a knife and an ax for this. Everyone thinks only of himself. This is how they will leave you, and your icy corpse will be desecrated in the same way. And we all tremble at the thought that the same fate inevitably awaits us as these inhabitants of the field. If earlier they dug graves and put up crosses, now there are not enough living people to dig graves for the dead.”

Our troops went on the offensive against the Kotelnikovskaya grouping on December 24, 1942 at 6 am after a 15-minute powerful fire attack. By the end of December 26, the enemy defense was broken through, and on December 30, the troops of the Stalingrad Front completed the defeat of the Kotelnikov group. So, the successful actions of our troops in December 1942 on the external front thwarted the enemy's attempt to unblock the encircled group near Stalingrad, and its position became hopeless. The liquidation of the encircled enemy grouping was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commanded by Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky). The front included seven combined-arms armies, from the air the offensive of the troops was supported by the forces of the air army. According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in this operation, called the "Ring", the troops of the Don Front were to deliver the main blow from west to east, given that in the western part of the ledge there were enemy troops who suffered the greatest losses, and their defense was less prepared. The main blow was delivered by the forces of the 65th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General P.I. Batov) and the 21st Army (commanded by Major General I.M. Chistyakov). From the south towards st. Voroponovo carry out the strike of the 57th and 64th armies. From the north and from the region of Stalingrad, the 24th, 66th and 62nd armies attacked Gorodishche. The delivery of these blows was supposed to lead to the dismemberment of the encircled enemy grouping, its destruction in parts.

To avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the commander of the Don Front, Colonel-General K.K. Rokossovsky and the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov on January 8, 1943 presented an ultimatum to the commander of the encircled troops, Field Marshal Paulus. This ultimatum was humane, saved lives and did not humiliate the dignity of those surrounded. However, it was not accepted. Then, on January 10, 1943, the Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive.

Overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, the troops of the 21st Army on January 26, in the area west of Mamaev Kurgan, united with the troops of the 62nd Army. The encircled enemy troops were pressed against the Volga and cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern strike force was captured along with Field Marshal Paulus and his headquarters. On February 2, after the strongest artillery fire strike, the northern group also laid down their arms. The great historical battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete victory of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Thus, the great battle on the Volga ended with a brilliant victory for the Soviet Armed Forces. Five armies of fascist Germany and its allies were defeated: two German, two Romanian and one Italian. In total, the enemy lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured, lost three and a half thousand tanks, over three thousand combat and transport aircraft, more than twelve thousand guns and mortars.

The Battle of Stalingrad is rightfully defined as the largest military-political event of the entire Second World War. It was the Stalingrad victory that predetermined the beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc, increased the scope of the liberation movement in the countries that fell under the yoke of Nazi occupation, and obviously showed that fascism was doomed to inevitable death. The world perceived the victory on the Volga as a victory of Soviet military art over German.

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Stalingrad battle. Chronicle, facts, people. In 2 volumes Publishing house : Olma-Press M., 2002

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Reinhard Gehlen Intelligence War. Covert operations of the German intelligence services. Publisher: M., Tsentrpolitgraf 2004, 1942-1971

Military history Military publishing house M., 2006

Von Manstein Erich Lost Victories "Military History Library" 1955

L. Steidle From the Volga to Weimar Publishing house "Veche" 2010

Military history Military publishing house M., 2006

Reader on Russian history Publishing house "Vlados" M., 1996

Tsobechia Gabriel

November 19, 1942 76 years ago The beginning of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad (the beginning of the Stalingrad operation).

The Battle of Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943) is one of the largest strategic operations of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War.

Its code name is Operation Uranus. The battle included two periods.

The first is the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), as a result of which not only the offensive power of the enemy was crushed and the main strike force of the German army on the southern front was bled, but also conditions were prepared for the transition of Soviet troops to a decisive counteroffensive.

The second period of the battle - the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation - began on November 19, 1942.

During the operation, Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed the main forces of the German armies.

In total, during the Battle of Stalingrad, the enemy lost about one and a half million people - a quarter of his forces operating on the Soviet-German front.

The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad was of great political and international significance, it had a significant impact on the development of the Resistance Movement on the territory of European states occupied by the fascist invaders.

As a result of the battle, the Soviet armed forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end of the war.

In the Battle of Stalingrad, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers showed unparalleled heroism and high military skill. 55 formations and units were awarded orders, 179 - converted into guards, 26 received honorary titles. About 100 fighters received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Stalingrad became a symbol of the steadfastness, courage and heroism of the Soviet people in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the motherland.

On May 1, 1945, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Stalingrad was awarded the honorary title of Hero City.

By November 1942, formations of Nazi troops and their allies (Romanians and Italians), which were part of Army Group B (Colonel General M. Weichs), were operating in the Stalingrad direction. The enemy strike force, which consisted of the most combat-ready 6th field (General of Tank Forces F. Paulus) and 4th Tank (Colonel General G. Gol) German armies, fought in the Stalingrad area and directly in the city itself. Its flanks were covered by the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies. In addition, the 8th Italian Army was defending on the Middle Don. The operational formation of Army Group "B" was one-echelon. In its reserve were only 3 divisions (two armored and one motorized). The ground forces of the enemy were supported by the Don aviation group and part of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet.

The enemy defense on the Middle Don and south of Stalingrad consisted of only one main belt 5-8 km deep, which had two positions. In the operational depth there were separate nodes of resistance, equipped at the most important road junctions. The enemy group operating in the Stalingrad direction consisted of 1 million 11 thousand people, about 10.3 thousand guns and mortars, up to 700 tanks and assault guns, over 1.2 thousand aircraft.

Soviet troops near Stalingrad were united in three fronts: the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad. Southwestern Front (lieutenant general, from 12/7/1942, colonel general N.F. Vatutin), which included four armies (1st Guards and 21st combined arms, 5th tank and 17th air), by the beginning of the operation, he was on the defensive in a 250-kilometer strip from Upper Mamon to Kletskaya. In a strip 150 km wide, from Klelskaya to Yerzovka, the Don Front (lieutenant general, from 15.01.1943 Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky) defended, which also included four armies (24th, th combined arms, 16th air). Further south in a 450-kilometer strip, from the village of Rynok (north of Stalingrad) to the Kuma River, the Stalingrad Front (Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko) was on the defensive. It consisted of six armies (62, 64, 57, 51, 28th combined arms and 8th air). The troops of all three fronts numbered 1 million 135 thousand people, about 15 thousand guns and mortars (including 115 divisions of rocket artillery - "Katyushas"), up to 1.6 thousand tanks and over 1.9 thousand aircraft.

In the areas of Serafimovich. Kletskaya and Sirotinsky, our troops held bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don, and south of Stalingrad - an operationally important defile of the Sarpinsky Lakes. The terrain in the area of ​​the forthcoming hostilities was suitable for the use of all branches of the armed forces. At the same time, numerous snow-covered ravines and gullies, steep river banks presented serious obstacles for tanks. The presence of the Don River in the operational depth of the enemy, 170-300 m wide and up to 6 m deep, was a serious obstacle and made increased demands on the engineering support of military operations. Severe climatic and difficult weather conditions had a significant impact on the combat use of aviation: frequent and thick fogs, heavy clouds and snowfalls at this time of the year limited its capabilities.

The counteroffensive plan was developed by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army with the participation of the commanders of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces, as well as the military councils of the fronts of the Stalingrad direction under the direct supervision of the Deputy Supreme Commander General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky. The decision to launch a counteroffensive near Stalingrad (the code name for Operation Uranus) was taken by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on September 13, 1942. The idea was to. in order to defeat the Romanian troops covering the flanks of the enemy strike group with strikes from the bridgeheads on the Don and from the Sarpinsky Lakes region, developing the offensive in converging directions on the city of Kalach-on-Don, the Soviet farm, to surround and destroy its main forces operating in the Stalingrad region .

The Southwestern Front received the task of delivering the main blow from the bridgeheads in the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya with the forces of the 5th Tank and 21st Combined Arms Armies, defeating the troops of the 3rd Romanian Army, and reaching the Kalach-on-Don region by the end of the third day of the operation, Sovetsky, Marinovka and connect with the troops of the Stalingrad Front, closing the encirclement ring of the Stalingrad enemy grouping. At the same time, the 1st Guards Army was to strike in a southwestern direction, reach the line of the Chir River and create an external encirclement front along it.

The Stalingrad Front was to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 51st, 57th and 64th armies from the area of ​​​​the Sarpinsky lakes, defeat the 4th Romanian army and, developing the offensive in the direction of Sovetsky, Kalach-on-Don, connect there with the troops of the South-Western front. Part of the forces of the front received the task of advancing in the direction of Abganerovo, Kotelnikovsky (now the city of Kotelnikovo) and forming an external front of encirclement along the line 150-170 km southwest of Stalingrad.

The Don Front launched strikes from the bridgehead in the Kletskaya area (65th Army) and from the Kachalinskaya area (24th Army) in converging directions to the village of Vertyachiy with the task of encircling and destroying enemy troops in the small bend of the Don. Subsequently, together with the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, he was supposed to participate in the liquidation of the encircled group of Nazi troops. The timing of the transition to the offensive was determined: for the Southwestern and Don fronts - November 19, for the Stati and the city front - November 20. This was due to the need for a simultaneous exit of the shock groups of the fronts to the Kalach-on-Don, Sovetsky area. The troops of the shock group of the South-Western Front were to overcome the distance of 110-140 km in three days, and the troops of the Stalingrad Front in two days - 90 km.

Taking into account the shallow formation of the enemy's tactical defense and the lack of prepared defensive lines in the operational depth, as well as the shallow depth of the operation, the operational formation of the fronts was one-echelon, with the allocation of small reserves. The main attention in the decisions of the front commanders was given to breaking through the enemy defenses at high rates and ensuring a swift offensive in its operational depth. To this end, forces and means were massed in the directions of the main attacks, and all tank, mechanized and cavalry corps were given reinforcements to the armies. In the breakthrough areas, which accounted for only 9% of the total length of the front line, 50-66% of all rifle divisions, up to 85% of artillery and over 90% of tanks were concentrated. As a result, superiority over the enemy was achieved in the breakthrough areas: in people - 2-2.5 times, in tanks and artillery - 4-5 times.

Near Stalingrad, for the first time on a large scale, the combat use of artillery and aviation was planned in the form of an artillery and aviation offensive.

2-6 days before the transition to the offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out. Rifle battalions (in some cases companies) supported by artillery were involved in it. In the course of it, it was revealed that only the enemy’s outposts were located in front of the Soviet troops prepared for the strike, and its forward edge was located at a depth of 2-3 km. This made it possible to make the necessary adjustments to the plan of the artillery offensive and, most importantly, excluded the conduct of artillery preparation from scratch. In addition, reconnaissance established the presence of several new formations in the enemy grouping.

At 8 o'clock, 50 min. On November 19, 1942, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the Southwestern and Don fronts went on the offensive. The counteroffensive of the Red Army on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, which was destined to become crucial not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Second World War, has begun!

Unfavorable meteorological conditions did not allow for aviation training. The rifle divisions of the 5th Panzer (Lieutenant General P.L. Romanenko) and the 21st (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) armies completed the breakthrough of the first position of the enemy’s main line of defense by noon. To increase the rate of breakthrough, the army commanders, on the orders of the front commander, brought into battle mobile groups: the 1st (Major General V.V. Butkov) and the 26th (Major General A.G. Rodin) tank corps of the 5th tank army and the 4th Tank Corps (Major General A.G. Kravchenko) of the 21st Army. They attacked the enemy on the move, together with the rifle divisions quickly broke his resistance in the second position and. having completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemy, they broke into the operational space. In the afternoon, the 3rd Guards (Major General I.A. Pliev) and the 8th (Major General M.D. Borisov) cavalry corps entered the breakthrough. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the defense of the 3rd Romanian army was broken through in two sectors: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Klstskaya area. At the same time, rifle divisions advanced to a depth of 10-19 km, and tank and cavalry corps - to 25-30 km. On the Don Front, the troops of the 65th Army (Lieutenant General P.I. Batov). having met strong resistance of the enemy, they could not break through his defenses. They only managed to wedge into the enemy's location to a depth of 3-5 km.

On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. Bad weather also prevented the use of aviation here. Troops of the 51st (Major General N.I. Trufanov), 57th (Major General F.I. Tolbukhin) and 64th (Major General M.S. Shumilov) armies broke through the defenses of the 4th Romanian Army on the first day of the attack. In the afternoon, army mobile groups were introduced into the gap: the 13th tank (Major General T.I. Tanaschishin), the 4th mechanized (Major General V.T. Volsky) and the 4th cavalry (Lieutenant General TT Shapkin) corps. By the end of the day, they had advanced to a depth of 20 km. Having entered the operational space, the mobile formations of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts launched a swift offensive in the general direction of Kalach-on-Don, enveloping the enemy's Stalingrad grouping from the flanks. As a result of the first two days of the offensive, the Soviet troops achieved major successes: the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies suffered a heavy defeat, the enemy’s operational reserves were defeated, and a deep coverage of a large grouping of Romanian troops in the Raspopinskaya area was indicated.

The successful solution of this problem largely depended on the rapid capture of crossings across the Don. To this end, on the evening of November 21, the commander of the 26th Panzer Corps detached a forward detachment consisting of two motorized rifle companies. five tanks and one armored vehicle. It was headed by the commander of the 14th motorized rifle brigade, lieutenant colonel G.N. Filippov. When approaching the river, it turned out that the bridge at Kalach-on-Don had already been blown up by the Germans. A local resident led a detachment to another bridge, located a few kilometers northwest of Kalach-on-Don. In a short skirmish, using the element of surprise (the guards of the bridge at first mistook the forward detachment for their retreating unit and allowed it to cross without hindrance), the advance detachment destroyed the guards and captured the bridge, already prepared for the explosion. All attempts by the enemy to return the crossing were unsuccessful. By evening, the 19th tank brigade (lieutenant colonel N.M. Filippenko) broke through to the aid of the advance detachment, exhausted in an unequal struggle, defeating large enemy forces on the approaches to the bridge. The success of the advance detachment was consolidated. The capture of the bridge across the Don ensured the rapid overcoming of this large water barrier by formations of the 26th and 4th tank corps, which soon approached. On November 23, the 26th Panzer Corps, after stubborn battles, captured the city of Kalach-on-Don, capturing large trophies in it (Kalach-on-Don was the main rear base of the German 6th field army). For courage and heroism shown during the capture of the bridge across the Don and the liberation of the city of Kalach-on-Don, all the soldiers and commanders of the forward detachment were awarded orders and medals, and Lieutenant Colonels Filippov and Filippenko were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

At 4 p.m. on November 23, the 4th Panzer Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front linked up in the area of ​​the Soviet farm, completing the operational encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy grouping. The 45th tank brigade (lieutenant colonel P.K. Zhidkov) of the 4th tank corps and the 36th mechanized brigade (lieutenant colonel M.I. Rodionov) of the 4th mechanized corps were the first to reach this Don farm. 22 divisions and more than 160 separate units that were part of the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the enemy were surrounded. The total number of the encircled enemy group was about 300 thousand people. On the same day, the Raspopin enemy grouping (27 thousand people) capitulated. This was the first capitulation of a large enemy grouping in the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, the troops of the 57th Army destroyed two Romanian divisions in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Oak Ravine (the western shore of Lake Sarpa).

On November 24-30, the troops of all fronts, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, squeezed the encirclement closer and closer. With the improvement of the weather, aviation provided significant assistance to the ground forces, which carried out 6,000 sorties in six November days. By November 30, the territory occupied by the encircled enemy had more than halved. By the end of November, rifle divisions and cavalry corps of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, advancing in the southwestern and southern directions, created an outer encirclement front. It passed along the line of the Chir and Don rivers, then turned to Kotelnikovsky and was almost 500 km wide. The distance between the outer and inner fronts of encirclement varied from 30 to 110 km.

For the blockade of Paulus's troops, the German fascist command in the koine of November created the Don Army Group (Field Marshal E. Manstein), which included German and Romanian formations that had escaped encirclement, newly arrived divisions, as well as the encircled 6th Army, - a total of 44 divisions. Initially, Manstein planned to strike from two directions - from the areas of Tormosin and Kotelnikovsky in the general direction of Stalingrad. However, the lack of forces (due to the opposition of partisans and Soviet air strikes on railway junctions, the transfer of German divisions from the West to the Don was very slow), as well as the activity of Soviet troops on the outer front of the encirclement, did not allow this plan to be carried out. Then Manstein decided to begin deblockade operations with the forces of only one Kotelnikov group, which had more troops than the Tormosin group, which was supposed to go on the offensive later. The Kotelnikovskaya grouping (army group "Got": 13 divisions and several separate units) received the task of striking along the railway Kotelnikovsky village - Stalingrad, breaking through to the encircled troops. Its basis was the 57th German tank corps (up to 300 tanks and assault guns).

The fronts of the Stalingrad direction at that time were preparing to solve three tasks at the same time: defeating the enemy on the Middle Don, eliminating the grouping surrounded in the Stalingrad region, and repelling a possible enemy counterattack on the outer front of the encirclement.

On December 12, 1942, the Germans went on the offensive from the Kotelnikovo area. The enemy tank divisions broke through in the center of the front of the duck, which was seriously weakened in previous battles and had not yet had time to firmly gain a foothold on the occupied line of the 51st Army (it was 3 times inferior to the enemy in tanks, and more than 2.5 times in guns and mortars) and by the end of the day they advanced to a depth of 40 km. But the stubborn resistance of the army units and formations on the flanks of the breakthrough forced the enemy to send significant forces to fight them and thereby weaken the blow in the main direction. Taking advantage of this, the commander of the 51st Army (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, from 01/08/1943, Major General N.I. Trufanov) with rifle divisions pinned down the enemy grouping that had broken through from the front, and with mobile formations (105 tanks) struck her counterattack in the flank. As a result, the enemy was forced to disperse his forces on a broad front and sharply reduce the pace of the offensive.

The troops of the 51st Army failed to defeat the enemy strike force, but its offensive slowed down. Over the next 10 days, despite all efforts, the Goth army group was able to advance only 20 km. She met especially strong resistance in the area of ​​​​the Verkhnekumsky farm (the interfluve of Myshkov - Esaulovsky Aksay), Here the Soviet soldiers of the 51st Army fought to the death, demonstrating high combat skill, unshakable stamina and mass heroism. Thus, the 1378th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Diasamidze, subjected to continuous attacks by enemy aircraft, repelled more than 30 enemy attacks and destroyed up to two infantry battalions and several dozen German tanks for five days (from December 15 to 19). The regiment left its position only after the Nazis managed, using overwhelming numerical superiority, to surround the main forces of the 4th Mechanized Corps, which was defending in the Verkhnekumsky area. After that, Diasamidze gathered the remnants of his regiment into one fist and broke through the encirclement with a sudden blow at night.

The 55th separate tank regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.A., also fought valiantly near Verkhnekumsky. Aslanov. He repulsed 12 enemy attacks, while destroying up to two companies of infantry. 20 tanks and up to 50 vehicles with soldiers and ammunition. For courage and heroism shown in the battles near Verkhnekumsky, lieutenant colonels Aslanov and Diasamidze were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. To match their commanders, their subordinates steadfastly held on. Twenty-four soldiers of the 1378th Infantry Regiment, led by Lieutenant I.N. Nechaev knocked out and destroyed 18 German tanks. Up to 300 enemy soldiers and 18 tanks were destroyed by the rifle company of Senior Lieutenant P.N. Naumova, defending height 137.2. Only after all the soldiers of the company, together with the commander, died the death of the brave in an unequal battle. The enemy managed to capture the height.

In the battles near Verkhnekumsky, the Nazis lost up to 140 tanks. 17 guns and over 3.2 thousand people. The 4th mechanized corps also suffered heavy losses. But he will complete his task; fully. For the massive heroism shown in the six-day battles near Verkhnekumsky, the highest stamina and courage, the corps was transformed into the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps.

Having reached the Myshkova River, Manstein's tanks unsuccessfully attacked the Soviet troops defending here for four days. From this line to the encircled group, they had to go only about 40 km. But here, on the way of the German tank divisions, the 2nd Guards Army (Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky) urgently advanced from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, stood up as an insurmountable obstacle. It was a powerful combined-arms formation fully equipped with personnel and military equipment (122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, about 470 tanks). In a fierce battle that unfolded on the banks of the Myshkova River on December 20-23, the enemy suffered heavy losses and completely exhausted their offensive capabilities. By the end of December 23, he was forced to stop attacking and go on the defensive.

The next day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. Enemy resistance on the Myshkova River was quickly broken, and he began to retreat, pursued by Soviet troops. All his attempts to gain a foothold on intermediate lines were unsuccessful. On December 29, the 7th Tank Corps (Major General P.A. Rotmistrov) liberated the village of Kotelnikovsky after fierce fighting. On December 31, the city of Tor Mosin was taken. The remnants of the army group "Goth" were driven back across the Sad River.

The most important step of the Soviet command to disrupt the enemy's attempt to release the encircled group was the offensive of the Southwestern Front on the Middle Don (Operation Little Saturn). It began on December 16, 1942. During tense 2-week battles, the 8th Italian Army, the German-Romanian Hollidt Task Force and the remnants of the 3rd Romanian Army were utterly defeated. The 24th Panzer Corps (Major-General V.M. Badanov) distinguished itself especially, having made a 240-kilometer raid on the rear of the enemy. The result of this raid was the capture of the Tatsinskaya railway station, the defeat of the most important rear base of the Germans located there and two large airfields, from which the group surrounded in the Stalingrad region was supplied. The enemy suddenly lost huge material assets, including over 300 aircraft.

The major victory of the Soviet troops in the Middle Don and the threat of the main forces of the Southwestern Front entering the rear of Army Group Don radically changed the situation in the Stalingrad direction. The enemy finally abandoned attempts to release the Paulus grouping and concentrated his main efforts on repelling the offensive of the Soviet troops on the Middle Don.

By the end of December 1942, the fascist German command still managed to restore the front of defense on the Don, but he had to abandon the 6th Army in Stalingrad to the mercy of fate. Thus, by December 31, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, having defeated the enemy, advanced to a depth of 150-200 km. Favorable conditions were created for the liquidation of the group of Nazi troops surrounded near Stalingrad.

A major role in changing the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was played by the distracting operation "Mars", carried out in November - December 1942 by the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts. She fettered the large forces of the Wehrmacht in the western direction and did not allow the transfer of troops from here to the Don. By the beginning of 1943, the front line on the Don passed west of Kantemirovka, along the Kalitva River. north of Morozovsk, along the Chir River, then through Tormosin, Pronin. Andreevskaya.

The Stalingrad grouping of the enemy was finally liquidated during the operation "Ring", carried out by the troops of the Don Front on January 10 - February 2, 1943. At the beginning of the operation, the Don Front included eight armies (21, 24, 57, 62, 64, 65, 66- I combined arms and 16th air) - a total of 212 thousand people, about 6.9 thousand guns and mortars, up to 260 tanks and 300 aircraft. The enemy grouping consisted of over 250 thousand people, more than 4.1 thousand guns and mortars and up to 300 tanks.

On January 8, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Soviet command presented an ultimatum to the encircled enemy grouping to surrender, which was rejected. The German 6th Army carried out Hitler's order to "stand to the end."

On the morning of January 10, after a powerful 55-way artillery preparation, the troops of the Don Front went on the offensive. The 65th Army delivered the main blow from the west. It was faced with the task, in cooperation with other armies of the front, to destroy the enemy west of the Rossoshka River and to eliminate the so-called Marinov ledge.

For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, artillery support for an attack by infantry and tanks in the offensive zone was carried out with a barrage of fire to a depth of 1.5 km. Soviet troops ran into fierce resistance from the enemy and on the first day they could not break through his defenses. Only in the direction of the main attack did they manage to penetrate the enemy defenses to a depth of 3-5 km. The breakthrough problem was solved only the next day. By the end of January 12, the troops of the Don Front reached the Rossoshka River and liquidated the Marinovsky ledge of the front. Three German divisions were defeated here.

The second line of enemy defense passed along Rossoshka. Her breakthrough was assigned to the 21st Army. Resuming the offensive on January 15, the troops of the 21st Army by January 17 had completed the breakthrough of the enemy defenses and reached the Voroionovo region, where they again encountered a well-prepared defense. In stubborn battles on January 22-25, the resistance of the Nazi troops on this line was broken. On the evening of January 26, the soldiers of the 21st Army in the area of ​​Mamaev Kurgan united with the soldiers of the 62nd Army, which had been fighting in Stalingrad since September 1942. The first to meet here was the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Major General N.D. Kozin) 21st Army and the 284th Infantry Division (Colonel N.F. Batyuk) of the 62nd Army. Thus, the enemy grouping was cut into two parts.

However, despite the hopelessness of the situation, the enemy continued to stubbornly resist. Under the powerful blows of the Soviet troops, he lost one position after another. Soon, the struggle among the city ruins, where the remnants of the 6th German army were driven, broke up into several centers isolated from each other. A mass surrender of German and Romanian soldiers began. On the morning of January 31, the southern group of troops of the 6th Army ceased to exist. With her, along with his headquarters, the commander of the 6th Field Army, Field Marshal F. Paulus, surrendered (this was the highest military rank in the German army, Paulus received just a few hours before the surrender). On February 2, the northern group, led by Colonel General K. Strekker, also capitulated. More than 140 thousand German and Romanian soldiers and officers were destroyed by the troops of the Don Front during the operation "Ring", more than 91 thousand people surrendered, including more than 2.5 thousand officers and 24 generals led by Paulus.

On February 2, 1943, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Don Front, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov and the commander of the Don Front, Colonel-General K.K. Rokossovsky reported to the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin on the liquidation of the Stalingrad grouping of the enemy.

The Battle of Stalingrad ended in a complete triumph of Soviet military art. As a result of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the 4th German tank was defeated. The 3rd and 4th Romanian, 8th Italian armies and several operational groups, and the 6th German field army ceased to exist. The total losses of the enemy during the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad amounted to over 800 thousand people, up to 2 thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 3 thousand combat and transport aircraft. The Nazi troops and their allies were thrown back far to the west of the Volga.

The victorious outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad was of great military and political significance. He made a decisive contribution to achieving a radical change not only in the Great Patriotic War, but throughout the Second World War, was the most important stage on the path of the Soviet people to victory over Germany. Conditions were created for the deployment of the general offensive of the Red Army and the mass expulsion of the invaders from the territories they occupied.

As a result of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Armed Forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end of the war. The victory at Stalingrad raised the international prestige of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces even higher, contributed to the further strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition, and the intensification of military operations in other theaters of war. The peoples of Europe, enslaved by fascist Germany, believed in their imminent liberation and began to wage a more active struggle against the fascist German occupiers.

The crushing defeat at Stalingrad was a severe moral and political shock for fascist Germany and its satellites. It finally shook the foreign policy positions of the Third Reich, shocked its ruling circles, and undermined the confidence of its allies. For the first time since the beginning of World War II, a nationwide mourning was declared in Germany for the 6th field army that died in Stalingrad. Japan was forced to finally abandon plans to attack the USSR, and Turkey, despite strong pressure from Germany, decided to refrain from entering the war on the side of the fascist bloc and remain neutral.

The outstanding victory of the Red Army on the banks of the Volga and the Dol showed the whole world its increased power and the high level of Soviet military art.

The most important prerequisites for a successful counter-offensive near Stalingrad were: the correct choice of strikes and methods of troop action, the skillful creation of strike groups for the offensive, the thoroughness and secrecy of the preparation of the operation, the correct use of forces and means in the offensive, clear interaction between fronts and armies, the rapid creation of internal and external fronts encirclement with the simultaneous development of the offensive on both fronts.

The moment was well chosen for going over to the counteroffensive, when the enemy had already exhausted his offensive possibilities, but had not yet had time to create a defensive grouping and prepare a solid defense. The encirclement of the enemy was carried out with an almost equal ratio of forces and means of the parties and in a short time. At the same time, selected, well-equipped and armed enemy troops, who had rich combat experience, became the object of the encirclement.

A skillfully organized air blockade of the enemy played an important role in liquidating the encircled grouping of Nazi troops. As a result, an attempt to create a so-called "air bridge" to supply the group surrounded by air near Stalingrad, which the Nazi command so counted on, completely failed. During the entire period of the air blockade, which began in December 1942, 1,160 enemy combat and transport aircraft were destroyed, and one third of this number was destroyed at airfields.

An exceptionally important role in matters of the effective use of strategic reserves and the skillful organization of interaction between groups of fronts operating in different strategic directions belonged to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

For military distinctions in the Battle of Stalingrad, 44 units and formations were awarded honorary titles, 55 were awarded orders, 183 units, formations and associations were transformed into guards. Tens of thousands of Stalingrad soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 112 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The medal "For the Defense of Stalingrad" (established on December 22, 1942) was awarded to more than 707 thousand participants in the battle. At the same time, it should be noted that the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad over one of the strongest armies in the world - the German fascist - was given to the Red Army at a high price. During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops lost 486 thousand people, including about 155 thousand people irretrievably, about 3.6 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2.9 thousand tanks and over 700 aircraft.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, Volgograd (Stalingrad) was awarded the honorary title of Hero City with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (May 8, 1965). The memory of the Battle of Stalingrad is immortalized in a grandiose monument-ensemble erected on Mamaev Kurgan in 1967. Centuries will pass, but the unfading glory of the defenders of the Volga stronghold will live forever in the memory of the peoples of the world as the brightest example of courage and heroism unparalleled in military history. The name "Statingrad" is forever inscribed in golden letters in the history of our Fatherland.

On the 516th day of the war, from a massive artillery shelling in the early morning, our troops began to surround and destroy the enemy.

By the beginning of the counteroffensive in the Stalingrad direction, the troops of the South-Western (1st Guards and 21st A, 5th TA, 17th and from December - 2nd VA), Donskoy (65th, 24th and 66th A, 16th VA) and Stalingrad (62, 64, 57, 51 and 28th A, 8th VA) fronts.

The Soviet troops were opposed by the 8th Italian, 3rd and 4th Romanian, German 6th field and 4th tank armies of Army Group "B".

Breakthrough of the enemy defenses was carried out simultaneously in several sectors. In the morning, a heavy fog hung over the Stalingrad region, so we had to abandon the use of aviation.

Artillery cleared the way for Soviet soldiers. At 07:30, the enemy heard volleys of Katyushas.

The fire was fired at previously reconnoitered targets, therefore, it inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. 3500 guns and mortars smashed the enemy defenses. The crushing fire inflicted heavy damage on the enemy and had a frightening effect on him. However, due to poor visibility, not all targets were destroyed, especially on the flanks of the strike force of the Southwestern Front, where the enemy offered the greatest resistance to the advancing troops. At 8 o'clock. 50 min. the rifle divisions of the 5th Panzer and 21st Armies, together with tanks of direct infantry support, went on the attack.

The advance was slow, the enemy connected reserves, in some areas not losing ground to the last. Even the tank army was not able to ensure such a pace of advancement of the Soviet troops, which was originally planned.

At the same time, the troops of the Don Front went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered by the formations of the 65th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General P.I. Batov. At 8 o'clock. 50 minutes - 80 minutes after the start of artillery preparation - rifle divisions went on the attack.

The first two lines of trenches on the coastal high ground were taken at once. The battle for the nearest heights unfolded. The enemy's defense was built according to the type of separate strongholds connected by trenches of a full profile. Each height is a heavily fortified point.

Only by 2 p.m. the enemy’s stubborn resistance was broken, the first, most heavily fortified positions were hacked, the enemy’s defenses were broken through in two sectors: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area, the 21st and 5th tank armies launched an offensive. By the end of the day, the tankers fought 20-35 km.

At first, the 6th Army of Paulus did not feel the imminent danger. At 18.00 on November 19, 1942, the army command announced that on November 20 it plans to continue the operations of reconnaissance units in Stalingrad.

However, the order of the commander of army group "B", given at 22.00, left no doubt about the imminent danger. General M. Weichs demanded that F. Paulus immediately stop all offensive operations in Stalingrad and allocate 4 formations to strike in a northwestern direction against the advancing troops of the Red Army.

Throughout the day of November 19, 1942, the soldiers of the Southwestern and Don fronts in offensive battles near Stalingrad show high fighting qualities, an unshakable will to win. Describing the main reasons for the successful operations of the fronts in the offensive operation, the head of the political department, divisional commissar M. V. Rudakov, wrote in a report to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army: only the suddenness of the strike decided the outcome of the battles. Victory over the enemy is the result, first of all, of the high offensive impulse of our troops ... ".

Thus begins a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War as a whole.

Interview with Georgy Zhukov about Operation Uranus. Archive video:

On November 19, 1942, the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad began

On November 19, 1942, the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad began ( Operation Uranus). The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the greatest battles in the Great Patriotic War and World War II. The military chronicle of Russia has a huge number of examples of courage and heroism, the valor of soldiers on the battlefield and the strategic skill of Russian commanders. But even in their example, the Battle of Stalingrad stands out.

For 200 days and nights on the banks of the great rivers Don and Volga, and then at the walls of the city on the Volga and directly in Stalingrad itself, this fierce battle continued. The battle unfolded over a vast territory of about 100 thousand square meters. km with a front length of 400 - 850 km. More than 2.1 million soldiers took part in this titanic battle from both sides at different stages of hostilities. In terms of significance, scale and fierceness of hostilities, the Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all previous battles in world history.

This battle includes two stages.

First stage- Stalingrad strategic defensive operation, it lasted from July 17, 1942 to November 18, 1942. At this stage, in turn, one can distinguish: defensive operations on the distant approaches to Stalingrad from July 17 to September 12, 1942 and the defense of the city itself from September 13 to November 18, 1942. There were no long pauses or truces in the battles for the city, the battles and skirmishes went on without interruption. Stalingrad for the German army became a kind of "graveyard" of their hopes and aspirations. The city ground thousands of enemy soldiers and officers. The Germans themselves called the city "hell on earth", "Red Verdun", noted that the Russians fought with unprecedented ferocity, fighting to the last man. On the eve of the Soviet counter-offensive, the German troops launched the 4th assault on Stalingrad, or rather its ruins. On November 11, against the 62nd Soviet Army (by this time it numbered 47 thousand soldiers, about 800 guns and mortars and 19 tanks), 2 tank and 5 infantry divisions were thrown into battle. By this time, the Soviet army was already divided into three parts. A fiery hail fell on the Russian positions, they were ironed by enemy aircraft, it seemed that there was nothing alive there anymore. However, when the German chains went on the attack, Russian arrows began to mow them down.

German soldier with Soviet PPSh, Stalingrad, spring 1942. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

By mid-November, the German offensive had fizzled out in all major directions. The enemy was forced to make a decision to go on the defensive. On this, the defensive part of the Battle of Stalingrad was completed. The troops of the Red Army solved the main task by stopping the powerful offensive of the Nazis in the Stalingrad direction, creating the prerequisites for a retaliatory strike by the Red Army. During the defense of Stalingrad, the enemy suffered heavy losses. The German armed forces lost about 700 thousand people killed and wounded, about 1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.4 thousand combat and transport aircraft. Instead of mobile warfare and rapid advance, the main enemy forces were drawn into bloody and furious urban battles. The plan of the German command for the summer of 1942 was thwarted. On October 14, 1942, the German command decides to transfer the army to strategic defense along the entire length of the Eastern Front. The troops received the task of holding the front line, offensive operations were planned to continue only in 1943.

Stalingrad in October 1942, Soviet soldiers are fighting at the Krasny Oktyabr plant. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

Soviet soldiers advance through the ruins of Stalingrad, August 1942. (Georgy Zelma/Waralbum.ru)

It must be said that at that time the Soviet troops also suffered huge losses in personnel and equipment: 644 thousand people (irretrievable - 324 thousand people, sanitary - 320 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, about 1400 tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft.

October 1942. Dive bomber Junkers Ju 87 over Stalingrad. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

Ruins of Stalingrad, November 5, 1942. (AP Photo)

The second period of the battle on the Volga- Stalingrad strategic offensive operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in September-November 1942 developed a plan for the strategic counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. The development of the plan was led by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. On November 13, the plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by the Stavka under the chairmanship of Joseph Stalin. The Southwestern Front under the command of Nikolai Vatutin was given the task of inflicting deep blows on enemy forces from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya. The grouping of the Stalingrad Front under the command of Andrei Eremenko was advancing from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. The offensive groupings of both fronts were to meet in the Kalach area and take the main enemy forces near Stalingrad into an encirclement ring. At the same time, the troops of these fronts created an external encirclement ring in order to prevent the Wehrmacht from deblocking the Stalingrad grouping with strikes from outside. The Don Front under the leadership of Konstantin Rokossovsky delivered two auxiliary blows: the first - from the Kletskaya region to the southeast, the second - from the Kachalinsky region along the left bank of the Don to the south. In the areas of the main attacks, due to the weakening of secondary areas, a 2-2.5-fold superiority in people and a 4-5-fold superiority in artillery and tanks were created. Due to the strictest secrecy in the development of the plan and the secrecy of the concentration of troops, the strategic surprise of the counteroffensive was ensured. During defensive battles, the Headquarters was able to create a significant reserve that could be thrown into the offensive. The number of troops in the Stalingrad direction was increased to 1.1 million people, about 15.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.3 thousand aircraft. True, the weakness of this powerful grouping of Soviet troops was that about 60% of the personnel of the troops were young recruits who had no combat experience.

The Red Army was opposed by the German 6th field (Friedrich Paulus) and 4th tank armies (Hermann Goth), the Romanian 3rd and 4th armies of Army Group B (commander Maximilian von Weichs), which numbered more than 1 million people. soldiers, about 10.3 thousand guns and mortars, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 1.2 thousand combat aircraft. The most combat-ready German units were concentrated directly in the Stalingrad area, participating in the assault on the city. The flanks of the group were covered by the weaker Romanian and Italian divisions in terms of morale and technical equipment. As a result of the concentration of the main forces and means of the army group directly in the Stalingrad region, the line of defense on the flanks did not have sufficient depth and reserves. The Soviet counter-offensive in the Stalingrad region would come as a complete surprise to the Germans, the German command was sure that all the main forces of the Red Army were tied up in heavy battles, bled dry and did not have the strength and material means for such a large-scale strike.

The offensive of the German infantry on the outskirts of Stalingrad, the end of 1942. (NARA)

Autumn 1942, a German soldier hangs the flag of Nazi Germany on a house in the center of Stalingrad. (NARA)

On November 19, 1942, after a powerful 80-minute artillery preparation, Operation Uranus began. Our army launched an offensive with the aim of encircling the enemy in the Stalingrad region. A turning point in the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II began.

At 7 o'clock. 30 minutes. with a volley of rocket launchers - "Katyushas" - artillery preparation began. The troops of the Southwestern and Don fronts went on the attack. By the end of the day, the formations of the South-Western Front advanced 25-35 km, they broke the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army in two sectors: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. In fact, the 3rd Romanian was defeated, and its remnants were engulfed from the flanks. On the Don Front, the situation was more difficult: the advancing Batov's 65th Army met fierce resistance from the enemy, advanced only 3-5 km by the end of the day and could not even break through the enemy's first line of defense.

Soviet riflemen fire at the Germans from behind a pile of rubble during a street fight on the outskirts of Stalingrad, early 1943. (AP Photo)

On November 20, after artillery preparation, parts of the Stalingrad Front went on the attack. They broke through the defenses of the 4th Romanian army and by the end of the day they walked 20-30 km. The German command received news of the offensive of the Soviet troops and the breakthrough of the front line on both flanks, but there were actually no large reserves in Army Group B.

By November 21, the Romanian armies were finally defeated, and the tank corps of the Southwestern Front were irresistibly rushing towards Kalach.

On November 22, tankers occupied Kalach. Parts of the Stalingrad Front were moving towards the mobile formations of the South-Western Front.

On November 23, formations of the 26th tank corps of the South-Western Front quickly reached the Sovetsky farm and connected with units of the 4th mechanized corps of the Northern Fleet. The 6th field and the main forces of the 4th tank armies were surrounded by encirclement: 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total strength of about 300 thousand soldiers and officers. The Germans did not know such a defeat during the Second World War. On the same day, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Raspopinskaya, an enemy group capitulated - more than 27 thousand Romanian soldiers and officers surrendered. It was a real military disaster. The Germans were stunned, confused, they did not even think that such a catastrophe was possible.

Soviet soldiers in camouflage on the roof of a house in Stalingrad, January 1943. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

On November 30, the operation of the Soviet troops to encircle and block the German group in Stalingrad as a whole was completed. The Red Army created two encirclement rings - external and internal. The total length of the outer ring of encirclement was about 450 km.

However, the Soviet troops were unable to immediately cut through the enemy grouping in order to complete its elimination. One of the main reasons for this was the underestimation of the size of the encircled Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht - it was assumed that it had 80-90 thousand people. In addition, the German command, by reducing the front line, was able to condense their battle formations, using the already existing positions of the Red Army for defense (their Soviet troops occupied the summer of 1942).

German troops walk through a destroyed generator room in the industrial area of ​​Stalingrad on December 28, 1942. (AP Photo)

German troops in the devastated Stalingrad, early 1943. (AP Photo)

After the failure of the attempt to unblock the Stalingrad grouping by the Don Army Group under the command of Manstein on December 12-23, 1942, the encircled German troops were doomed. An organized "air bridge" could not solve the problem of supplying the encircled troops with food, fuel, ammunition, medicines and other means. Hunger, cold and disease mowed down the soldiers of Paulus.

A horse in front of the ruins of Stalingrad, December 1942. (AP Photo)

January 10 - February 2, 1943, the Don Front carried out the offensive operation "Ring", during which the Stalingrad grouping of the Wehrmacht was liquidated. The Germans lost 140 thousand soldiers killed, about 90 thousand more surrendered. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.

The ruins of Stalingrad - by the end of the siege, almost nothing remained of the city. Aerial photograph, late 1943. (Michael Savin/Waralbum.ru)

Samsonov Alexander