Russian-French alliance: history and significance. The emergence and goals of the Russian-French alliance Years of formalization of the Russian-French alliance
Inspired by the same desire to preserve peace, France and Russia, with the sole purpose of preparing for the demands of a defensive war caused by an attack by the troops of the Triple Alliance against one of them, agreed on the following provisions:
1. If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will use all the troops she can command to attack Germany.
If Russia were attacked by Germany or Austria supported by Germany, France would use all the troops it could to attack Germany. (Original French draft: "If France or Russia should be attacked by the Triple Alliance or Germany alone...")
2. In the event of the mobilization of the troops of the Triple Alliance or one of its constituent powers, France and Russia will immediately, upon receiving news of this, without waiting for any prior agreement, mobilize immediately and simultaneously all their forces and move them as close as possible to their borders.
(Original French draft: "In the event of the mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance or Germany alone...")
The active armies to be used against Germany will be 1,300,000 men on the French side, and from 700,000 to 800,000 on the Russian side. These troops will be fully and quickly brought into action, so that Germany will have to fight in both the east and the west at once.
1. The General Staffs of both countries will constantly communicate with each other in order to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the measures provided for above.
They will communicate to each other in time of peace all information regarding the armies of the Triple Alliance that is known to them or will be known to them. The ways and means of intercourse during war will be studied and provided for in advance.
2. Neither France nor Russia will conclude a separate peace.
3. This Convention will be in force for the same period as the Triple Alliance.
4. All points listed above will be kept in the strictest confidence.
Signed:
adjutant general, chief of the General Staff Obruchev, disposition general, assistant chief of the General Staff Boisdeffre.
Collection of treaties between Russia and other states. 1856-1917. - pp. 281-282
This draft military convention was signed in St. Petersburg at the initiative of France on August 5, 1892 and marked the beginning of the conclusion of a Franco-Russian alliance against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The formalization of this union occurred after the approval of this project by the Russian Emperor, the French President and the French government.
In the 19th century, two opposing alliances were formed in the European arena - the Russian-French and the Triple Alliance. This suggests that a new stage has begun in international relations, characterized by a fierce battle between several powers for the division of influence in various spheres.
Economics in relations between France and Russia
French capital began to actively penetrate Russia in the third third of the 19th century. In 1875, the French created a large mining company in the southern part of Russia. Their capital was based on 20 million francs. In 1876, the French introduced gas lighting in St. Petersburg. A year later, they opened steel and iron-making concerns in Poland, which then belonged to the Russian Empire. Also, every year various joint-stock companies and factories were opened in Russia, which had capital of 10 million francs or more. They extracted salt, ore and other minerals for export.
At the end of the 19th century, the Russian government experienced certain financial difficulties. Then it was decided to begin negotiations in 1886 with French bankers. Two years later, dialogues with banks begin. They develop successfully and easily. The first loan amount was small - only 500 million francs. But this loan was a great start in this relationship.
Thus, we will look at the lively economic relations between Russia and France in the eighties of the 19th century, which were initiated by France.
Reasons for the development of economic relations
There are three good reasons. Firstly, the Russian market was very attractive to the French. Secondly, the richest deposits of raw materials of the Russian Empire actively attracted foreign investment. Third, the economy is the political bridge that France intended to build. Next we will talk about the formation of the Russian-French alliance and the consequences.
Cultural relations of allied countries
This state that we are considering has been bound by cultural traditions for many centuries. French culture significantly influenced Russian culture, and the entire domestic intelligentsia was brought up on the latest ideas of the French enlighteners. The names of philosophers and writers such as Voltaire, Diderot, Corneille were known to every educated Russian. And in the eighties of the 19th century, a radical revolution took place in these national cultures. In a short period of time, publishing houses appeared in Paris, specializing in the printing of Russian literary works. The novels of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, as well as the works of Turgenev, Ostrovsky, Korolenko, Goncharov, Nekrasov and other pillars of Russian literature were actively translated. Similar processes are observed in a variety of forms of art. For example, Russian composers have received wide recognition in French musical circles.
Electric lanterns are lit on the streets of the French capital. The townspeople called them “yablochkof”. They received this name after the name of the inventor, who was a famous domestic electrical engineer and professor Yablochkov. French humanities are actively interested in history, literature, and the Russian language. And philology in general. The works of professors Kurire and Louis Léger became fundamental.
Thus, Russian-French relations in the field of culture have become multilateral and broad. If earlier France was a “donor” to Russia in the field of culture, then in the nineteenth century their relations became mutual, that is, bilateral. It is noteworthy that the residents of France are becoming acquainted with the cultural works of Russia, and are also beginning to develop various topics at a scientific level. And we are moving on to studying the reasons for the Russian-French alliance.
Political relations and prerequisites for the emergence of an alliance on the part of France
France fought small colonial wars during this period. Therefore, in the eighties, her relations with Italy and England became strained. Then a particularly difficult relationship with Germany isolated France in Europe. Thus, she found herself surrounded by enemies. The danger for this state increased day by day, so French politicians and diplomats sought to improve relations with Russia, as well as get closer to it in various areas. This is one of the explanations for the conclusion of the Russian-French alliance.
Political relations and prerequisites for the emergence of an alliance on the part of the Russian Empire
Now let's look at Russia's position in the international arena. At the end of the 19th century, a whole system of unions developed in Europe. The first of them is Austro-German. The second is Austro-German-Italian or otherwise Triple. The third is the Union of Three Emperors (Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany). It was in it that Germany occupied a dominant position. The first two unions purely theoretically threatened Russia, and the presence of the Union of Three Emperors gave rise to doubts after the crisis in Bulgaria. The political benefit of Russia and France was not yet relevant. In addition, the two states had a common enemy in the East - Great Britain, which was a rival for France in the Egyptian state and the Mediterranean, and for Russia in the Asian lands. It is noteworthy that the strengthening of the Russian-French alliance became obvious when Anglo-Russian interests in Central Asia intensified, when England tried to drag Austria and Prussia into hostility with Russia.
The outcome of the confrontations
This situation in the political arena led to the fact that it was much easier to sign an agreement with the French state than with Prussia. This was evidenced by the agreement on concessions, the optimal volume of trade, as well as the absence of conflicts in this area. In addition, Paris considered this idea as a means of putting pressure on the Germans. After all, Berlin was extremely wary of formalizing a Russian-French alliance. It is known that the penetration of two cultures strengthened the political ideas of the powers.
Conclusion of the Russian-French alliance
This union took shape very difficult and slowly. This was preceded by various steps. But the main one was the rapprochement of the two countries. They were mutual. However, there was a little more action on the part of France. In the spring of 1890, Germany refused to renew the reinsurance agreement with Russia. Then the French authorities turned the situation in their direction. A year later, in July, a French military squadron visits Kronstadt. This visit is nothing more than a demonstration of Russian-French friendship. The guests were greeted by Emperor Alexander III himself. After this, another round of negotiations between diplomats took place. The result of this meeting was a pact between Russia and France, which was sealed with the signatures of the foreign ministers. According to this document, states were obliged, in the event of a threat of attack, to agree on joint measures that could be taken simultaneously and immediately. This is how the Russian-French alliance was formalized (1891).
Next steps and actions
It is noteworthy that the reception the emperor gave to the French sailors in Kronstadt was an event with far-reaching consequences. The St. Petersburg newspaper rejoiced! With such a formidable force, the Triple Alliance will be forced to stop and think. Then the attorney in Germany, Bülow, wrote to the Reich Chancellor that the Kronstadt meeting was a heavy factor that powerfully hit the renewed Triple Alliance. Then, in 1892, a new positive development took place in relation to the Russian-French alliance. The head of the French General Staff is invited by the Russian side to military maneuvers. In August of this year, he and General Obruchev signed a military convention consisting of three provisions. It was supposed to be prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giers, who delayed the presentation. However, the emperor did not rush him. Germany took advantage of the situation and started a new customs war with Russia. In addition, the German army grew to 4 million fighters. Having learned about this, Alexander III became seriously angry and defiantly took another step towards rapprochement with his ally, sending our military squadron to Toulon. The formation of the Russian-French alliance unnerved Germany.
Formalization of the convention
The French state gave the domestic sailors an enthusiastic welcome. Then Alexander III cast aside all doubts. He ordered Minister Giers to speed up the writing of the convention submission, and he soon approved it on December 14th. Then an exchange of letters took place, which was provided for by the protocol of diplomats between the capitals of the two powers.
Thus, in December 1893 the convention came into force. The French alliance was concluded.
Consequences of the political game between Russia and France
Similar to the Triple Alliance, the agreement between Russia and France was created from a defense point of view. In fact, both the first and the second alliance concealed a military aggressive principle in the seizure and division of spheres of influence of sales markets, as well as sources of raw materials. The formation of the Russian-French alliance completed the regrouping of forces that had been seething in Europe since the Congress in Berlin in 1878. As it turned out, the balance of military and political forces depended on whose interests would be supported by England, which at that time was the most economically developed state. However, Foggy Albion preferred to remain neutral, continuing a position called “brilliant isolation.” However, the growing colonial claims of Germany forced Foggy Albion to begin to lean toward a Russian-French alliance.
Conclusion
The Russian-French bloc was formed in 1891 and existed until 1917. This led to significant changes and the balance of power in Europe. The conclusion of the alliance is considered a turning point in the development of the French state during the era of the World War. This unification of forces led to France overcoming political isolation. Russia provided for its ally and Europe not only stability, but also strength in the status of a Great Power.
The alliance between Russia and France, concluded in December 1893, was dictated not only by the common military-strategic interests of both powers, but also by the presence of a threat from common enemies. By that time, there was already a strong economic basis for the union. Since the 70s of the 19th century, Russia was in dire need of free capital to invest in industry and railway construction; France, on the contrary, did not find a sufficient number of objects for its own investment and actively exported its capital abroad. It was from then on that the share of French capital in the Russian economy gradually began to increase. For 1869-1887 17 foreign enterprises were founded in Russia, 9 of them French. The economic prerequisites of the union also had a special military-technical aspect. Already in 1888, the brother of Alexander III, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, who came to Paris on an unofficial visit, managed to place a mutually beneficial order with French military factories for the production of 500 thousand rifles for the Russian army.
The cultural prerequisites for the alliance between Russia and France were long-standing and strong. No other country had such a powerful cultural impact on Russia as France. The names of Voltaire and Rousseau, Hugo and Balzac were known to every educated Russian. In France they always knew less about Russian culture than in Russia about French culture. But since the 80s, the French, more than ever before, have become familiar with Russian cultural values. Publishing houses are emerging that specialize in reproducing masterpieces of Russian literature - the works of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Goncharov and Saltykov-Shchedrin, not to mention I.S. Turgenev, who lived in France for a long time and became one of the favorite writers for the French.
In the context of growing rapprochement between Russia and France, an alliance was advocated in both countries by advocates of an active offensive policy against Germany. In France, as long as it maintained a defensive position towards Germany, an alliance with Russia was not a burning need. But as soon as Paris recovered from the consequences of the defeat of 1870 and the question of revenge arose, the course towards an alliance with Russia began to sharply prevail among the country’s leaders.
At the same time, a “French” party began to take shape in Russia. Its herald was the famous General Skobelev. On February 5, 1882, in Paris, Skobelev, at his own risk, made a speech to Serbian students - a speech that bypassed the European press and plunged the diplomatic circles of Russia and Germany into confusion. He branded official Russia for becoming a victim of “foreign influences” and losing track of who is its friend and who is its enemy. “If you want me to name you this enemy, so dangerous for Russia and for the Slavs, I will name him for you,” thundered Skobelev. “This is the author of the “onslaught on the East” - he is familiar to all of you - this is Germany. I repeat to you and ask Don’t forget this: the enemy is Germany. The struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons is inevitable!
In Germany and France, as well as in Austria-Hungary, Skobelev’s speech became the political topic of the day for a long time. The impression it made was all the stronger because it was perceived as inspiration “from above.” “What Skobelev, a general in active service, the most famous of the Russian military figures of that time, says, not authorized by anyone, solely on his own behalf, no one believed this either in France or in Germany,”- noted historian Tarle. Skobelev suddenly died four months after this speech. But Pobedonostsev, Ignatiev and Katkov began to insist on rapprochement with France. In January 1887, Alexander III, in one of his conversations with Giers, noted: “Before I thought that it was only Katkov who disliked Germany, but now I am convinced that it is all of Russia.” True, the positions of supporters of rapprochement with Germany were strong at the court and in the Russian government: Minister of Foreign Affairs Giers, his closest assistant and future successor Lamzdorf, Minister of War Vannovsky.
The Russian-French alliance took shape slowly and difficultly. It was preceded by a number of preliminary steps towards rapprochement between the two countries - mutual steps, but more active on the part of France. In the spring of 1890, after Germany refused to renew the Russian-German “reinsurance” agreement, the French authorities skillfully took advantage of the difficult situation for Russia. To win the favor of Alexander III, on May 29, 1890, they arrested 27 Russian political emigrants in Paris. The arrested victims of entrapment were tried and sentenced to prison. Alexander III, having learned about this, exclaimed: "Finally there is a government in France!" It is interesting that the French government was headed at that time by Charles-Louis Freycinet, who refused to extradite to Russia the Narodnaya Volya member Hartmann, accused of preparing a terrorist act against Alexander II.
On July 13, 1891, a French military squadron came to Kronstadt on an official visit. Her visit was an impressive demonstration of Franco-Russian friendship. The squadron was met by Alexander III himself. The Russian autocrat, standing, with his head uncovered, humbly listened to the revolutionary anthem of France "Marseillaise", for the performance of which in Russia itself people were punished as a "state crime". Following the visit of the squadron, a new round of diplomatic negotiations took place, the result of which was a kind of consultative pact between Russia and France, signed by two foreign ministers - Gears and Ribot. Under this pact, the parties pledged, in the event of a threat of attack on one of them, to agree on joint measures that could be taken “immediately and simultaneously.”
Indeed, the royal reception given to the French sailors in Kronstadt became, as it were, the event of the year with far-reaching consequences. The newspaper "St. Petersburg Vedomosti" stated with satisfaction: “The two powers, bound by natural friendship, have such a formidable force of bayonets that the Triple Alliance must involuntarily stop in thought.” The German attorney Bülow, in a report to the Reich Chancellor, assessed the Kronstadt meeting as "a very important factor that weighs heavily in the balance against the renewed Triple Alliance."
The New Year brought with it a new step in the creation of the Russian-French alliance. Boisdeffre, who by that time headed the French General Staff, was again invited to the military maneuvers of the Russian army. On August 5, 1892, in St. Petersburg, he and General Obruchev signed the agreed text of a military convention, which actually meant an agreement between Russia and France on an alliance. These are the main terms of the convention.
1. If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will attack Germany, and if Russia is attacked by Germany or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, then France will move against Germany.
2. In the event of the mobilization of troops of the Triple Alliance or one of its powers, Russia and France will immediately and simultaneously mobilize all their forces and move them as close as possible to their borders.
3. France undertakes to field 1,300 thousand soldiers against Germany, Russia - up to 800 thousand. “These troops,” the convention said, “will be fully and quickly brought into action so that Germany will have to fight in both the East and the West at once.”
The Convention was to come into force after its ratification by the Emperor of Russia and the President of France. The ministers of foreign affairs were supposed to prepare and submit its text for ratification. However, Giers delayed the presentation, citing the fact that his illness prevented him from studying the details with due care. The French government, beyond his expectations, helped him: in the fall of 1892, it became entangled in a grandiose Panamanian scam.
An international joint stock company created in France in 1879 to build the Panama Canal, chaired by Lesseps, went bankrupt as a result of embezzlement and bribery of many prominent officials, including three former prime ministers. A number of these individuals, hopelessly compromised, were brought to trial. A ministerial leapfrog has begun in France. Giers and Lamsdorf gloated, anticipating the reaction of Alexander III. “The Sovereign,” Lamsdorf wrote in his diary, “will have the opportunity to see how dangerous and imprudent it is to become too closely associated with states without a permanent government, which France currently is.”
Alexander III really did not rush Giers to study the convention, but then the German government upset his whole game. In the spring of 1893, Germany began another customs war against Russia, and on August 3, its Reichstag adopted a new military law, according to which the German armed forces grew numerically to 4 million people. Having received detailed information about this from the French General Staff, Alexander III became angry and defiantly took a new step towards rapprochement with France, namely, he sent a Russian military squadron to Toulon on a return visit.
France gave the Russian sailors such an enthusiastic reception that Alexander III left all doubts. He ordered Giers to speed up the presentation of the Russian-French convention and approved it on December 14. Then the exchange of letters provided for by diplomatic protocol between St. Petersburg and Paris took place, and on December 23, 1893, the convention officially came into force. The Russian-French alliance was formalized.
Like the Triple Alliance, the Russian-French alliance was created outwardly as a defensive one. In essence, both of them harbored an aggressive beginning as rivals in the struggle for the division and redistribution of spheres of influence, sources of raw materials, markets on the road to European and world war. The 1894 alliance between Russia and France basically completed the regrouping of forces that took place in Europe after the Berlin Congress of 1878. The balance of forces largely depended on whose side England, the most economically developed power of the then world, would take. Foggy Albion still preferred to remain outside the blocs, continuing the policy of “brilliant isolation.” But the growing Anglo-German antagonism due to colonial claims against each other forced England to increasingly lean towards the Russian-French bloc.
The alliance between Russia and France was dictated not only by the common military-strategic interests of both powers, but also by the presence of a threat from common enemies. By that time, the union already had a solid economic basis. Since the 70s, Russia has been in dire need of free capital to invest in industry and railway construction; France, on the contrary, did not find a sufficient number of objects for its own investment and actively exported its capital abroad. It was from then on that the share of French capital in the Russian economy gradually began to increase. For 1869-1887 17 foreign enterprises were founded in Russia, 9 of them French. Kinyapina N.S. Russian foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century. - M., 1974 Thus, already in the early 90s, the foundation of Russia’s financial dependence on France was laid. The economic prerequisites of the union also had a special military-technical aspect. Already in 1888, the brother of Alexander III, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, who came to Paris on an unofficial visit, managed to place a mutually beneficial order with French military factories for the production of 500 thousand rifles for the Russian army.
In the context of growing rapprochement between Russia and France, an alliance was advocated in both countries by advocates of an active offensive policy against Germany. In France, as long as it maintained a defensive position towards Germany, an alliance with Russia was not a burning need. Now, when France recovered from the consequences of the defeat of 1870 and the question of revenge arose on the order of the day for French foreign policy, the course towards an alliance with Russia sharply prevailed among its leaders (including President S. Carnot and Prime Minister C. Freycinet). History of Russian foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century. M., 1997.
In Russia, meanwhile, the government was being pushed towards an alliance with France by the landowners and bourgeoisie, who were hurt by Germany’s economic sanctions and therefore advocated a turn of the domestic economy from German to French loans. In addition, wide (politically very different) circles of the Russian public were interested in the Russian-French alliance, which took into account the entire set of mutually beneficial prerequisites for this alliance. A “French” party began to take shape in society, in the government, and even at the royal court. Its herald was the famous “white general” M.D. Skobelev.
True, the “German” party was also strong at the court and in the Russian government: Foreign Minister N.K. Gire, his closest assistant and future successor V.N. Lamzdorf, Minister of War P.S. Vannovsky, ambassadors to Germany P.A. Saburov and Pavel Shuvalov. The court support of this party was the wife of the Tsar's brother Vladimir Alexandrovich, Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna (nee Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin). On the one hand, she influenced the Tsar’s family in favor of Germany, and on the other hand, she assisted the German government, informing it about the plans of Alexander III and about Russian affairs. In terms of influence on the tsar and the government, as well as in the energy, persistence and “caliber” of its members, the “German” party was inferior to the “French” one, but a number of objective factors that hindered Russian-French rapprochement were in favor of the first. Rosenthal E.M. Diplomatic history of the Russian-French alliance at the beginning of the 20th century. M., 1960
What hampered the union between Russia and France more were differences in their state and political systems. In the eyes of such a reactionary as Alexander III, the alliance of tsarist autocracy with republican democracy looked almost unnatural, especially since it oriented Russia against the German Empire, led by the Hohenzollern dynasty, which was traditionally friendly and even related to tsarism.
This shows why the Russian-French alliance took shape, although steadily, but slowly and difficultly. It was preceded by a number of preliminary steps towards rapprochement between the two countries - mutual steps, but more active on the part of France.
In the spring of 1890, after Germany refused to renew the Russian-German “reinsurance” agreement, the French authorities skillfully took advantage of the difficult situation for Russia. To win the favor of Alexander III, on May 29, 1890, they arrested a large group (27 people) of Russian political emigrants in Paris. At the same time, the French police did not disdain the services of a provocateur. Agent of the St. Petersburg secret police since 1883 A.M. Haeckelmann (aka Landesen, Petrovsky, Baer and General von Harting), with the knowledge of the Paris police authorities and, apparently, for a certain bribe, staged preparations for the assassination attempt on Alexander III in the French capital: he himself delivered bombs to the apartment of the “terrorists”, aimed at told the police and escaped safely. The arrested victims of his provocation were put on trial and (except for three women, acquitted with purely French gallantry) sentenced to imprisonment. Alexander III, having learned about this, exclaimed: “Finally there is a government in France!” World History: In 24 volumes. T. 18. The eve of World War I // Badak A.N., I.E. Voynich, N.M. Volchek et al. Minsk, 1999
The following year, 1891, the opposing side gave a new impetus to the formation of the Russian-French bloc, advertising the resumption of the Triple Alliance. In response, France and Russia are taking a second practical step towards rapprochement. On July 13 (25), 1891, a French military squadron came to Kronstadt on an official visit. Her visit was an impressive demonstration of Franco-Russian friendship. The squadron was met by Alexander III himself. The Russian autocrat, standing, with his head uncovered, humbly listened to the revolutionary anthem of France “Marseillaise”, for the performance of which in Russia itself people were punished as a “state crime”.
Following the visit of the squadron, a new round of diplomatic negotiations took place, the result of which was a kind of consultative pact between Russia and France, signed by two foreign ministers - N.K. Girsa and A. Ribot. Under this pact, the parties pledged, in the event of a threat of attack on one of them, to agree on joint measures that could be taken “immediately and simultaneously.”
The New Year brought with it a new step in the creation of the Russian-French alliance. R. Boisdeffre, who by that time headed the General Staff of France, was again invited to the military maneuvers of the Russian army. On August 5 (17), 1892 in St. Petersburg, he and General N.N. Obruchev signed the agreed text of the military convention, which actually meant an agreement between Russia and France on an alliance.
The Convention was to come into force after its ratification by the Emperor of Russia and the President of France. The ministers of foreign affairs were supposed to prepare and submit its text for ratification. However, Gire deliberately (in the interests of Germany) delayed the presentation, citing the fact that his illness prevented him from studying the details with due care. The French government, beyond his expectations, helped him: in the fall of 1892, it became entangled in a grandiose Panamanian scam. 1. Rotshtein F.A. International relations at the end of the 19th century.
The Tsar really did not rush Giers to study the convention, but then the German government, for which Giers worked so hard, upset his whole game. In the spring of 1893, Germany began another customs war against Russia, and on August 3, its Reichstag adopted a new military law, according to which the German armed forces grew numerically from 2 million 800 thousand to 4 million 300 thousand people. Having received detailed information about this from the French General Staff, Alexander III became angry and defiantly took a new step towards rapprochement with France, namely, he sent a Russian military squadron to Toulon on a return visit.
France gave the Russian sailors such an enthusiastic reception that Alexander III left all doubts. He ordered Giers to speed up the presentation of the Russian-French convention and approved it on December 14. Then the exchange of letters provided for by diplomatic protocol between St. Petersburg and Paris took place, and on December 23, 1893 (January 4, 1894) the convention officially came into force. The Russian-French alliance was formalized.
Like the Triple Alliance, the Russian-French alliance was created outwardly as a defensive one. In essence, both of them harbored an aggressive beginning as rivals in the struggle for the division and redistribution of spheres of influence, sources of raw materials, markets on the road to European and world war. The 1894 alliance between Russia and France basically completed the regrouping of forces that took place in Europe after the Berlin Congress of 1878. F. Engels defined the results of the development of international relations in 1879-1894: “The major military powers of the continent were divided into two large ones, camps threatening each other: Russia and France on the one hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other.” The balance of power between them largely depended on which side England, the most economically developed power of the world at that time, would take. The ruling circles of England still preferred to remain outside the blocs, continuing the policy of “brilliant isolation.” But the growing Anglo-German antagonism due to colonial claims against each other forced England to increasingly lean towards the Russian-French bloc.
RUSSIAN-FRENCH UNION
It was formed in 1891-93 and existed until 1917.
Prehistory of R.-f. dates back to the early 70s of the 19th century. - to the contradictions generated by the Franco-Prussian war and Treaty of Frankfurt 1871(cm.). Weakened and humiliated by defeat in the war of 1870-71, France feared new German aggression and, trying to overcome its foreign policy isolation, made every effort to win the trust and favor of Russia. Already on June 7, 1871, a month after the signing of the Frankfurt Peace Treaty, J. Favre instructed the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, General. Leflo is in this direction. Thiers(see), Broglie, Decaz in Leflot's instructions emphasized the same task. In personal negotiations with the Russian ambassador in Paris N.A. Orlov(see) and in diplomatic relations with St. Petersburg, the leaders of French diplomacy tried in every possible way to please the tsar and Gorchakov(cm.). The diplomatic conflicts of 1873 and 1874 with France provoked by Bismarck's Germany prompted the French government to directly appeal to Russia for support and assistance in preventing German aggression. The Russian government provided France with significant diplomatic support.
In its clearest form, the role of Russia as the main obstacle to German aggression against France was revealed during the so-called. military alarm in 1875, when vigorous Russian intervention forced Germany to retreat and abandon its plan to attack France. In 1876, Bismarck's attempts to get Russia to guarantee Alsace-Lorraine in exchange for Germany's unconditional support for Russian policy in the East failed. In 1877, during the new Franco-German alarm provoked by Bismarck, Russia also maintained a position friendly to France.
Thus, at the most critical time for France, Russia, without accepting any formal obligations, nevertheless acted as the main factor in solving the security problem of France.
However, already the day before and during Berlin Congress 1878(see) French diplomacy, led Waddington(see), focusing on rapprochement with England and Germany, took a position hostile to Russia.
During this period, French foreign policy, after some hesitation, subordinated to the selfish calculations of banking circles, the financial oligarchy and its political representation in the ranks of the ruling moderate Republicans, followed the path of colonial conquest. This path, long recommended to France by Bismarck, was naturally supposed to weaken France’s position in Europe, increase the number of its opponents on the basis of colonial rivalry, and therefore was possible only under the condition of reconciliation with Germany and even acquiring its support in colonial enterprises.
The consequence of this course should have been the deterioration of France’s relations with Russia, since, having become virtually dependent on Bismarck, French diplomacy was afraid of incurring his wrath by attempts to rapprochement with Russia; as is known, the prevention of R.-f. With. was one of the main tasks of Bismarck's diplomacy.
Thus, France’s retreat from the policy of cooperation with Russia, which began at the end of 1877, led to the alienation of these two powers, which lasted for a number of years. Gambetta's attempt during his leadership of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (November 1881 - January 1882) to achieve rapprochement with Russia remained only a short-term episode that had no consequences. Meanwhile, the policy of colonial conquest, especially vigorously pursued by J.(see), already in March 1885 was interrupted due to the defeat of French troops in Annam, which entailed the fall of the Ferry cabinet and the formation of new government combinations with the participation of radicals, who at that time acted as opponents of colonial enterprises. At the same time, Bismarck, who had previously pushed France towards colonial conquests, from the end of 1885 again spoke to her in threatening language. At the beginning of 1887, a new Franco-German military alarm broke out.
Finding itself in a state of extreme, even more acute than in 1875, danger of a German attack, the French government directly turned to the Russian government with a call for help. “The fate of France is in your hands,” wrote the French Foreign Minister Flourens to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg Laboule in February 1887, calling on him to convince the Russian government not to bind itself to obligations towards Germany and to retain freedom of action. Flourens rightly believed that this would be enough to stop Bismarck in his aggressive plans.
The position taken by the Russian government during the crisis of 1887 forced Bismarck to retreat again; according to the remark of Alexander III, Bismarck “realized that they would not let him crush France...” So France was once again spared by Russia from an extremely serious danger. Moreover, during the conclusion in the same 1887 with Germany of the so-called. "Reinsurance agreement"(see) Russia insisted on maintaining for France the same conditions that Germany had negotiated for its ally, Austria.
This position of Russia, based on an understanding of the danger of excessive strengthening of Germany at the expense of weakening or crushing France, was also determined by the fact that Russia’s relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany continued to deteriorate. The Russian government was extremely irritated by the role of Austria and Germany, which supported it, in Bulgarian affairs. In the circles of the Russian industrial bourgeoisie there was also strong dissatisfaction with the significant penetration of German goods into the Russian market. Germany's large increase in duties on Russian grain in 1887 affected the interests of Russian landowners and merchants and marked the beginning of an acute customs war between the two countries (see. Russian-German trade agreements), as well as the campaign against the ruble raised by the Berlin stock exchange further aggravated the situation. In these conditions, the idea of the need to reorient Russian foreign policy towards cooperation with France - instead of a compromised policy Union of Three Emperors(see) - gained support in a certain part of government circles.
The political rapprochement that emerged in 1887 between Russia and France soon led to their business cooperation. Having encountered obstacles deliberately placed in the way of Russian credit in Berlin, the Russian government concluded the first loan in France in 1888, followed by new large loans in 1889, 1890, 1891. In 1888, the Russian government, by agreement with the French, placed an order in France for the production of 500 thousand guns for the Russian army. This business cooperation was based primarily on political and strategic interests.
At the same time, the progressive deterioration of Russian-German relations and the general aggravation of the international situation in Europe—Germany’s refusal to renew the “reinsurance treaty” in 1890, the Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty of the same year, the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891 and rumors that were very persistent in that time, about the accession of England to it - created the ground for a favorable perception in St. Petersburg of the French sounding for the conclusion of a political agreement. In the summer of 1891, a French squadron adm. visited Kronstadt. Gervais. This visit turned into a demonstration of Russian-French friendship. Negotiations between Giers and Labule, which began in mid-July, were continued during the Kronstadt celebrations and ended in August.
The agreement was given the form of an exchange of letters between the Russian (Girs) and French (Ribault) ministers of foreign affairs, carried out through the Russian ambassador in Paris Morenheim on 27. VIII 1891. In the letters of the ministers, after the preamble, which differed somewhat in particulars, two identical points followed: "1) In order to determine and establish the cordial consent that unites them, and desiring jointly to contribute to the maintenance of peace, which is the object of their most sincere desires, the two governments declare that they will consult with each other on every question capable of threatening the general peace. 2) In the event that the world were really in danger, and especially in the event that one of the two parties were under threat of attack, both parties agree to agree on measures, the immediate and simultaneous implementation of which will be imperative for both of them in the event of the occurrence of the said events governments."
Subsequently, France, interested in a military alliance, which it needed much more than Russia, sought to expand the agreement of 1891, adding certain military obligations to it. As a result of the ensuing negotiations, representatives of the Russian and French general staffs signed a military convention on August 17, 1892. It consisted of a very short preamble, emphasizing that both powers had the goal of “preparing for the demands of a defensive war,” and 7 articles. Art. 1 read: "If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will use all its available forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany or Austria supported by Germany, France will use all its available forces to attack Germany." Art. 2 determined that “in the event of the mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance or one of its member powers,” both powers immediately and simultaneously mobilize their forces. Art. 3 defined the forces deployed against Germany: for France - 1,300 thousand people, for Russia - from 700 to 800 thousand people, and stipulated that they should be quickly “put into action, so that Germany would have to fight immediately and in the east and in the west." Art. 4 and 5 established the obligation of both main headquarters to mutually consult and the mutual obligation of both powers not to conclude a separate peace. According to Art. 6 Convention remained in force for the same period as the Triple Alliance. Art. 7 stipulated the strictest secrecy of the convention.
After the signing of the convention, the French government tried to make changes to it in a spirit more beneficial for France, but, making sure that the tsar was generally delaying its approval, did not insist on this. The acute internal crisis (related to the Panama affair) experienced by France at this time prompted Alexander III to take his time in approving the convention. Only towards the end of 1893, after a return visit of the Russian squadron to Toulon, which turned into a new demonstration of friendship between Russia and France, did the tsar agree to approve the convention. Exchange of letters between the French ambassador in St. Petersburg Montebello and Giers 27. XII 1893-4. I 1894 both governments notified each other of their ratification of the military convention. Thus, the Russian-French military-political alliance was formalized by agreements of 1891, 1892 and 1893.
Historical place and significance of R.-f. With. was defined by J.V. Stalin. In a report at the XIV Party Congress in 1925, speaking about the history of the First World War, J.V. Stalin pointed out that one of the foundations of this imperialist war was the agreement between Austria and Germany in 1879. “Against whom was this agreement directed? Against Russia and France... The consequence of this agreement on peace in Europe, but in fact on war in Europe, was another agreement, the agreement between Russia and France in 1891-1893..."
Although the agreements of 1891-93 were kept strictly secret, thanks to the Kronstadt and Toulon demonstrations their meaning was understood in Europe. The German charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg, Bülow, in a report to the German Chancellor Caprivi, assessed the Kronstadt meeting as "... a very important factor that weighs heavily on the balance against the renewed Triple Alliance." Europe was divided into two hostile camps.
French imperialism acted together with Russian imperialism in the Far East, but directed the main efforts of its colonial policy to North-West and Central Africa; the presence of a strong ally - Russia - made France more courageous in relation to England. Forced to retreat after Fashoda conflict(see) before England, France then seeks to further strengthen the alliance with Russia. At the initiative of France, the agreement Delcasse(see) with Muravyov(see) 9. VIII 1899 validity period of the R.-f. With. in amendment to Art. 6 of the Military Convention of 1892 was no longer bound by the duration of the Triple Alliance.
Even after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente(see) the leaders of French politics of those years (Delcasse, Clemenceau, Poincare, etc.) understood that British military support could not replace Russian military assistance.
For Russia, the alliance with France had a different meaning. If during the period of preparation, formalization and in the first years of the union, Russia played a decisive and, to a certain extent, leading role, and France, as a weaker and more interested party, put up with this, then over time the situation changed. Continuing to need money and concluding new loans (in 1894, 1896, 1901, 1904, etc.), reaching several billion, Russian tsarism eventually became financially dependent on French imperialism. Billions of loans from France (and England) to tsarism, the transfer into the hands and control of French (and English) capital of the most important branches of Russian industry, according to the definition of PL V. Stalin, “chained tsarism to Anglo-French imperialism, turned Russia into a tributary of these countries, into their semi-colony."
The cooperation of the general staffs of both countries, which had been established since the 90s (there was a short break at the beginning of the 20th century), took on closer forms in the pre-war years. 16. VII 1912 in Paris, the chief of the Russian naval general staff, Prince. Lieven and the chief of the French naval general staff, Auber, signed a Russian-French maritime convention on joint actions.
Russia and France entered the world imperialist war of 1914-18, bound by an alliance treaty. This had a decisive influence on the course and outcome of the war, since it forced Germany from the very first days of the war to fight simultaneously on two fronts, which led to the collapse of the Schlieffen plan, which provided for the defeat of opponents one by one, and then to the defeat of Germany. For Russia, French military assistance, due to the absence of large maneuver operations on the Western Front and the reluctance of the allies to adequately help Russia with military equipment, was of limited importance. But for France, the role of Russian military assistance was decisive. The Russian offensive in East Prussia in August - September 1914 saved France from defeat on the Marne and made impossible what happened in May 1940 - the lightning-fast crushing of the French military forces by the Germans. The Russian front, which drew back huge German forces through active operations and especially the offensive in 1916, saved France by forcing the Germans to stop the operation at Verdun. In general, it was Russia’s military assistance that gave France the opportunity to withstand the fight against Germany and achieve victory.
Diplomatic Dictionary. - M.: State Publishing House of Political Literature. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, S. A. Lozovsky. 1948 .
See what "RUSSIAN-FRENCH UNION" is in other dictionaries:
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RUSSIAN-FRENCH ALLIANCE, military-political alliance of Russia and France in 1891 1917. Opposed to the Triple Alliance led by Germany. Formalized by an agreement in 1891 and a secret military convention in 1892. The parties pledged to provide mutual assistance in... ... Russian history
Military-political alliance of Russia and France in 1891 1917. Opposed to the Triple Alliance led by Germany. Formalized by an agreement in 1891 and a secret military convention in 1892. The parties pledged to provide mutual assistance in the event of a German attack... encyclopedic Dictionary
Formalized by agreements in 1891-93, it existed until 1917. Strengthening of the German Empire, the emergence of the Triple Alliance of 1882 (See Triple Alliance of 1882), aggravation by the end of the 80s. Franco-German and Russian-German contradictions... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
