Taking the kushka. fight on the jackpot
Gorny Mikhail
Campaign against the Afghans and the battle on Kushka (1885)
Memoirs of former private Andrei Bolandlin
From the text: The bridge was covered with the corpses of the fugitives. Our soldiers tried not to even look at them. Silently, with serious faces, maintaining an alignment, they walked, clutching their berdans with hands blackened by gunpowder, in their damp greatcoats. “One, two, three, four... one, two, three, four!..” - counted most of them, stepping over the corpses of Afghans, foot and horse, trampled, tormented by horse hooves, artillery shells and boots of the Pkhotin soldiers.
Hoaxer: The armed conflict of 1885 was the only clash of this kind that occurred during the reign (1881-1894) of Alexander III the Peacemaker. In some reference books (for example, V. Pokhlebkin “Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years”, M., 1995) this conflict is called a “Russian-English armed conflict” (due to the presence of hundreds of English advisers in the ranks of the Afghans ), in other works this is called the Russian-Afghan armed conflict (which, in my opinion, is correct, unlike the previous name). But the fact that the British were among the Afghans, and were beaten, is beyond doubt. This is reflected in the song given in the text of this book: “The enemy will always remember, / The British and Afghans will never forget...”.
Notes
Campaign against the Afghans and battle on Kushk
"And we passed the steppe like the sea,
Through the sand hurricane...
So he walks into the open space,
Rushing from mound to mound...
The bird rarely flies there,
There the sand is flying like a column...
(Cossack song).
One of the early January days of 1885, in the Samarkand barracks of the 3rd linear Turkestan battalion, “literature” classes were going on. At the white wooden tables sat about thirty students, students already mustachioed and bearded, however, they had just begun to write on slates. The teacher of these strange schoolchildren was a young, dark-haired ensign Degtyarev, who stood near two black boards with large cardboard letters.
Well, brothers, what letter is this? - he asks, raising the letter b up.
Would! If only!.. - shouts a chorus of the most diverse voices.
Which one is this? - the ensign raises another letter.
A! A! - the soldiers shout.
What syllable, brothers, will it be if we take these letters together? the teacher speaks again.
Bah! - the students respond.
The students, however, are not particularly attentive: some move away, others give each other clicks, others push each other. But there are also attentive people who try to understand for themselves the whole abyss of wisdom. The jokers tell them:
What to study? If they haven’t taught the little ones, it’s all the same: they won’t get it into the heads of the big ones!
Nah, that's not it, guys! - they respond: better late than never. The diploma will come in handy - at least write a letter home or something else...
After the mental exercises, the physical exercises began. The entire third half-company, young and old, had already been gathered.
The red soldier Chernousov deftly pulled himself up on the rings. Then the turn came to the clumsy Vyatka fat soldier Volkov, who always had trouble doing pull-ups.
Well, you, Vyatka,” Degtyarev mumbled: don’t mess up your Vyatka!
Yes, Mr. Ensign, I didn’t learn it from a young age, but now I’m going to go home soon...
Home, not home, but still it’s a shame for the old soldier to do such a thing. You are supposed to serve as a prime minister for others, but it turns out that the young soldiers are better than you.
The soldiers grinned.
The time was approaching 12 o'clock. Suddenly the horn began to play: - Gathering!
The recruits, not knowing whether they were playing for obed or for "collection", assumed the former, grabbed copper cups and rushed to the kitchen, because, according to the established order in almost all troops, recruits go behind the obel. The old people quarreled.
Where are you going, you fucking devils?
For volume!
What a size for you! Do you hear that they are playing the collection, not obed! Roll your overcoats, take your bags and mice.
The soldiers began to fuss, grabbed guns and other ammunition and marched to the courtyard. And other companies were already forming in the yard. At the first company, in a carriage drawn by a pair of blacks, sat the Colonel himself, Mikhail Petrovich Kav, a gallant man, wearing glasses, with a black and gray beard, who had just arrived here. The officers also gathered, each to his own unit. Finally, the army lined up. Company commanders also came. Then the colonel cheerfully jumped out of the carriage, said something to them, and then turned to all the soldiers, who were eager to find out why the authorities had gathered them, and said:
Congratulations on your campaign, brothers! I received a telegram from the commander of the troops: we are moving to the city of Merv.
We are glad to try, your honor!.. - the battalion roared loudly.
Gg. Disband the company commanders, company schoolchildren and the training team into companies, stop classes and prepare for the campaign!..
The soldiers were dismissed.
Eh, brothers, let's go on a hike... - some said.
To Merv, probably, to the parking lot,” the others replied.
Well, hardly for parking... - the first ones did not agree. The 3rd battalion in other Samarkand troops (1) had quite a few fellow countrymen.
Let's go on a hike, brothers! - the soldiers of the 3rd battalion announced to them.
Well, lie! Kava always goes on hikes, goes racing every year.
In fact, the efficient colonel did annual practice, and walked twenty or thirty miles in full march with his battalion, with all the baggage and provisions.
On the same day, the colonel received a second telegram, in which the soldiers were allowed to take things with them. The delighted Turkestanis, assuming that they were going to the parking lot, were already thinking of taking with them beds, boxes, and other equipment, when a new telegram dispelled their dreams: it ordered each soldier to have no more than a pound of his own belongings.
The married men were also ordered to be taken on the march at first, but later an order came out to leave the married men behind and replace them with people from other units.
a military clash that occurred on March 18, 1885 after the Russian army captured Afghan territory south of the Amu Darya River and the Merv oasis, near the village of Penjdeh. The confrontation between Russian and British interests in Central Asia lasted for years, in fact, in the form of a Cold War known as the Great Game, and the Battle of Kushka brought this confrontation to the brink of a full-scale armed conflict.
General Komarov, being the commander of the entire Trans-Caspian region, drew attention to Merv as “a nest of robbery and destruction that hampered the development of almost the entire Central Asia.” At the end of 1883, he sent there Captain Alikhanov and Tekin Major Mahmut-Kuli Khan with an offer to the Mervians to accept Russian citizenship. On January 25, 1884, a deputation of Mervians arrived in Askhabad and presented Komarov with a petition addressed to the emperor to accept Merv as Russian citizenship and took the oath.
After the annexation of Merv, the need arose to determine the boundaries between the new Russian province and Afghanistan. Great Britain, defending its imperial interests, sent its delimitation commission, with a military detachment to protect it. Russia also sent its commission, and also with a military detachment, under the command of General Komarov. During the correspondence regarding the appointment of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission, Russia challenged Afghan claims to the Panjshekh Oasis, persistently asserting that the oasis belonged to Russia on the basis of its possession of Merv.
Since Afghanistan was a protectorate of the British Empire, the Viceroy of India made a big fuss, fearing that a Russian invasion of India was being prepared. He demanded that the Afghan emir provide armed resistance to the Russian advance. Afghanistan sent troops to Panjsheh to strengthen its defenses. When Komarov found out about this, he became furious. Komarov declared that the oasis belonged to Russia and ordered the Afghan troops to leave immediately. The Afghan commander refused. Komarov immediately turned to the British special commissioner in Afghanistan, General Lamsden, demanding that he tell the Afghan troops to leave. Lamsden refused to do this.
Determined not to let Panjshekh slip through his fingers, Komarov decided to change tactics. On March 13, 1885, under pressure from Britain, the Russian government gave an oath guarantee that Russian troops would not attack Panjshekh if the Afghans refrained from military action. Three days later, Foreign Minister Nikolai Girs repeated this and added that such an obligation was given with the full approval of the tsar.
Afghan troops concentrated on the western bank of the Kushka River, and Russian troops on the eastern bank. Despite repeated promises from the Russian government, Komarov's troops gradually surrounded Panjshekh. By March 12, 1885, they were less than a mile away from his defenders. Komarov now presented the commander of the Afghan troops with an ultimatum: either he withdraws the troops in five days, or the Russians themselves will expel them.
On March 18, 1885, when General Komarov’s ultimatum expired and the Afghans showed no signs of retreat, he ordered his units to go on the offensive, but not to open fire first. As a result, the Afghans were the first to open fire, wounding the horse of one of the Cossacks. After which the Russian troops were ordered to open fire on the Afghan cavalry, which was concentrated within sight. The cavalry could not withstand the murderous fire and fled in disarray. But the Afghan infantry fought bravely. By morning the enemy was driven back beyond the Pul-i-Khishti bridge, suffering approximately 600 casualties. The losses of Komarov's troops amounted to only 40 dead and wounded.
This international incident was actively discussed in the European press and, as they thought at that time, brought Russia to the brink of war with Great Britain. Emir Abdur Rahman, who was at a meeting with Lord Dufferin in Rawalpindi at the time, tried to hush up the incident as a minor border misunderstanding. Lord Ripon, an influential member of Gladstone's cabinet, insisted that any concession by the British would encourage open Russian intervention in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, war was averted through the efforts of diplomats, who received assurances from the Tsar's representatives of their intentions to respect the territorial integrity of Afghanistan in the future.
To resolve the incident, a Russian-British border commission was established, which determined the modern northern border of Afghanistan. Representatives of the emir did not participate in its work. The concessions of the royal representatives were minimal. Russia retained the piece of land conquered by Komarov, on which the city of Kushka was subsequently founded. It was the southernmost populated area of both the Russian Empire and the USSR. The historical significance of the battle on Kushka was that it drew a line under the expansion of Tsarist Russia to the south of Turkmenistan.
| Afghan khanates |
18.3.1885 (31.3). – The victorious battle of the Russians on Kushka with the Anglo-Afghan army.
At the final stage, Russia reached natural mountain boundaries in the south. The border with Iran was established on the Kopetdag mountains, to the north of which the Russian Trans-Caspian region was formed on Turkmen lands (the southern part of modern Turkmenistan). In February 1884, as a result of negotiations with local residents, the Merv oasis near British-controlled Afghanistan was also annexed. At the beginning of January, the Mervians sent their deputation to the Russian command with a request to accept them as Russian citizenship:
“To the Illustrious Great Tsar, the Highest Ruler of the Russian and other peoples. May his prosperity and power continue, may his mercy and favor not dry up, may the blessing of Allah be upon him.
We, the khans, elders and representatives of all clans and tribes of the Merv people, having gathered today (January 1, 1884) at the gengesh and having listened to the captain-captain Alikhanov sent to us, unanimously decided to voluntarily accept Russian citizenship. Giving ourselves, our people and our country under Your mighty hand, Great King, we place before Your throne a request to make us equal with all the peoples subject to You, to appoint rulers over us and to establish order between us, for which, at Your command, we are ready to set the required number armed horsemen.
To present this resolution to the people’s representatives, we have authorized 4 khans and 24 elders, each from two thousand tents.”
(Battle on Kushka on March 18, 1885 and territorial acquisitions during the reign of Emperor Alexander III // Russian Antiquity, No. 3. 1910)
In confirmation of its sincerity, the deputation represented by the khans of the Tekin family and the honorary elders of Merv arrived in Ashgabat, where, according to the Highest permission, they swore an oath of unconditional citizenship to His Imperial Majesty the Sovereign. The Turkmen were happy, since they were not infringed upon in their previous rights and Russian patronage saved them from constant conflicts with the Afghans.
England was afraid of Russia's further advance towards India and tried to incite the local border population against the Russians. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared a war with England and demanded that the Russian military command exclusively peacefully resolve disputed border issues, with a strict ban on starting hostilities first. However, during the negotiations, England demanded that Russia give Afghanistan the Penjdeh oasis and some other Turkmen territories. The Russians refused, saying that the Turkmen lands never belonged to Afghanistan, but rather were in conflict with neighboring Afghan tribes. Persevering, the British advisers encouraged the Afghan emir to oppose the Russians, promising him help, and actually handed over an artillery battery to the Afghans. British officers led the Afghan army, which captured the Penjdeh oasis, which previously belonged to Merv.
Head of the Transcaspian region, General A.V. Komarov demanded that they leave Russian territory, and when they ignored his demands, on March 18 he gave the command to Russian troops to move into the territory captured by the Afghans, without opening fire without a command. Seeing the Russians, the Afghans were the first to open rifle fire on them. Then the order was given and the Russian troops were ordered to return fire (thus the requirement of the St. Petersburg Ministry of Foreign Affairs was met).
In this battle on the Kushka River, the Afghans advanced with a detachment of 4 thousand people (2.5 thousand cavalry and 1.5 thousand infantry), the Russians had 1840 soldiers (four infantry battalions, Cossacks and Turkmen militia fighters). But the Afghans were armed mostly with old guns, while the Russians had more modern rifles. The Afghan troops were put to flight with huge losses: up to one and a half thousand people. Russian troops lost 9 people killed and 22 wounded, 23 were shell-shocked. The Russians also received British artillery as a trophy. On April 6, Russian soldiers staged an Easter fireworks display using Anglo-Afghan cannons.
The Russians did not pursue the Afghans on their territory. The Russian command sent a polite message to the Afghan authorities with a promise to limit themselves to the liberation of their Turkmen territories and not to cross the border unless the Afghans themselves attack again. The wounded Afghans were provided with medical assistance, the prisoners were sent home, and they were given provisions for the journey. The British were assigned an escort to ensure their safety along the way. In Europe, in connection with this battle, there was a stir about the start of a new war between Russia and England, but the Russian Foreign Ministry pretended that nothing had happened, there was only a minor skirmish.
Gorny Mikhail
Campaign against the Afghans and the battle on Kushka (1885)
Gorny Mikhail
Campaign against the Afghans and the battle on Kushka (1885)
Memoirs of former private Andrei Bolandlin
From the text: The bridge was covered with the corpses of the fugitives. Our soldiers tried not to even look at them. Silently, with serious faces, maintaining an alignment, they walked, clutching their berdans with hands blackened by gunpowder, in their damp greatcoats. “One, two, three, four... one, two, three, four!..” - counted most of them, stepping over the corpses of Afghans, foot and horse, trampled, tormented by horse hooves, artillery shells and boots of the Pkhotin soldiers.
Hoaxer: The armed conflict of 1885 was the only clash of this kind that occurred during the reign (1881-1894) of Alexander III the Peacemaker. In some reference books (for example, V. Pokhlebkin “Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years”, M., 1995) this conflict is called a “Russian-English armed conflict” (due to the presence of hundreds of English advisers in the ranks of the Afghans ), in other works this is called the Russian-Afghan armed conflict (which, in my opinion, is correct, unlike the previous name). But the fact that the British were among the Afghans, and were beaten, is beyond doubt. This is reflected in the song given in the text of this book: “The enemy will always remember, / The British and Afghans will never forget...”.
Notes
Campaign against the Afghans and battle on Kushk
"And we passed the steppe like the sea,
Through the sand hurricane...
So he walks into the open space,
Rushing from mound to mound...
The bird rarely flies there,
There the sand is flying like a column...
(Cossack song).
One of the early January days of 1885, in the Samarkand barracks of the 3rd linear Turkestan battalion, “literature” classes were going on. At the white wooden tables sat about thirty students, students already mustachioed and bearded, however, they had just begun to write on slates. The teacher of these strange schoolchildren was a young, dark-haired ensign Degtyarev, who stood near two black boards with large cardboard letters.
Well, brothers, what letter is this? - he asks, raising the letter b up.
Would! If only!.. - shouts a chorus of the most diverse voices.
Which one is this? - the ensign raises another letter.
A! A! - the soldiers shout.
What syllable, brothers, will it be if we take these letters together? the teacher speaks again.
Bah! - the students respond.
The students, however, are not particularly attentive: some move away, others give each other clicks, others push each other. But there are also attentive people who try to understand for themselves the whole abyss of wisdom. The jokers tell them:
What to study? If they haven’t taught the little ones, it’s all the same: they won’t get it into the heads of the big ones!
Nah, that's not it, guys! - they respond: better late than never. The diploma will come in handy - at least write a letter home or something else...
After the mental exercises, the physical exercises began. The entire third half-company, young and old, had already been gathered.
The red soldier Chernousov deftly pulled himself up on the rings. Then the turn came to the clumsy Vyatka fat soldier Volkov, who always had trouble doing pull-ups.
Well, you, Vyatka,” Degtyarev mumbled: don’t mess up your Vyatka!
Yes, Mr. Ensign, I didn’t learn it from a young age, but now I’m going to go home soon...
Home, not home, but still it’s a shame for the old soldier to do such a thing. You are supposed to serve as a prime minister for others, but it turns out that the young soldiers are better than you.
The soldiers grinned.
The time was approaching 12 o'clock. Suddenly the horn began to play: - Gathering!
The recruits, not knowing whether they were playing for obed or for "collection", assumed the former, grabbed copper cups and rushed to the kitchen, because, according to the established order in almost all troops, recruits go behind the obel. The old people quarreled.
Where are you going, you fucking devils?
For volume!
What a size for you! Do you hear that they are playing the collection, not obed! Roll your overcoats, take your bags and mice.
The soldiers began to fuss, grabbed guns and other ammunition and marched to the courtyard. And other companies were already forming in the yard. At the first company, in a carriage drawn by a pair of blacks, sat the Colonel himself, Mikhail Petrovich Kav, a gallant man, wearing glasses, with a black and gray beard, who had just arrived here. The officers also gathered, each to his own unit. Finally, the army lined up. Company commanders also came. Then the colonel cheerfully jumped out of the carriage, said something to them, and then turned to all the soldiers, who were eager to find out why the authorities had gathered them, and said:
Congratulations on your campaign, brothers! I received a telegram from the commander of the troops: we are moving to the city of Merv.
We are glad to try, your honor!.. - the battalion roared loudly.
Gg. Disband the company commanders, company schoolchildren and the training team into companies, stop classes and prepare for the campaign!..
The soldiers were dismissed.
Eh, brothers, let's go on a hike... - some said.
To Merv, probably, to the parking lot,” the others replied.
Well, hardly for parking... - the first ones did not agree. The 3rd battalion in other Samarkand troops (1) had quite a few fellow countrymen.
Let's go on a hike, brothers! - the soldiers of the 3rd battalion announced to them.
Well, lie! Kava always goes on hikes, goes racing every year.
In fact, the efficient colonel did annual practice, and walked twenty or thirty miles in full march with his battalion, with all the baggage and provisions.
On the same day, the colonel received a second telegram, in which the soldiers were allowed to take things with them. The delighted Turkestanis, assuming that they were going to the parking lot, were already thinking of taking with them beds, boxes, and other equipment, when a new telegram dispelled their dreams: it ordered each soldier to have no more than a pound of his own belongings.
The married men were also ordered to be taken on the march at first, but later an order came out to leave the married men behind and replace them with people from other units.
They will kill you, brothers,” the bachelors first laughed at the married, “and your wives will remain.”
Shall we go to war? - they snapped.
What about the parking lot? Let's go to war...
The women, having heard that their husbands were being taken to war, started howling. When they left the married women, the soldiers were dissatisfied with this too...
And, indeed: the soldiers will serve their term, go home, but their wives will hide and remain in Turkestan. However, the husbands who were transferred from their comrades to other units were also dissatisfied and almost cried.
We bring to your attention a story about how in 1885 the territory was demarcated between Turkmenistan, which became part of the Russian Empire, and Afghanistan. The text is taken from the study of Colonel of the General Staff A.D. Shemansky, “The Conquest of Central Asia.”
---
1. Merv's lesson
Merv, asking for citizenship, ate with Alikhanov, by decision of his Council, an embassy of 4 main khans with 16 elders, who swore allegiance in Ashgabat on February 6, 1884.
To bring us into possession of Merv, the head of the Trans-Caspian region, Lieutenant General, was sent there. Alexander Vissarionovich Komarov, who went there on February 25, 1884 with a detachment of 1 b., 2 s. and 2 op. from r. Tejen (village of Karry-Bend, in the lower reaches, on the Ashgabat-Merv road). He was met in the desert by a deputation of 400 men. But in the city of Merv itself, the English emissary, the aforementioned “siya-nush”, with several hundred adherents (with Topaz-Qajar Khan) tried to organize “armed resistance” for us, with the aim of turning voluntary citizenship into - supposedly - forced.
The rebels were scattered, and the “siya-nush” [English agent] was captured by us during the flight, with the help of the Turkmen who wanted to serve us. The citadel of Merv - Koushut-khan-kala was occupied by us, then we built another additional fortification, the inhabitants were disarmed and all the Persian, Bukhara and Khiva cannons, the pride of the Turkmen of the entire Teke, were collected, like trophies of past victories.
Lieutenant Colonel Alikhanov was appointed head of the new Merv district, who was entrusted with managing the accession to us of the Merv vassals - the Saryks and Solors, who were eager for our citizenship since the defeat of Leok-1epe, since Merv greatly oppressed them. Only as a result of the pressure of Merv, the Pendin saryks were forced, as indicated, to rent mountain (summer) pastures in Afghanistan.
But some of the saryks were so close to Merv that we decided to accept them immediately. These were the residents of Iolatani (on the Murgab River), who took the oath in Ashgabat on April 21, 1884. A bailiff has been assigned to them. And on May 25, we occupied the center of the Solors - Serakhs, which the Persians were going to occupy (at the instigation of the British), even having moved their detachment there from Meshed on May 22. The second bailiff from the Merv district was stationed there.
The lands of the Saryks-Pendians along the Murgab with the tributaries Kushkoy, Kash and Kaysor and the northern foothills of the “Herat” ridge, the lands of the Solors with the deserts separating Pende from the Amu Darya and Tejen remained unoccupied by us. We decided to send troops there only after the international commission determined their border with Afghanistan.
It was decided to make up the commission from an English delegate, General Sir Peter Lemsden, and a Russian, General Zeleny. With both, a large convoy and a large headquarters of draftsmen, surveyors and reconnaissance officers are allowed.
2. Demarcation with the Anglo-Afghans beyond the Caspian Sea.
The commission for the delimitation of Afghanistan and our Turkmenistan was supposed to begin operating in the fall of 1884. The British hastened to send their delegates there (September), who traveled through the Caucasus and Persia to the vicinity of Herat, and their convoy arrived there from Quetta.
But we refrained from sending our own, noticing the desire of the Afghans and the British to chop off all of Pende and the south of the Solor lands. Afghan guards appeared there, and the British commission, traveling between them, encouraged and justified them. Then we said we wouldn't start
demarcation until: 1) the Afghan invaders leave the Turkmen lands, and 2) until England agrees in advance to consider the Saryks and Solors as leaving to us.
The delimitation should have consisted only in clarifying on the spot the boundaries of the possessions of these tribes in Afghanistan.
The British did not want to agree to this, and the negotiations moved at a snail's pace, and the number of Afghan troops continued to grow both on Murghab (Pende) and on Tejen (above Serakhs).
The Afghan detachment grew especially strongly in Penda, settling in the outskirts of this oasis closest to us, at the mouth of the river. Kushki, a tributary of the Murgab, at Tash-Kepri (stone bridge, viaduct across Kushka) and Ak-Tepe (a huge hillock, near this place). It was a good strategic point: the best route to Herat, on the one hand, and to Afghan Turkestan (Char Vilayet) went from Russian Merv along the Murghab valley and in Pende, branched into a number of roads along the valleys of its tributaries pp. Kushka, Kash and Kaysar). The Anglo-Afghans, dreaming of erecting a fortress at Tash-Kepri, hoped with it to effectively cover access to Afghanistan from the Trans-Caspian region. This was the only way there in the entire vast space from the Amu Darya to Tedjen, which was an “insurmountable” desert.
But... the Afghans, who advanced to Turkmenistan as invaders, began to behave extremely defiantly, and numerous reconnaissance officers of the English mission ruled there like masters.
Finally, in the English press, and in Asian market rumors, and in diplomatic correspondence, they began to scare us with a war with the Anglo-Afghans...
Emperor Alexander III showed great determination and ordered “not to concede in anything” to our Central Asian opponents... The result of this was the hasty development of a plan in case of war in Central Asia with England and Afghanistan; strengthening (from the Caucasus and Turkestan) the Trans-Caspian region with large forces and means, with the preparation of the nearest “reserve” for it in the Caucasus... We moved detachments to Murghab and Tedzhen with an intermediate post between them at the northern foot of the Herat Mountains... Goal detachments, when necessary, to drive out the invaders by force, and to be the vanguard of our deployment should war break out.
And the correspondence about the demarcation went on as usual, taking on larger and larger dimensions, becoming more and more confused every day.
The main forces of our detachments of Murgab and Tejen gathered in Merv and Serakhs, and their vanguards, first in the form of Cossack hundreds, were moved forward to Iolatani and Pulikhatun up the currents of these rivers, with forward posts at Tash-Kepri (on Murgab) and at Zulfagara (on Tejen), with an intermediate post at Akrabat.
The Afghans occupied Pende against the Murgab detachment and Zulfagar - against the Tejen detachment. Our travels met with Afghans.
Bored with bickering about how to look for the border and who should be considered within our borders, we designed the border we wanted, offered it to England and decided, if the latter disagreed, to occupy it with troops.
As always, here too we tried to voluntarily give up something to our rivals: drawing the border from the Amu Darya along the northern edge of the Afghan oases of Andkhoy, we gave the valleys of pp. to the Afghans. Salgalaka and Kaysora, where they lived (partly free Turkmens; then, leaving Pende behind us, from Meruchak to Murgab, instead of drawing the border along the ridge of the Herat Mountains, as it should have been, we gave the Afghans most of the northern slope of these mountains, drawing a line to Khauzi Khan on Kushka, then along its tributary the Egri-chen River and the wells of Keriz-syuime, Keriz-Ilyas to the Tedzhen River, leaving Zyulfagar himself (10 versts downstream).
From Herat this line passed 120-200 versts.
But the British, not appreciating our concessions, stood their ground and demanded for Afghanistan both Pende (as far as Sary-Yazy on Murghab) and the Tejen valley to Pulikhatun (even to Shir-Tepe, which is even further north). This was an obvious “request” from the traders, based on the principle “to have something to give in to.” The British delayed their response until March 1, 1885!
On March 15, we responded with new insistence. Although, tired of the verbal struggle, we were ready to secretly agree to a concession to Pende, in order to thereby sway Afghanistan in our favor with such great kindness...
Meanwhile, our military activities on the theme of “not giving up anything” kept developing and developing, and every minute the question could be raised point-blank...
In total, beyond the Caspian Sea at that time we had up to 6 thousand infantry, 2 thousand cavalry and 16 guns (7 battalions, 14 Kazakh troops, one railway battalion and one local team). Without exposing the newly conquered country, we could move only 1/4 - 1/3) of these forces into our forward detachments = 2 battalions, 6 s., 4 guns and no more than 4 battalions. Moreover, there were up to 3 hundred Turkmen police in the region, b. hours of which a lieutenant colonel was hastily recruited. Alikhanov to strengthen the forward detachments.
The Afghans have already deployed up to 4 thousand people against these forces. with 8 cannons at Tash-Kepri and up to 300 at Zulfagar, not counting 1 thousand people. Indo-British in Gurlen, against Akrabat.
To form the Murghab and Serakh detachments, troops were moved from Ashgabat, 400 versts from it to Kushka. The command of the Murghab detachment was assumed by Lieutenant General himself. Komarov, and the head of the vanguard of this detachment (three horse hundreds) was lieutenant colonel. Alikhanov.
While the echelons of the Murgab detachment slowly walked into the area. Imam Baba on Murghab (138 versts from Merv and 70 versts from Tash-Kepri), Alikhanov’s vanguard was ordered to occupy the entire space up to the river. Kushki, pushing Afghan posts and patrols along the Murghab valley towards it. He performed this between February 2 and March 5, while his assistant, Lt. Col. Tatarins with a hundred formed the vanguard of the Serakh detachment (regiment Fleisher = 0.5 battalions, 2 op.) in Pulikhatun.
Alikhanov with the main forces of his vanguard (2 hundreds, of which one was native, the other Cossack) on February 3, 1885 came from Merv to his advanced hundred, stationed in Imam Baba.
The English Colonel Ridgway, who was with the advanced Afghan detachment, sent him a letter in which he warned against moving forward and threatened him with a clash with the Afghans.
Alikhanov, in response to this, went forward with three hundred to Aimak-Jar in order to encourage the Afghan patrols to lay siege to the river. Kushka. The instructions advised him not to put pressure on the Afghans with all the forces of the vanguard, but only by traveling. But the work of the latter was not enough.
The Afghan captain hastened to retreat in advance along with Ridgway and his squad, leaving Alikhanov with a written threat to “stop him by force of saber, gun and cannon” if he went further.
Of course, Alikhanov went further forward, to Kushka itself, where the main forces of the Afghan detachment stood (behind it); but he took with him only the native hundred.
Chasing Afghan patrols and pickets in front of him, on February 8 he reached Tash-Kepri and on this side of Kushka set up his post on the hill of Kizil-Tepe under the command of the dashing horseman, Aman-Klych, and he himself retreated to Aimak-Jar.
In Tash-Kepri at that time there were both Afghan and English generals - Kousuddin Khan and Lemsden, with the core of the English delimitation commission. Lemsden addressed an arrogant and stern letter to Alikhanov regarding his arrival. Alikhanov replied that he was “only a soldier,” “an exact executor of the orders of his superiors, and he knows nothing about politics.” Leaving a group of officers and “leaders” with the Afghan detachment, Lemsden and the rest of his commission went to Gurlen. This time the Afghan general was kind to Alikhanov and even hastily returned to him the horseman who had run into their camp.
Alikhanov was instructed to maintain relations with the population and Pende, who were rushing towards us, and to establish reconnaissance for the Afghans in the Murghab basin. Lieutenant Lopatinsky carried the same reconnaissance mission in the Tedjen basin, standing at Zulfagar and Akrabat.
With only 31 people. At his disposal, this valiant officer showed great courage and dexterity in dealing with the Afghan detachment at Zulfagar, which outnumbered him ten times.
Our intelligence services gave us accurate and comprehensive information about the Afghans: that the Herat garrison was liquid; that the Afghans are led in their tenacity and military actions by the British; finally, the most accurate information about the number, composition, weapons and equipment of the Afghans, what their soldiers chatter around the fires, and what the British officers do and where they travel - reconnaissance officers. This success of reconnaissance must be attributed mainly to the sending of the best (more prominent, influential, wealthy and developed natives) people from Merv and Iolatani as spies.
We learned that the Ak-Tepe hill with the Afghan camp was being fortified according to the European model; that a ferry was built from it beyond Murghab, where field fortifications were also being built. We learned that the British were tempting the Saryk-Pende for good money to place a thousand riflemen (mergens) in the Afghan detachment, with weapons at their expense, and that the deadline for response was set for March 18...
Day by day we knew the arrival of large reinforcements to Ak-Tepe from Herat along the river valley. Kushki from Maimene, the Kaysor valley, and about the hasty repairs by the Afghans in Pende and near the old native fortresses of Meruchak and Bala-Murgab.
We learned that at Tash-Kepri the Afghans had gathered 1.5 thousand infantry and up to 2.5 thousand cavalry with 8 different-caliber guns, half of which were mountain guns and 1/4 were Afghan work, and the rest were English... We were told , that the Afghan infantry is inspired and thirsty for battle, saying that “they are going to Gazavat and will not let Rus' into the Afghan borders.” But the Afghan cavalry, assembled from the Hazaras and Jamshils, hating the Afghans, is more inclined towards us, like the Pendins. The latter wanted to cut out the Afghan detachment with an accidental attack on it, but did not dare, without receiving direct consent from us for support. The British generously showered money and gifts in the form of their own insurance, and yet there were robberies of their luggage.
The Afghan guns were bad, there were many flintlock guns, cap guns, and no more than a dozen fast-loading guns. Bayonets, pikes, checkers and large curved knives made up edged weapons. The guns did not have grapeshot, but only cannonballs. Their gunpowder for rifles and cannons was bad. A convoy of carts (packs) along with the residents, to offset taxes. Contentment is unimportant; clothes b. part of their own, native, but Afghan generals and officers wore English suits on ceremonial occasions. In order to influence our people suspected of spying, the Afghans staged whole performances, forcing the same people to enter the camp, as if reinforcements had arrived...
Komarov received the task: “remove the Afghans beyond the river. Kushka, avoiding – if possible – bloodshed.” He reported that he “can’t vouch for the latter”; and in private correspondence he says that he is “being held by the tail like a dog.”
Making a concession to the last condition, he had to constantly put himself in a more difficult military and combat situation: not to rush to drive out the Afghans while there were few of them; prohibit your troops from using weapons first, even if separate shots are fired from the enemy; patiently endure the arrogance of the Afghans; in the event of a clash and success - not to pursue or invade Afghanistan, to Herat, and, finally, not to stop negotiations on defeat, intertwining diplomatic steps, steps of strategy and tactics into one whole.
The Murghab detachment gathered at Imam-Bab on March 5, and on the 7th and 8th, in two echelons, moved to Aimak-Jar, where it remained until March 11 in the vain hope that the Afghans would “step back.” Then on the 12th he moved even closer to them, to Urush-dushan (20 versts from Tash-Kepri), and on the 13th he went to the river. Kushka, but stopped in camp, not reaching it 5 versts, “so as not to irritate the Afghans.” Our outposts were located 2 versts from Kushka, on the line of Kizil-Tepe and Cossack Hill. In total, no more than 60-65 miles were covered per week.
When approaching Kushka, our two officers, General. headquarters from the hill of Kizil-Tepe reconnoitered the location of the Afghans, and in the sands beyond Murgab, Afghan patrols were detained, trying to monitor our movements. Hearing about the great need in the Afghan camp and about supplies being smuggled there by sand, we sent patrols into the desert and announced in Merv and Iolatani that we would confiscate such cargo.
Afghan outposts stood 0.5-1 verst from ours in front of Kushka and even beyond Murghab. Their camp, surrounded by trenches, was behind Kushka at the foot of the Ak-Tepe hillock, on the top of which there was an observation post and one gun. A chain of posts guarded their camp from Pende, whom they did not trust. Their position behind Murghab commanded ours.
When the Murghab detachment approached, the entire Afghan cavalry (with 2 cannons) poured out from behind Kushka and lined up on the crest of this bank, where they immediately began to dig trenches. Seeing that we were not thinking of attacking, the cavalry went across the river, and its position was taken by the infantry, the duty unit. From then on, the Afghans never left this shore and kept improving its trenches, kept increasing their forces on it, until they completely turned them around and were thrown into Kushka by our combat strike.
If the British officers chose this position for the Afghans, they could only do it in mockery, because it had great shortcomings. And since one of these officers told us that they “never doubted our defeat of the Afghans,” it follows that, leading this whole matter to such a conclusion, England wanted to alienate the sympathies of the Afghans from us for a long time with the Kushkin defeat...
Murgab, firstly, divided the position in half, and counting Kushka, which was raging at that time (the flood), the position was divided into three, counting the troops that remained in the camp and covered it from the Pendans. The position in front of Kushka was completely narrow, pressed against the steep cliffs of the bank and the only bridge, narrow and long. Fording the seething Kushka was unsafe.
The best, that is, the shortest and safer from the Turkmens, path came from the left flank, which, as it stood out in front, was inevitably going to be attacked. Another path, a longer one, went back, beyond Kushka, through the settlements of the Saryks and Dzhemshids.
Following his instructions, Komarov began with negotiations through the British, so that the Afghans would go beyond Kushka and from behind Murgab to their camp and there they would quietly await the verdict of the delimitation commission - who would get Pende.
The British were looking forward to these negotiations with such impatience that they called them on March 13 themselves, composing that one of the Russian commanders wanted to see them.
The next day, the 14th, the meeting between the Russians and the British took place at 5 o'clock. evenings between outposts near Tash-Kepri. On the date were Gen. headquarters, Colonel Zakrzhevsky53" from us and Captain Iet with his retinues. We treated the British, according to Russian hospitality. We discussed the general situation and events of the day: spreading from both their flanks with posts and patrols, the Afghans enveloped us, which was both disadvantageous for us and impudent for them sides. To our proposal to go to the camp, behind Kushka, they responded by strengthening their position in front of Kushka. The British did their best to justify the Afghans.
The next day the negotiations continued with letters, and everything in the same spirit...
Relations with the Afghans worsened: they were extremely hostile towards our ranks and units sent to reconnaissance on the flanks. Alikhanov, who rode (to the right flank) with the Turkmen hundred up the river. Kushke, on the way to Mop-Kala, was overtaken by the Afghan general himself with several hundred cavalry and had to return, repaying the Afghans by escorting them all the way to the Tash-Keprin bridge, greatly annoying him. Captain Prasolov with a company, marching beyond Murghab, was stopped by the threatening actions of an Afghan company, which detained one of our horsemen until the morning of the 16th.
The posts and patrols of the Afghans became more and more intense and they all engulfed us, boldly approaching us (to our ferry on Murghab) and shouting various threats: “Get out of here! We are not Turkmens for you, we are Afghans; We have beaten the English more than once, and we will beat you too if you don’t leave!” The latest facts happened on the 16th. We told the British about them at a meeting that took place that day, and they all around blamed us.
Komarov began to notice that the impudent treatment of us by the Afghans greatly reduced our charm among the Turkmen policemen, and the negotiations led to absolutely nothing; the spies reported that the Afghans were going to attack us unexpectedly and that our patient endurance was giving them courage.
Then Komarov decided to scare them with the threat of battle and on the 17th sent an ultimatum to the Afghan general: “I demand that today, March 17, before the evening, all Afghans leave the left bank of the Kushka, and behind Murgab they retreat to the river line. Kushki. There will be no more negotiations or explanations on this issue. You have intelligence and insight and probably will not allow me to carry out my demand myself.”
At the same time, we invited the British for the last time and asked them to bring with them a delegate from the Afghans. The British appeared alone and did their best to justify the Afghans.
At this time, the senior Afghan general was Naib-Salar. He answered Komarov that he could not fulfill his demands and agreed only to slight corrections in the position of his posts. He motivated his refusal by the instructions of the emir and the advice of the British.
Then Komarov tried to secretly make it known in a new private letter that the British were evil advisers to the Afghans, that they wanted to bring the matter to a battle. In conclusion, Komarov said: “God help you! The choice between friendship and enmity depends on you!”
The Afghan general convened a military council, at which the prevailing opinion532 was to give battle. And by morning the Afghans stood “at gunpoint” in their position ahead of Kushka.
3. Battle on the river. Kushka March 18, 1885.
Komarov also gathered his superiors for a meeting and announced to them the disposition for battle the next day, adding that he did not lose hope that one type of our offensive would remove the Afghans beyond Kushka, which is why he forbade us to shoot first, to respond to single shots...
Our ferry through Murgab was filmed; a small team (50 people) of non-combatants remained in our camp for its defense533. The detachment rose at 4 o'clock. morning and moved into battle under the cover of outposts (half-company), which were removed as our columns approached them.
In total, we had 1840 people in our detachment, 600 horses and 4 mountain cannons, and 1660 soldiers with 4 cannons went into battle.
Our battle plan was simple: from the front, Komarov sent 500 people to the trenches occupied by Afghan infantry and artillery. He sent 500 of his cavalrymen to the Trans-Caspian infantry against the Afghan cavalry, which was always built on the left flank of the “pre-Kushkino” position, and sent 600 Turkestanians with mountain cannons to cover the left flank of the Afghans.
They say that the cavalry should have gone into the envelopment, not the Turkestans, but it turned out as stated above, and the reason for this was the wandering of the Turkestans in the lumpy sands with which they went to envelop. This wandering caused them to be late and take part only at the end of the battle. On the Kizil-Tepe hill a dressing station became, and the gene. Komarov and his headquarters stayed behind the cavalry column. The artillery, which was also very late in its appearance on the battlefield, was attached to the latter, before the Turkestanians emerged from the sands.
In his disposition, Komarov announced that he had exhausted all persuasion to remove the Afghans beyond Kushka, which is why he ordered his detachment to knock them out of their position in front of this river. This was done 2 - 3 hours after the start of the battle.
The Afghan forces outnumbered us three times: 4.7 thousand and 8 guns - 3 baht, 26 hundred. and 8 guns. Yes, 1 thousand saryks were expected.
The Afghan infantry and artillery had been in the trenches since the night, their outposts had been removed, and the cavalry formed a huge column on the left flank. And their entire location was on the commanding ridge at the very cliff into the Kushka valley.
It was damp, cold, cloudy, drizzling with cold rain mixed with snow... This was not favorable for the Afghan flintlock and piston guns, which constantly misfired; The heavy leather shoes of the Afghan infantry, studded with nails, constantly got stuck in the sticky mud and flew off their feet.
The darkness hid the opponents from each other for a long time...
Our cavalry was the first to run into the enemy; she, climbing the Tash-Keprin plateau, just came out against the enemy’s cavalry mass of 536 - 500 people. against 2.6 thousand! No wonder the captured Afghans said: “We were not afraid of your cavalry, it was like a fly against ours.”
Seeing ours, Naib-Salar, on his gray horse in front of the Afghan cavalry, shouted to her: “Strive for the glory of God!” The Afghans responded with loud cries: “Alla!..”
Alikhanov, believing that this would be followed by a hurricane of cavalry attack from the spot, and seeing that the enemy’s cavalry began to move, to worry, from the anxiety of the horses, excited by the cry of the masses, quickly built a front and hurried the Cossacks... They were joined by about 20 natives with guns , and the other horsemen remained with their sabers drawn on both flanks of the Cossacks...
Meanwhile, the cavalry of the Afghans moved forward towards Alikhanov, but, having walked more than twenty steps, they stopped about 400 steps, finding themselves in forest arable land, which had previously been so loose by horse hooves that the horses began to get stuck up to the knees...
It was at 6.15 o'clock. morning.
At this time, the advance of the Transcaspian infantry was clearly visible to the left of our cavalry, having already seen the difficult position of their cavalry, and the silhouettes of the Turkestan infantry had just appeared far behind as a ledge to the right of the cavalry.
At that moment, the nearest Afghan infantry fired rifle fire at our cavalry... First, one shot cracked, then, ten seconds later, a second, and then a whole group of them, like a volley... Alikhanov's horse threw him off, another Cossack horse was wounded... But Alikhanov, who quickly recovered, opened fire with his dismounted men, shouting instead of the usual command - “Burn! Burn!”
The fire spread across the entire battlefield. The rare impacts of Afghan cannon shots and the distinct volleys of the Trans-Caspian battalion and dashing Cossack fire stood out.
They say that the Kabulians were the first to open fire, so they were instructed to help their cavalry...
“Ten minutes” after the start of the skirmish, several squadrons of Kabul cavalry (up to 300 people) from the right flank of their cavalry rushed to Alikhanov’s left flank... The horsemen standing here rushed towards them, but after the death of their leader (Seyid-Nazar- Yuzbash, from Kaahk), they gave the rear, they got confused... But Alikhanov, rushing towards them, shouted in Turkmen: “Either win or die!” - and the horsemen, emboldened, rushed into the fray... However, several Cossack horses escaped from the horse guides and rushed towards Kizil-Tepe... Nevertheless, the Afghan attack was instantly besieged by the fire of the Cossacks and the Trans-Caspian infantry and scattered... And the rest of the Afghan cavalry the mass from the Cossack fire fell into complete chaos, panic... and, crushing a friend and suffering huge losses, jumped off the cliffs of Kushka into its stormy waters and began to scatter to the other shore...
At this time, chains of Turkestans arrived and opened destructive fire on the cavalry, and along the rest of the Afghan position, and behind Kushka against the crowds trying to put themselves in order there.
With the combined onslaught of all units, the Afghan infantry was shot down and fled across the bridge and ford across the river... The guns, banners, drums, trumpets, badges went to us...
At this time, our artillery had already opened fire on the Afghans who were trying to line up behind Kushka... our infantry went across the bridge, and the cavalry forded. The Afghans fled, abandoning the camp, littering the battlefield with corpses, weapons, horse bodies, boots...
Komarov did not allow persecution to emphasize that he was satisfied with what he wanted, and even transferred all the troops beyond Kushka.
The battle ended at 8 o'clock. morning, and for another two hours separate shots were heard - these were a few individual Afghans hiding in the camp and near the bridge who preferred death in battle to captivity...
The English officers (Eet, Owen, Smythe) first watched the battle from the other side of the Kushka, then drove off to the Pendensky village of Erden, where their apartment and luggage were...
Fearing the wild antics of the defeated Afghans, at one time they wanted to seek protection from us and sent two letters, offering the services of their doctor and asking for an escort... But the sent convoy did not find them, they preferred to retreat with the Afghan cavalry.
The battle did not cost us much: 9 people and 7 horses were killed; 22 people wounded. and 11 horses and shell-shocked 23 people. Of the officers, a police warrant officer was killed and two were wounded. The Transcaspian infantry suffered the most from bullets, cannonballs and bayonets, then the Cossacks, then the police, and finally the Turkestanis; headquarters - no losses.
The Afghans suffered heavy losses: more than 500 people were killed on the battlefield; weight of horses; Yes, so many died from wounds and deprivation in the first days that the Afghans themselves consider their loss to be more than 1 thousand people. dead. There were only 17 wounded and 7 prisoners. A lot of the Afghan leadership suffered - four were killed, and the leader himself was wounded by two bullets in the thigh.
We spent only 28 gun shots and fired 134,230 rifle shots.
Our trophies and booty: 8 cannons, banners, badges, a musical instrument, the entire camp, convoys, supplies... But most of all we gained glory! For the Afghans are considered the most serious enemy for the Europeans in Central Asia, after a series of dashing battles with the British, and Roberts himself said about them: “They only lack knowledgeable leaders to become a formidable military force.”
In the Kushkinsky battle we were convinced that they lacked quite a lot for such a flattering prospect!
Komarov sent secret scouts after those who fled, and on the 21st and 22nd, sub-regiments were sent along both roads to Herat, up the Murghab (via Pende to Meruchak538) and up the Kushka. Alikhanov and cap. Prasolov with an escort. The Afghans, melting along the way, reached Herat on the 11th day (March 28), after 9 marches from 50 to 10 versts per day, with only 2 days. Their situation was terrible in the cold - without clothes, linen, supplies, among a hostile population... Only 1 thousand of them gathered in the city of Kushka-Afghan. (600 horse and 400 foot). Here they were met by the Herat authorities and caught up with a messenger from General Komarov with a letter. In the letter, we announced to the Afghans that we were content with their cleansing of the left bank of the Kushka, that’s why we weren’t pursuing... because we no longer had any anger and we invited them to forget the clash. It added that the killed Afghans were buried in a Muslim manner, by hired workers, and the wounded, upon recovery, would be sent home at our expense. This letter made an impression; the vanquished thought that the winner - in Asian style - would fill him with mockery...
The commander of the cavalry unit and four officers had their ears cut off because their detachment set an example of flight. Alikhanov was considered the main culprit in the strained relations. The British were confused for a while.
The Kushkin battle raised a howl in England about the need for war with Russia. Abdurakhman was elected commander-in-chief of the allied forces. Members of the British delimitation commission began to strengthen Herat. In India, a large corps was concentrated near Ravaltidi. Our closest reserves from the Caucasus were transported to the Trans-Caspian region...
The British began a meticulous study of the behavior of General Komarov in this whole “Kushkin” story, they even demanded an arbitration court... All this was rejected by the Emperor, who expressed that, in his opinion, “it will not come to war, after all.” And it didn’t come through, due to his hardness.
The immediate consequence of the battle was that Pende remained behind us, a strong movement between the neighboring Jamshids to come under our authority from the rule of Afghanistan. We, of course, rejected this, and the Afghans subsequently brutally took revenge on the Jamshids for their impulse.
The demarcation continued, and we continued to make concessions: we gave up the labyrinth of the Zulfagar Pass, one of the good routes to Herat, and moved our border between the Amu Darya and Murghab 50 miles from the cultural border of Afghanistan into the wild desert.
Our beautiful monument adorns the field of the Kushkin battle, and a hundred miles to the south the Kushka fortress, which is respectable for Asia, grew up; according to the stages of the Murghab detachment from Merv to the region. There is a railway coming from Kushki, the station of which “Tash-Kepri” was right at our first bivouac in sight of the Afghans.
The troops were generously awarded for this battle, which became a high-profile page in the native political and military history. By the way, this is the only battle during the reign of Alexander III... And Komarov’s historical report, which excited the world, has still not been forgotten:
“Complete victory once again covered the troops of the Sovereign Emperor in Central Asia with resounding glory. The impudence of the Afghans forced me, in order to maintain the honor and dignity of Russia, to attack their heavily fortified positions on both banks of the river on March 18. Kushki. Afghan detachment of regular troops, force of 4 thousand people. with 8 guns, defeated and scattered, lost more than 500 people. killed, all the artillery, two banners, the entire camp, convoy, supplies... The British officers who led the actions of the Afghans asked for our protection; Unfortunately, my convoy did not catch up with them: they were probably carried away by the fleeing Afghan cavalry..."
May Alexander III’s response to this report, full of calm, dignity, strength, and most importantly, peacefulness, not be forgotten: “The Sovereign Emperor sends his royal thanks to Your Excellency (and all ranks) of the brave (Murghab) detachment for the brilliant deed on March 18; ordered that the most distinguished officers be presented for awards, and the lower ranks are awarded 50 insignia of a military order... At the same time, His Majesty is pleased to know in detail the reasons that prompted you to act contrary to the command conveyed to you: to refrain from a bloody clash with all your might..."
Let us add that the explanations of the gene. Komarov were considered quite correct.
In our place, we mentioned that Afghanistan made a seizure from us not only in Turkmenistan, but also in the Pamirs, where it covered the entire Western Pamirs (Roshan and Shugnan), instigated by England and our compliance, which later gave up to the English without much dispute. to the Afghans the south of the Pamirs - Wakhan - and the northern slope of the Hindu Kush, with the passes we discovered in its eastern part. Having removed the invaders from Turkmenistan by force and freed our hands there, we set about clearing the Pamirs from the Afghan invaders, which was not without heroic skirmishes and struggle with the difficult conditions of the military campaign on this truly “Roof of the World.”
