The effect of path dependence in world practice. Ideal types of structures and their characteristics

home / Love

One of the important signs of the development of sociological science in recent years has been its desire to integrate the historical dimension. This was reflected in the works of N. Elias, C. Tilly or T. Skocpol. There is reason to talk, in particular, about the emergence of a new movement - historical sociology, on the basis of which sociologists strive to overcome disciplinary fragmentation and express an unconventional view of objects and conventional approaches in sociology. This approach is of considerable interest, since it focuses research on the process of formation and evolution of political objects and, in particular, public policy. It is also associated with the division of the object of analysis (institutions, programs, actors, etc.), which presupposes an understanding of policy development in a relatively long time frame (P. Sabatier suggests, for example, a ten-year time frame).

Heritage

Based on the historical dimension, some public policy researchers emphasize the particular importance of the influence of previous policies on the behavior of public actors. This influence, in their opinion, is more important than the influence of what is associated with managing the environment and useful information, or with the complexity of special relationships in a given subsystem (for example, the influence of coercive factors). According to experts, it is the legacy left by previous governments that seems to be the determining factor in possible changes in public action.

Analyzing the evolution of British state programs after the Second World War, R. Rose shows that the possibilities of choice in changing public policy are limited by previous policies. Thus, based on an analysis of legislative acts, he came to the conclusion that when Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, more than half of the laws (56.6%) were voted before 1945; Moreover, during the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), 26% of the laws were developed, which were still in effect 20 years later.

Is it possible to make radical changes in public action in such a situation? If transformations that are revolutionary in their essence are not carried out in society, radical changes in a short time period are simply impossible: coercions, in particular, of institutional origin, affect both programs of public action and political and administrative actors. According to R. Rose,

“obligations to the past cannot be avoided by those who govern at a given moment, to the extent that they are built into public law and institutions and implemented by officials.”

On the other hand, most programs are implemented autonomously, which in itself is an obstacle to subsequent re-evaluation.

Thus, mechanisms of social action, as a rule, continue to function on the same principles and rules that were in effect at the time of their creation, while the socio-economic environment has changed profoundly. Changes in public action in such conditions are most often carried out mechanically under the influence of the logic of the programs themselves.

Path dependence processes

In the study of public action, a historical dimension has given rise. As noted above, a special trend of neo-institutionalism called historical institutionalism. It focuses on the study of the sociogenesis of the mechanisms of public action, as well as the principles, values, modes of action and relationships of forces that characterize it. Within this general orientation, the most famous concept is the "path dependent" (path dependence ), which describes the existence of cumulative movements that crystallize systems of action and institutional configurations inherent in a given subsystem and predetermine the exact course of public action.

Initially path dependence relies on the economic concept of increasing productivity (increasing returns ) a set of mechanisms that feed the cumulative dynamics. It is characterized by four main elements:

1. Unpredictability: if the underlying events have a large impact, then it is still impossible to predict the final state of the initial processes.
2. Inflexibility: The more you advance in this process, the more difficult it is to carry out new elections. Can't change path (path ).
3. Non-ergodicity: this concept implies that events occurring, including those during the process, cannot be ignored. They leave their mark on the dynamics of the process. And the already known situation cannot be repeated. Evolution occurs, but a certain cycle does not occur.
4. Potential inefficiency started path: the started process does not guarantee optimum or at least that an effective solution will be found. The alternative chosen is not always the one that leads to the best outcome.

In the economic field, such a theory was able to explain the inequality of economic development depending on geographical conditions by the benefits that countries that earlier joined the industrial revolution still receive.

Another example. The works of American economists show that Fordism as a method of economic organization has become dominant in mass production. However, its emergence owes more to the structure of capital distribution in the US and UK than to its more economically progressive nature. Every “path” that is started eventually tends to crystallize and become more and more coercive as it develops.

According to P. Pearson, certain conditions contribute to the emergence of a cumulative process of this type. First of all, there is a process of routinization by which actors become accustomed to acting within certain boundaries, tending to do and think in certain ways. A progressive change in practice in a certain direction, along a certain axis is forced, excluding the possibility of refusing to move in the direction of change. Change is a means of improving control over the process, which may not have been possible at the very beginning of its implementation. Thus, the coordination of everything that is associated with change concerns actors who “revolve” around the state, interest groups, political parties, trade unions, and the media, closely related to the dynamics that have begun.

Finally, two factors of adaptive anticipation in peripheral actors are added. In the process of change, no one wants to be in a marginal position, and therefore actors strive to choose the most fruitful path or the most acceptable one.

Recognizing that the use of economic concepts poses operational problems for political science, P. Pearson shows that the characteristics inherent in politics strengthen the validity of such analysis. According to Pearson, numerous factors justify that the process path dependence turns out to be more suitable for political objects than for characterizing economic dynamics.

1. The political field is characterized primarily by high institutional saturation. This is a consequence of the multiplicity of rules of procedure, the complexity of legislation in various social fields, the influence of mechanisms of public action, which themselves constitute coercion for action and leave an imprint on the behavior of actors.
2. Taking one of the first steps of incrementalism, P. Pearson insists on the inevitably collective nature of the political field. A typical example. Most public goods produced by the state, which is essentially a collective actor, are not intended for individual “consumption.” And therefore, in the political space, more than anywhere else, “actors must constantly adapt their behavior, anticipating the behavior of other actors.” This characteristic applies to the moment when bargaining begins, the movement towards cooperation and compromise.
3. Finally, P. Pearson insists on the complexity and uncertainty of politics. Against the expectations of incrementalism and bounded rationality, but from a different, broader perspective, aimed at a relatively strict definition of institutions, he shows the extent to which information weakness, the difficulty of defining clear goals or a short-term horizon of action, often determined by the electoral rhythm, is useful. All of these are coercive factors. With regard to the goals of public action, the confusion of interests, the multiplicity of principles and values inherent in each actor, is an obstacle to the establishment of true rationality.

Taking these various characteristics into account, P. Pearson ultimately shows that the progressive sedimentation of public policy, carried out by an increasingly large and increasingly heterogeneous bureaucratic apparatus, determines the most likely way of public policy evolution, thereby creating obstacles to any form of change. Squeezed into a space of complex action, actors are closely tied to primordial processes that serve their interests and/or satisfy some of their expectations, and/or frame or justify their behavior in the limited space. These processes also reduce uncertainty.

It must be said that the hypothesis of change in public action must be comprehended in relation to this tangled bundle of elements, and the evolution of public action most often takes on a form predetermined by the weight of various variables that “precipitated” and were institutionalized by these processes path dependence .

This approach was used by P. Pearson to study welfare state reforms in Great Britain and the USA. Examining the potentially destructive effect of the programs of ultra-liberal conservatives, on whose ideas M. Thatcher and R. Reagan were elected to office in 1979 and 1980, respectively, P. Pearson shows that the reforms undertaken by these politicians had significantly less consequences than initially expected .

What explains this? The reforms carried out in the UK and the USA were faced with a set of very complex compulsions (or, more precisely, restrictions) that freed these countries from the harmful consequences of reforms. Moreover, the welfare state in these two countries was not destroyed either. In the USA, for example, there was a combination of institutional elements. And this connection became a counterbalance to the declared orientations: conflictual relations arose between Congress and the president, the role of administrations and pressure from trade unions, pensioners’ associations, etc. affected.

Inside a process path dependence P. Pearson, relying on the work of a number of researchers, emphasizes the role played by the “mental maps” of actors. On top of institutional mechanisms, the cumulative processes described above determine specific cognitive structures that facilitate the understanding of reality and any form of action. The currently dominant cognitive and normative matrices, to the extent of their participation in the mechanisms of social construction of reality in the subsystem of public action, acquire some stability at least in the “normal” period. They define the legitimate boundaries of public action, assessing certain political-administrative actors and those concerned, the frame of reference, and therefore they function as editors of uncertainty and determine some axes of the evolution of public policies.

This framework of analysis allows us to describe and analyze the connections that exist between cumulative institutional frameworks and established exchanges between the state and those concerned. Patrick Assentefel, in particular, showed how the “state in interaction” is capable of influencing the evolution of public action. By analyzing the programs of various governments aimed at reducing persistent social deficits, he was able to show that the differences that exist between France, Germany and the UK are determined by the nature of formalized exchanges between doctors, for example, and political-administrative actors in each country

In this perspective, usually referred to as path dependence , it can be understood as a new element, connecting the traditional functioning of administrations and systems of action in the interaction of public and private actors. Experiencing dependence on ingrained habits and principles and institutionalized power relations, actors of this subsystem of public action may encounter phenomena that are “incomprehensible” to them. Thus, relying on their attachment to the principles and tools of Keynesian macroeconomic policy, some governments gave inadequate “responses” to the economic crisis of the 1970s.

In the last decade, the development of Russian economic science has been marked by the growing popularity of the institutional paradigm. However, there is one area of economic research by domestic social scientists that is still poorly affected by institutionalism - economic history.

The interpretation of institutions as consciously and/or spontaneously emerging “rules of the game” naturally raises the question of how and why these rules change. Proponents of the new economic history in the spirit of D. North place emphasis on the conscious choice of norms, on institutional design and export of institutions. But there is another side to the problem of institutional variability - institutional inertia, which prevents the selection, design and export/import of institutions. These aspects became the main object of study of the new school of economic history. We are talking about something that arose in the 1980s. theory of path dependence, “dependence on previous development”, the foundations of which were laid by American economists and historians P.A. David and B.B. Arthur.

The ideas of “modern economic history” are widely known abroad, but in Russia, unfortunately, they are known much less well than they deserve. Meanwhile, the problem of path dependence is one of the “Russian” questions that our intellectuals have been thinking about for more than one century. Everyone knows the “unsolvable” problems like “why is Russia not America?” or “why do we want the best, but it turns out as always?” But the essence of the problem of path dependence can be expressed by the question: why, in the competition of institutions, quite often “bad” institutions (norms, standards, etc.) defeat “good” ones? This problem includes an analysis of both the stable Russian identity and the failures of attempts to abandon it in favor of a seemingly more effective system of socio-economic institutions. However, despite the enormous relevance of the path dependence paradigm for Russia, only a few people are still studying it, and even translated literature on this topic is almost absent. Only the Economic Bulletin of Rostov State University systematically publishes publications on this topic.

An interesting field for creative discussion among economists, historians and sociologists was a symposium specifically dedicated to the problem of path dependence, held in the spring of 2005 at the State University Higher School of Economics (see [Scientific... 2005]), as well as a parallel Internet conference.

The discussion of antecedent dependence has gone through a number of stages. It all started with an “amusing story” about a typewriter. Then similar phenomena were discovered in the history of other technological standards. Then the discussion moved from the analysis of technological standards to the analysis of purely institutional rules/norms. Currently, the concept of path dependence has grown to a relatively independent unorthodox theory.

R.M. NUREYEV, Y.V. LATOV
What is path dependence and how do Russian economists study it?

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Posted on http://www.allbest.ru

IN. L. Nekrasov

PathDependenceand its capabilities in explainingsocio-economic evolution of regions

Formulation of the problem. The idea of irreversibility and path dependence is actually quite intuitive, and is certainly not an absolute theoretical innovation. However, before the appearance in the 1980s. Since the pioneering work of Paul David and Brian Arthur, this idea has been on the periphery of the social sciences. Having arisen as an attempt to answer the question: “why in the competition of technologies quite often “bad” technologies defeat “good” ones?” so-called QWERTY-nomics theory quickly evolved in the direction of analyzing institutions. The most important of the new ideas proposed in the development of the original concept of Paul David is that the victory of the initially chosen standards over all other, even more effective, ones can be observed not only in the history of the development of technology, but also in the history of the development of institutions. In the 1990-2000s. A number of fundamental works have appeared developing this new direction. In the words of D. Paffett: “Back-dependence for institutions is likely to be quite similar to back-dependence for technologies, since both are based on the high value of adaptation to some common practice (some technique or rules), so that deviation from it becomes too expensive." institute social dependence development

If when describing the history of technical innovations they write about QWERY effects, then within the framework of the analysis of institutional innovations they talk about path dependence - dependence on previous development. The fact is that when comparing institutions it is much more difficult than when comparing technologies to draw clear conclusions about which institution is better and which is worse. However, in the history of the formation of institutions, one can find a moment of institutional choice (“bifurcation point”), which “programs” development for a long time to come and makes it impossible (or associated with high costs) to abandon a previously chosen institution.

The theory of path dependence is called “recent economic history”, by analogy with the “new economic history” of Robert Fogel and Douglas North. Both of these areas are institutional approaches to socio-economic history. North's supporters emphasize the conscious choice of norms, institutional design, and the export of institutions. Representatives of recent economic history deal with the downside of institutional development - institutional inertia, which prevents the selection, design and export of institutions. However, representatives of both directions of the new institutional economic theory (NIET) are united by the assertion that institutions matter for the results of the functioning of economic systems, and that lasting differences in the functioning of economic systems are formed under the very deep influence of the development of institutions.

In the institutional-evolutionary theory, three types of relationships are distinguished between the content of old and new institutions: path dependence - a deep connection, a strong dependence of new institutions on old ones, path determinacy - a less strong dependence, leaving room for the emergence of completely new institutions, and path indeterminancy, or path independence - the absence of an obvious connection between old and new institutions.

In this case, we are interested in the first type of relationship - path dependence. Institutional change is a complex process because marginal changes may result from changes in rules, informal restrictions, and the manner and effectiveness of enforcing rules and restrictions.

In the history of the development of institutions, the manifestation of dependence on previous development can be traced at two levels: first, at the level of individual institutions (legal, organizational, political), and second, at the level of institutional systems. In discussions about path dependence, the first aspect is most often considered.

The purpose of this work is to discuss the methodological problems of applying the theory of dependence on previous development in the historical analysis of regional development.

Geography and institutions. The importance of geography and institutions in the long-term economic development of countries and regions is now widely discussed in the scientific literature. The thesis that “welfare is largely determined by geographic factors” does not require extensive comment. More complex is the question of the role of institutions in the economic development of countries and regions.

Any institution - economic, social, cultural - is, according to D. North’s definition, the “rules of the game” in society, or, to put it more formally, the restrictive framework created by man that organizes relationships between people.” According to representatives of institutional theory, institutions set the structure of incentives for human interaction - be it in politics, the social sphere or economics. Institutional change determines how societies develop over time and is thus key to understanding historical change. This general concept of institution can be specified and more complete definitions can be given.

The founder of the “young” historical school, G. Schmoller, interpreted the institute as a certain order (ordo) of joint life, which serves specific goals and has the potential for independent evolution. It lays a solid basis for the ordering of social actions over a long period of time, such as property, slavery, serfdom, marriage, guardianship, the market system, the monetary system, and free trade.

E. Ostrom defines institutions as a set of existing rules on the basis of which it is established who has the right to make decisions in relevant areas, what actions are permitted or restricted, what general rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must be provided and what not, and what benefits individuals will receive depending on their actions. All rules contain regulations that prohibit, permit, or require certain actions or decisions. Effective rules are those that are actually used, monitored, and protected by appropriate mechanisms when individuals choose the actions they intend to take.

Back in the early 2000s. O.S. Pchelintsev noted that the issue of institutional support for sustainable development has not only not been resolved, but has not even been raised. Based on what parameters (other than economics) can we talk about successful and unsuccessful regions and their contribution to the development of the country and the cultural diversity of the world? Despite the fact that recently the interest of researchers in this problem has been growing, as noted by N.V. Zubarevich developed approaches and techniques are not universal.

The debate about the reasons for differences in the level of development of countries and regions has a long history. Traditional neoclassical growth theory gives the leading role to the accumulation of labor and capital (population and employment growth, investment) and innovation. S. Kuznets emphasized that the country's economic growth is based on the development of technology and technology and on the necessary changes in the institutional structure and ideology. Representatives of NIET argue that the accumulation of growth factors, education and innovation is growth itself. From their point of view, the factors determining growth are institutions- a system of mechanisms and rules adopted in society that influence incentives for the accumulation of labor and capital, the generation and implementation of new ideas. At the same time, in recent years the point of view has become popular that institutions themselves are endogenous factors. D. Eismoglu, S. Johnson and J. Robinson identify three possible factors that determine institutions: rules established by people, geography and culture. Their work and a number of others demonstrated that the establishment of similar institutions was carried out differently in different geographical regions.

D. Rodrik divides growth factors into “direct” ones ( proximate) and “deep” ( deep). “Direct” factors that have a direct impact on growth are understood as factors of production (accumulation of physical and human capital) and growth in labor productivity. D. Rodrik considers three groups of factors to be deep determinants: foreign trade, institutions (which are partially endogenous) and geography (a completely exogenous factor). Following his logic, it is factors at a “deeper” level that have a decisive influence on economic growth and differentiation in the development of countries.

According to one of the most famous representatives of NIET O. Williamson, at deeper levels (compared to ordinary economic activities) political and economic structures are formed that determine the rules of behavior of individual participants. This means that institutional structures turn out to be the most profound source of long-term development and economic growth.

Thus, the synthesis of geographical and institutional factors in the theory of economic growth seems quite justified.

Path dependence and regional development. In this regard, the theory of path dependence provides ample opportunities in the analysis of the “path effect” in the development of regions, because, according to regionalists, everything that represents the territorial structure of the economy is extremely inert categories, and the dependence of current development on previous development is extremely high . The situation when “history matters” will allow us to go beyond the general formulation of the question that significant differences between the regions of Russia are associated with the nature and characteristics of the historical development of these regions over the past decades.

In modern regional science, regions are understood as multidimensional, integral categories, on the one hand, combining various parameters of system classifications of an object - from economics and law to historical geography and social psychology, and on the other hand, integrating subsystems of different quality and based on the interaction of simultaneously occurring natural, technological and social processes, economic, demographic, environmental, cultural and political factors. In other words, regions are institutional systems, i.e. a system of formal and informal norms and rules governing decision-making, activities and interaction of socio-economic groups and/or their groups in a particular territory. In general, any institutional system develops through “small increments.” Each subsequent increment is based on those institutions that already exist; consequently, the line of institutional development is always set by the entire previous institutional history of society. In this regard, the question arises: what is the sustainability of the development trajectory of a particular region?

This is another aspect of dependence on the trajectory of previous development - the effect of institutional continuity. The significance of the effect of institutional continuity is that it provides scientific justification for the fact of the influence of historical experience, culture and mentality of society on its current and future state. In other words, institutions link the past with the present and the future, so that history becomes a predominantly incremental process (“by small increments.” - N.V.) institutional development, and the functioning of economic systems over long historical periods becomes understandable only as part of an unfolding institutional process.

Thus, the choice that people make (or the direction of institutional change that they begin to achieve) is to a decisive extent predetermined by the entire previous institutional history of society, which is refracted through informal institutions of a cultural nature - traditions, preferences and value systems.

Based on the fact that, except in extreme circumstances, societies are not inclined to dramatically change the trajectory of their institutional development, it is not difficult to solve the “ultimate riddle of economics”: why some regions become richer while others remain poor, unwilling to borrow institutions from their more successful neighbors.

In this regard, it would be appropriate to quote D. North’s reasoning that “history matters not simply because we can learn lessons from the past, but also because the present and future are connected with the past by the continuity of the institutions of society. The choices we make today or tomorrow are shaped by the past. And the past can only be understood by us as a process of institutional development. To integrate the concept of “institutions” into economic theory and economic history is to take an important step in the development of this theory and history.”

Here we come to the problem of sources of dependence of regions on the trajectory of previous development. In reality, there may be many potential reasons for dependence on prior development, ranging from the micro level to the dynamics of the entire system as a whole. Sources of regions’ dependence on the previous trajectory of development and irreversibility include such phenomena as peripherality, cold discomfort, depression, sectoral specialization of the region, etc. Considering that once a chosen institutional trajectory is difficult to leave, regional communities that do not have strong internal sources of development may fall into “ institutional trap,” and exist for a historically long period of time with persistently low socio-economic indicators, despite all the efforts of the state.

Posted on Allbest.ru

...

Rut as a genetic disease

The first doctor to offer the darkest explanation is the economists of the so-called neo-Schumpeterian school. They extended to the economic history of countries the theory of “creative destruction” that the Austro-American economist Joseph Schumpeter formulated for the development of technology. According to this theory, what we usually mistake for development is nothing more than a recombination of elements: their shuffling gives the semblance of new pictures, but they all lie within the framework of one paradigm, which changes extremely rarely. As applied to countries, the paradigm is national identity, which sets strict boundaries for development. The country is making various modernization efforts, the picture seems to be changing, but it will not be possible to jump over one’s head until the paradigm changes.

The main argument of the supporters of the Schumpeterian explanation of the blockage is the story of Japan, one of the few countries that managed to break out of the rut and firmly establish itself in the group of developed countries. In the 1850s, Japan is a dying eastern country struggling to close itself down to quietly fade into oblivion. But Europe does not allow her to do this - not out of some abstract humanism, but out of a completely practical need for Japanese markets. The fleet of European powers forcefully opens the country to trade, and it is forced to begin the Meiji reforms. The results of these reforms were soon felt by our ancestors under Tsushima. In a military-technical battle where such things as long-range artillery and optics mattered most, an unremarkable eastern country smashed the great maritime power of the Russian Empire to smithereens.

“For 500 years we lived in an empire, and now few people can list three or four national characteristics that constitute the Russians as a nation.”

Then there was the Second World War, which, let me remind you, ended not on May 8, or even on May 9, 1945, but on September 2. For four months the whole world was at war with one country - Japan. And it took an atomic bomb for her to capitulate. And then the Japanese economic miracle of the 1960s happened. Over the course of 100 years, the country went through the entire Madison table and confidently moved from a low development trajectory to a high one. Neo-Schumpeterians argue that in order to make this leap, the country sacrificed its paradigm - national identity. The Japanese are no longer Japanese. There are indeed signs of this. For example, in Japan for ten years now the issue of abandoning the national language in office work and switching to English has been seriously discussed (because the Latin alphabet is much more convenient for a computer than hieroglyphs). At the same time, the suicide rate in Japan is extremely high - that is, the country as a whole seems to be quite successful, but something is still wrong. Neo-Schumpeterians explain it this way: to become a successful country, you need to abandon what institutional economists call supra-constitutional rules. These are informal institutions of the highest order, higher than the constitution or any other formal institution. It is they who determine the specifics of the country’s national values, and changing them is a monstrously difficult task that can result in very traumatic consequences.

But it seems to me that the neo-Schumpeterian explanation of blocking in the case of Russia does not work simply because a nation with its own supra-constitutional values has not been formed in Russia. We lived in an empire for 500 years, and now few people can list, without anyone arguing with them, three or four national features that constitute Russians as a nation. This seems to be not bad, because the most pessimistic forecast for our country turns out to be irrelevant, but what in this case is the reason for the blocking?

Rut as a chronic disease

The second doctor who at our consultation gives the patient, albeit illusory, but still hope for a cure, are economists who adhere to the Northian point of view on blocking. This version, which now dominates economic thought, is based on the theory of institutional change that won Douglas North the Nobel Prize in 1993. Like the theory of “creative destruction,” it grew out of observations of the development of technology, and more specifically, from Paul David’s article “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” published in the mid-1980s.

If you look at your computer keyboard, you will see the letters QWERTY in the top left corner. Do you know where this combination came from? When typewriter inventor Christopher Scholes perfected the keyboard layout in the 1870s, he placed the letters QWERTYUIOP in the top row so that salespeople could effectively emboss the device's name—TYPE WRITER—to impress customers. Many years have passed since then, the Remington company, which was the first to use the invention in mass production, is long gone, and there are problems with the typewriters themselves, but the name remains, and with it the corresponding layout. This is despite the fact that the arrangement of letters on a QWERTY keyboard is far from optimal; there are much more ergonomic layouts like the “Dvorak keyboard”. But no one is going to change it - everyone is too used to it.

Another example is the width of the railway track. Technologists have come to the joyful conclusion that the width of the railway track in Russia is correct and safer. Does it follow from this that the whole world will rebuild its railways according to the Russian model? No. Rather, Russia will build roads with a narrow, irregular surface, so as not to waste time and money on replacing carriage wheels in Brest. This is also a manifestation of the “QWERTY effect”, when an erroneous technical solution is fixed because everyone is used to it.

“We can observe not only the track along which Russia is moving, but even the point at which the mistake of the initial institutional choice was made - the 14th–15th centuries, when the institutions of autocracy and serfdom began to emerge.”

Douglas North decided to apply this idea more broadly - to development in general. Using the concept of institutions instead of technical solutions, he suggested that countries that are trying in vain to reach a high development trajectory have made mistakes in the initial institutional choice. He proved this using the examples of England and Spain. By the 16th century, these countries were on absolutely equal starting positions. Both were approximately equal in population and employment structure, and both carried out foreign policy expansion. Any macroeconomist would say that they will be at similar levels in a hundred years and in three hundred. But already in the 19th century, England, without any reservations, was the main world power, and Spain was one of the most backward countries in Europe. What's the matter?

North testified that what happened was an accident. It just so happened that in the 16th century in England the issue of tax distribution fell within the competence of parliament, and in Spain - the king. As a result, Spain, which took much more wealth from the colonies than England, very quickly squandered its treasures - because kings love wars and leaky budgets. There is no point in investing in the economy if the king can confiscate those investments at any time. In England, on the contrary, conditions for accumulation and investment have developed. Realization of the mistake comes, by historical standards, quite quickly. However, on the wrong path, so many institutions and interests are growing, working against fundamental changes, that Spain has been moving through revolutions and civil wars for two hundred years, trying to jump out of the rut it fell into, but it is not yet very clear whether it succeeded or not.

How applicable is the idea of random error in initial institutional choice to Russia? In principle, of course, it is applicable. Many researchers of Russian history argue that, firstly, in Russia the effect of returning to the rut is in effect. Nikolai Berdyaev very accurately described the situation in 1917, when from February to October all possible parties and ideas paraded before the surprised Russian gaze. What did the Russian people choose? Yes, the same as it was before February. A similar picture - in 1613, a bankrupt state was restored by the forces of society and the people's militia. But what next? Restoration of autocracy and strengthening of serfdom.

Thus, we can observe not only the track along which Russia is moving, but even the point at which the mistake of the initial institutional choice was made - the 14th–15th centuries, when the institutions of autocracy and serfdom began to emerge. As Georgy Fedotov quite rightly wrote, these phenomena are not identical to absolutism and feudal dependence, this is a unique Russian solution. And the same Fedotov came up with a formula: Russia has come up with a way to achieve progress without expanding freedom. In economics this has found a completely paradoxical expression. Since in Russia it was not land that was always in short supply, but people, then, in theory, the price of a person should have been constantly rising. But another solution was found: if you force a scarce person to the land, you get cheap labor. At the same time, you get a state that cannot withdraw from the economy, a state that is autocratic and not just an absolute monarchy. And in a sense, the consequences of this mistake in the initial institutional choice are still felt: our traditional armed forces are, in essence, serfdom, with its own versions of corvee and quitrent. And the relations between guest workers and employers are, in principle, reminiscent of serfdom. Of course, now the “serf” sector does not play such a huge role in the economy as in the 17th, 18th or mid-20th centuries, but several million people are employed in it.

Thus, the Northian diagnosis describes the Russian situation much more accurately than the neo-Schumpeterian one. And the forecast in this case, of course, is more optimistic, since the blockage is caused not by the supra-constitutional values that underlie society, but by erroneously chosen institutions. But this diagnosis, although it does not imply that the patient is incurable, does not promise a simple and quick cure either. What other options does Russia have?

Ruts like measles in adulthood

The third doctor who claims that an adult patient simply suffers from a childhood illness very hard is the brilliant Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. As Theodor Chanin wittily noted, developing countries are countries that are not developing. De Soto was precisely trying to show why they are not developing. The novelty of his approach is that he looked at the problem not from within the developed world, but from the outside. It turned out that all the problems that are now observed in developing countries also existed in today's developed countries - just much earlier. In England in the 17th century, cities tried to introduce an institution, which in Russian I would call “propiska,” - this is how they fought against the competition of visitors. At the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries, property rights were practically not recognized in the United States, the situation was much worse than, for example, in modern Russia, and now this is one of the supra-constitutional American values, which was painfully born in an endless series of lawsuits and state legislative decisions . But current generations in developed countries have already forgotten how these problems were solved in their time, and therefore the solutions they offer to developing countries often do not work.

What are the causes of childhood diseases in adult countries? According to de Soto, the whole point is the gap between formal and informal institutions, behind which there is a struggle of dominant groups seeking to preserve a status quo that is beneficial for themselves. There are several thriving centers that live within the bounds of the law and access to which is restricted by dominant groups. And the rest of the country lives according to informal rules, which conflict with the laws and are supported by influence groups such as the mafia. A cure for this disease is possible if a compromise is found between formal and informal institutions, involving the maximum number of groups - and in particular the mafia. To do this, first of all, you need to identify the most effective informal institutions. For example, to strengthen the institution of property in Indonesia, de Soto proposed the following: the country's rice fields were not fenced in any way, but while walking in Bali, he noticed that every time he crossed the boundaries of a farm, he heard a new dog barking. “Listen to the dogs, Mr. Minister,” said a Peruvian economist during a seminar in Jakarta. As for compromise, one of the most effective ways de Soto considers various types of amnesties that allow informal communities to be legalized.

“Some features of Peronism are already present in Russia, but at the core, I repeat, is the reluctance of the elites to change the trajectory, their hope that the curve will take out. But the curve doesn’t take us out.”

In the case of Russia, the problem with the Sotian - the most optimistic - theory is that de Soto considers primarily countries with a rich traditional layer, where customs work well. In Russia, unfortunately, this is bad.

It is clear that getting out of a rut is very difficult. But the theory of institutional change provides food for thought in terms of people's behavior and attitudes. On the one hand, it is obvious that the stagnation and reactionary political regime lights a revolutionary fire in souls. But there is no need to wish for revolution! An analysis of institutional changes shows that this is the worst of all options for getting out of a rut, and the grandchildren will have to deal with the delights associated with the consequences of revolutions. To students who are, in principle, inclined to revolutionary thinking (however, less so in Russia than in other countries), I repeat the phrase of Stanislav Jerzy Lec: “Well, let’s say you hit a wall with your head. And what will you do in the next cell?” A wonderful metaphor for revolution. On the other hand, do not trust evolution - do not assume that the curve itself will take you out. Where Russia's current curve will take it is not difficult to predict. There is such a country - Argentina. In the first half of the 20th century, in terms of GDP per capita, it was on par with the United States and confidently remained in the top ten countries in the world, but now the curve has taken it far from the top ten. Russia is now repeating this trajectory quite accurately.

What happened to Argentina? The country grew on traditional resources - grain and meat. During the Great Depression, when Roosevelt sharply changed course in the United States, the Argentine elites decided that they would not change anything, because people will always need grain and meat (our elites think that people will always burn oil and gas). Indeed, people still eat Argentinean meat with pleasure, but it turned out that this resource alone does not allow Argentina to be the leading country in the world. When Argentina realized this, convulsions began: the country went through the populist dictatorship of Perón, which was accompanied by political terror and human casualties. Some features of Peronism are already present in Russia, but at the core, I repeat, is the reluctance of the elites to change the trajectory, their hope that the curve will take them out. But the curve does not take out.

12. The role of Path Dependence, QWERTY effects in public administration: problem or opportunity.

“Path dependence” (dependence on previous development) is a concept that initiates the placement of new ontological accents in the social sciences. Its formation occurs at a time when social transformations have reached unprecedented uncertainty in terms of reflecting the dynamics of these changes in the social sciences. In this regard, any social problem, which has as its final basis the problem of social time, during the transition period reveals itself from the point of view of the historicity of man and society. For Russia, with its “unpredictable”, sometimes deliberately falsified past, path dependence is endowed with significant semantic and explicative potential, opening up new opportunities for integrating social memory into a single integrity. A comparative analysis of the conceptualization of path dependence in the domestic and Western traditions reveals specific features of the opposition to time inherent in different cultures.

In its most general form, it comes down to a statement of the “meaning” of the past for the present and future, and it sounds trivial. The problem is to give it analytical efficiency. Here it may be useful to refer to the concept of “pathdependence”, which is actively discussed within the framework of modern economic theory, i.e. depending on previous development.

It is far from speculative “historicism”, since it is built to explain a very specific phenomenon - cases of victory of such technical standards that are not the best, most efficient and economical. This phenomenon cannot be explained within the framework of neoclassical economic theory, according to which market competitive mechanisms should lead to the selection of the most effective technical solutions. The answer of the pathdependence theory is that the initial choice is made in conditions where the advantages of one or another option are not obvious and can be determined by random or “non-economic” factors. And then mechanisms begin to work - technical interdependence, increasing returns to scale, durability of capital equipment - which make it preferable (more profitable) for economic agents to use an established standard rather than try to introduce another, albeit technically more advanced one. Choices made in the past under certain conditions predetermine the choices made today when those conditions no longer exist. This is a dependence on previous development.

A generalization of the concept of pathdependence is associated with its development within the framework of neo-institutional economic theory, first in explaining why, over a long period of time, some countries demonstrate successful economic development, while others just as persistently lag behind. The answer was found in the differences in institutions that once established themselves in countries that had approximately the same starting opportunities for economic growth. Further analysis showed that pathdependence mechanisms also operate in the history of institutions—the coordination effect, network effects, and the durability of social capital. Pathdependence in the institutional sphere is similar to pathdependence in technology—both are based on the value of endorsing a general practice (in technique or rules) that is costly to change.

The problem of “institutional traps” has attracted close attention in the last ten years by economists and scientists studying economic processes in countries with economies in transition.

In the English-language literature, the “institutional trap” is most often used not as an “institutional trap”, but as a lock-in effect: according to North, this means that once a decision is made it is difficult to reverse (2). In terms of neo-institutional theory, “an institutional trap is an ineffective stable norm (ineffective institution) that is self-sustaining” (3). Its stability means that if an ineffective norm prevailed in the system, then after a strong disturbance the system can fall into an “institutional trap”, and then it will remain there even if the external influence is removed.

As D. North notes, “incremental changes in the technological sphere, once taking a certain direction, can lead to the victory of one technological solution over others, even when the first technological direction ultimately turns out to be less effective compared to the rejected alternative” (3 ).

A textbook example of such ineffective technological development was the problem of the QWERTY effect, outlined in the work of P. David (1) and further developed in the works of V. M. Polterovich (3) in relation to institutions and defined as an institutional trap.

Moreover, in this case, discussions about the degree of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the technology used are relegated to the background, since scientific interest is the very possibility of the existence of QWERTY effects, named by analogy with the above example, and the search for solutions to problems associated with them.

From the point of view of transaction cost theory, the emergence of the QWERTY effect is explained by at least two reasons:

1. Inconsistency of a number of interests of various groups of economic agents. The emergence of the QWERTY effect is the result of a partial mismatch between the interests of producers and consumers. The goal of the manufacturers is to sell more quickly and more; to achieve this, the present arrangement of letters on the keyboard was adopted. The goal of consumers is 1) to improve the quality of document execution (in printed form it is more presentable and readable than in handwritten form) and 2) which appeared somewhat later - to increase typing speed. Taking into account the different compatibility of goals (neutrality, compatibility, incompatibility and the degree of effect from their interaction - neutral, increasing and decreasing), the goals of producers (to sell more) and consumers (to improve the quality of document execution) can be considered compatible. However, subsequently, the combination of the number of sales and speeding up typing by changing the arrangement of letters on the keyboard are clearly incompatible goals. In this case, the result of whether we fall into a trap or not depends on the effect obtained from the overlap of targets. If buyers didn't have the first goal, it might encourage manufacturers to find faster letter layouts. However, the duality of consumer goals stimulated the initial demand and expansion of production of QWERTY-efficient products, and subsequently economies of scale played a role.

Based on the above, it follows that the QWERTY effect is one of the products and, at the same time, a fiasco of supply-side economics, when the interests of producers prevail over the tastes and preferences of consumers.

Thus, a trap was formed, the exit from which was associated with high costs (retraining of typists already working on typewriters, costs of resistance and costs of retraining, repurposing of production to produce typewriters with a new keyboard, as well as the costs of changing consumer opinions about the insufficient efficiency of these products ).

2. Inconsistency between short-term and long-term interests. In this case, such inconsistency is associated with the concept of “efficiency” and is largely determined by incomplete information. Since economic agents have incomplete information, in particular about the future level of technology development, and sometimes due to limited information in other areas of society (due to the physical and mental abilities of a person), it is unlawful to talk about the effectiveness of certain technologies, methods of organization, we can talk only about comparative effectiveness at the present stage of development.

Based on these two reasons, it is possible to explain the existence of a number of mutually incompatible, relatively ineffective standards: electricity transmission, different railway gauges, diversified traffic on roads, etc.

9. The role of bureaucracy in modernization processes. Is bureaucracy a “monster” or a “rational machine”?

Bureaucracy- this is a social stratum of professional managers included in an organizational structure characterized by a clear hierarchy, “vertical” information flows, formalized methods of decision-making, and a claim to a special status in society.

Bureaucracy is also understood as a closed layer of senior officials, opposing themselves to society, occupying a privileged position in it, specializing in management, monopolizing power functions in society in order to realize their corporate interests.

The term “bureaucracy” is used not only to designate a specific social group, but also a system of organizations created by public authorities in order to maximize their functions, as well as institutions and departments included in the ramified structure of the executive branch.

The objects of analysis when studying bureaucracy are:

contradictions that arise during the implementation of management functions;

management as a labor process;

interests of social groups participating in bureaucratic relations.

Weber's theory of bureaucracy

The appearance of the term “bureaucracy” is associated with the name of the French economist Vincent de Gournay, who introduced it in 1745 to designate the executive branch. This term came into scientific circulation thanks to the German sociologist, economist, and historian Max Weber (1864-1920), author of the most complete and comprehensive sociological study of the phenomenon of bureaucracy.

Weber proposed the following principles for the bureaucratic concept of organizational structure:

hierarchical structure of the organization;

hierarchy of orders built on legal authority;

subordination of a subordinate employee to a superior one and responsibility not only for one’s own actions, but also for the actions of subordinates;

specialization and division of labor by function;

a clear system of procedures and rules that ensures the uniformity of production processes;

a system of promotion and tenure based on skills and experience and measured by standards;

orientation of the communication system both within the organization and outside it based on written rules.

Weber used the term “bureaucracy” to designate a rational organization, the regulations and rules of which create the foundation for effective work and make it possible to combat favoritism. He considered bureaucracy as a kind of ideal image, the most effective tool for managing social structures and individual structural units.

According to Weber, the strictly formalized nature of bureaucratic relations, the clarity of the distribution of role functions, and the personal interest of bureaucrats in achieving the goals of the organization lead to the adoption of timely and qualified decisions based on carefully selected and verified information.

Bureaucracy as a rational management machine is characterized by:

strict responsibility for each area of work:

coordination to achieve organizational goals;

optimal operation of impersonal rules;

clear hierarchical dependence.

During the transition period (from the aggregate of officials to the bureaucracy), these measures should be combined with the creation of motivation for officials in the implementation of the modernization project. The set of mechanisms is classic - high wages and a social package for those officials on whom the advancement of certain blocks of the modernization project depends.

However, an inevitable question arises here: what, exactly, is meant by a modernization project in modern Russia? What kind of bureaucracy Russian society needs will ultimately depend on the essential characteristics of a given project.

Modernization project and prospects for bureaucracy

A modernization project, regardless of its content, is a special case of an innovation project, that is, a project of “purposeful change or creation of a new technical or socio-economic system.” The modernization project is characterized by the highest level of scientific and technical significance, surpassing in this indicator such types of projects as innovative, advanced and pioneering innovative

In modern Russia, the concept of “modernization project” has become quite widely used by experts since the beginning of the 21st century: back in 2001, at the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Science Research (Gorbachev Foundation), a research group led by Doctor of Philosophy V. Tolstykh developed "Modernization project for Russia." In our opinion, its authors were relatively free from ideological “spells”, and therefore they managed to make a number of intellectual breakthroughs. Of course, ideology was present in the project (the following quote is appropriate in this case: “The social democratic position regarding the dichotomy of “capitalism-socialism” occupies an important place in the formation of the Russian modernization project [Modernization Challenge... 2001], but its authors believed that the main thing is the modernization processes in the country, and not the formation of an ideological superstructure over them.

10. Basic provisions of the New Public Management.

Fundamentals of Public Administration

Public administration is the process of regulating relations within a state through the distribution of spheres of influence between the main territorial levels and branches of government. Public administration is based on state interest aimed at protecting the integrity of the state, its key institutions, and supporting the level and quality of life of its citizens. Among the priority areas in the implementation of public (state) interest is the need to perform several functions: protective (defense), social, legal, economic, political and arbitration.

State power extends to objects located both within the territory of the state itself and beyond its borders.

Main signs state authorities are:

o integrity;

o indivisibility;

o sovereignty.

Public administration implements the following functions.

1. Institutional - through the approval of the socio-economic, political, civil institutions necessary to resolve government issues for the distribution of power.

2. Regulatory - through a system of norms and laws that establish general rules governing the behavior of subjects.

3. Goal-setting - through the development and selection of priority directions for the socio-economic and political development of the country; implementation of programs supported by the majority of the population.

4. Functional - through the development and implementation of actions aimed at supporting the entire economic infrastructure of the state in the person of its leading industries.

5. Ideological - through the formation of a national idea designed to consolidate society within the borders of the state.

Basic principles formation of the public administration system are as follows:

o separation of powers;

o complementarity;

o subsidiarity;

o sovereignty;

o democracy;

o homogeneity.

Principle separation of powers involves the division of individual state power into three spheres: executive; legislative; judicial This should serve as a condition for effective control over the activities of the state apparatus.

Principle complementarity characterized by an orientation toward continuity in the power structure. It assumes an even distribution of power functions across the entire vertical of control at all territorial levels.

Principle subsidiarity involves a procedure for the distribution (and redistribution) of powers between managerial levels of government, i.e. the sequence of execution of power by management bodies and the procedure for distributing the responsibilities of these bodies to the population. The transfer of powers to a higher level of management in accordance with this principle can be carried out only if it is impossible to execute them at a lower level. The principle of subsidiarity has two dimensions: vertical and horizontal.

Vertical includes the distribution of power between levels of government in the direction from local to state authorities.

The horizontal dimension covers the procedure for distributing powers between branches of government at the federal, regional and local levels.

In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, power should be distributed among government structures mainly in connection with reducing the distance between the population and the government that represents it.

Principle sovereignty presupposes the presence of actual independence as an essential feature of the state. State sovereignty means “the supremacy and independence of power subject to law, the monopoly of coercion within the powers of the state, and the independence of the state within the international order.” Being an attributive feature of a state, sovereignty presupposes a set of special institutions that ensure the status of an independent subject of international relations.

Principle democracy directs the population to the need for active participation: in decision-making of state and municipal importance; election of state and municipal authorities; development of territorial development programs based on mastering the mechanisms of public involvement in the current affairs of the region or municipality; allocation of areas of authority to public associations organized in the territories.

Principle homogeneity determines the advantages of federal law over regional law.

The essence of the principle of homogeneity is manifested in accordance with the subordination of regional legislation to federal legislation, which ensures the unity of the state and the general subordination of all institutions of power to the Basic Law (the Constitution of the Russian Federation).